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ABSTRACT
ADVANCING THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION
FEBRUARY 2003
ETHAN R COLTON, BA, BOWDOIN COLLEGE
M A
,
TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
What does it mean to say that one event is a cause of another? The simplest
counterfactual analyses identify causation with one of two counterfactual-dependence
relations: (1) if event c had not occurred, then (distinct) event e would not have occurred,
(2) if c had not occurred, e’s probability would have been lower. These analyses enjoy
some success. For the first: the dart-throw caused the balloon-pop, because if the throw
had not occurred, the pop would not have occurred. For the second: suppose two
radioactive samples, A and B, are introduced into a room containing a Geiger counter,
and the counter clicks once due to an emission from an A-atom, then the introduction of
A is a cause of the click, the click might have occurred without the A-introduction (a B-
atom might have emitted), but we can say at least that without the A-introduction, the
probability of the click would have been lower.
Ultimately, however, these analyses fail, for two clear reasons. Preemption: add to
the dart scene that Lucy would have thrown her dart if I had refrained—then although my
throw caused the pop, the pop is not dependent on my throw. Failedpotential causes:
vi
the probability of the click would have been lower without the B-introduction, but the B-
introduction did not actually succeed in causing of the click.
I defend the two simple analyses against various other objections; I then try to home in
on the precise nature of their genuine problems, I examine almost all the attempts to date
to improve upon the simple analyses, and finally I propose two new analyses. One of my
analyses is deterministic, the other is confined to worlds that are purely indeterministic.
Both analyses take causation to be primarily a matter of counterfactual dependence in the
circumstances, holding certain features of the world fixed, effects and their probabilities
do indeed depend (almost exclusively) on their causes (or their direct causes).
My discussion of background issues—counterfactual semantics, objective chance,
events—includes arguments for substantial simplifications of David Lewis’s theory of
events.
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GLOSSARY
The special terminology one might need to reference is defined here. It is also defined
in the main text, and the definitions are there attributed, when necessary. In this glossary,
lower-case variables range over events unless otherwise indicated
backtracking counterfactual: a counterfactual conditional that says how the past would
have been different had the present been different
b is causally dependent on a b is counterfactually dependent on a, and a and b are
distinct
b is counterfactually dependent on a. were a to occur, b would occur, and were a not to
occur, b would not occur
Dependence Thesis, if occurrent e is counterfactually dependent on distinct, occurrent c,
then c is a cause of e
Deterministic Simple Analysis (DSA): c is a cause of e if, and only if, they occur, they are
distinct, and e is counterfactually dependent on c
Event proposition, any result of Boolean complications of simple event propositions
Failure Thesis: all clear cases of preemption involve a backup sequence that, thanks to
the preempting cause, does not completely come off
e isflexible: it is possible (logically, metaphysically) that e occurs differently
(with respect to time, place, manner)
P iffQ: P if, and only if, Q
occurrent event: an event that actually occurs, same as “actual event”
a is a part of b at world w: a and b occur at w and none of a’s region is outside V s
Probabilistic Simple Analysis (PSA): c is a cause of e if, and only if, they occur, they are
distinct, and e is probabilistically dependent on c
b is probabilistically dependent on a: for some range R of chances, (i) were a to occur,
the chance of b at (the end of) a’s time would be
within R, and (ii) were a not to occur, the chance
of b at that same time would be below R
xii
simple event proposition, any proposition that a certain event occurs or that a certain
event does not occur
e is strict iff e is inflexible in every respect (time, place, manner)
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Question
It seems obvious that some events cause other events: Lincoln’s death was caused by
a shooting, the chirping of my clock causes me to wake up, storms cause floods. It is a
trivial fact that throughout our personal and professional lives, we assume events have
causes and effects, and we devote often considerable energy to finding out what they are,
were, or will be. But what is this ‘causation’’^ How could we answer a skeptic who,
despite being very observant, still doubts there is causation? He says, “I see shootings
followed by deaths, alarms followed by wakings, storms followed by floods, and I
observe the detailed patterns of events in and around these.
.
yet I see nothing more
—
what is the ‘causation’ you claim exists?”
It may be tempting to identify causation with something the skeptic observes: perhaps
wherever there is causation in the actual world there is some special physical relation
—
something like, for example, a “flow of energy” from cause to effect (Fair 1979). One
apparent problem with this answer is that some causal structures do not involve anything
like a flow of energy from cause to effect: cutting the brake cable on someone’s car can
be among the causes of a car crash; but the cutting just removes a potential preventer of
the crash, it does not cause the crash by transferring energy to it (Chapter 3). This
particular causal structure aside, we can, it seems, imagine causation lacking any special
physical relation that might plausibly hold in actual cases of causation: when we imagine
that a magic spell is cast or a pin is stuck in a voodoo doll, it does not seem we are
positing anything like a flow of energy from cause to effect—on the contrary, the
1
causation is magical precisely because of the lack of any such physical connection. The
skeptic may ask, “What do all these cases of causation have in common such that you
want to count them cases of causation? Again, I see the events, but what is the
causation ? He is asking us what we mean when we say one event was a cause of
another, such that all and only cases of event causation, be they actual or merely possible,
fit the answer. This is the question I am pursuing. It is the search for a broadly
applicable definition, or “analysis,” of causation.
Some philosophers (e g., Nancy Cartwright (1979)) ask what it means to say that a
certain kind of thing causes another kind of thing—e g., smoking causes heart disease,
falls cause injuries. I am pursuing only the question of what it means to say that a
particular event caused, or was a cause of, another particular event—e g., Jim’s fall on
Tuesday caused the tearing of that ligament.
And some philosophers (e g., D. H. Mellor (1995)) ask what it means to say that one
fact caused another fact. My concern in this dissertation is only with events.
Sometimes we say that the open flame was a cause of the fire, or caused the fire, or
was the cause of the fire. I am pursuing analyses that are fit for the first two locutions but
not the third (and best fit for the first, perhaps). Obviously, events tend to have more
causes than just one, contrary to what is suggested by “the cause.” In practice, we choose
one cause among many as “the cause.” What we choose can shift, depending on our
epistemic attitudes: Suppose an open flame is very close to some properly installed
carpet, the carpet catches fire and the house burns down. Someone who takes carpeting
in a house to be normal and appropriate but open flames abnormal and inappropriate
(most of us) will likely count the open flame as the cause of the house fire and reject the
2
presence of carpeting as the cause; but one who takes carpeting in a house to be abnormal
and inappropriate but open flames normal and appropriate will likely count the presence
of carpeting as the cause. Since what is the cause can shift, what is the cause in a given
case must be relative to something that determines the choice. What
,
I do not know, but
just for the sake of illustration, here is a very rough proposal: the flame was the cause
relative to a “background circumstance” that includes the carpeting but excludes the
flame, and the carpeting was the cause relative to a “background circumstance” that
includes the flame but excludes the carpeting. It would be interesting to pin down how
the cause gets chosen, but it is not my aim here, I am pursuing an inclusive causal
relation, one that will readily count both the flame and the presence of carpeting as causes
of the house fire.
1.2 The Counterfactual Approach
A counterfactual conditional is a sentence about how things would, or might, be if
such-and-such were the case. Its content is best expressed in the subjunctive: “If P were
so, Q would be,” or “If P were so, Q might be”—where P (the “antecedent”) is the such-
and-such and Q (the “consequent”) is how things would (might) be. For example, “If
Bush were not President, then Gore might be President”; “Had I won the raffle, I would
have thrown a party .” Statements of this sort, when P is about the past or the present, are
typically made with the presumption that P is not actually so. The speaker wants the
audience to consider something contrary to actual fact—hence the name “counterfactual.”
Nevertheless, of course, in a given case it may be that P is true, whether the speaker
knows it or not, and if it is, the conditional may still be sensible and true or false. “Were
it the case that Tolstoy wrote a novel called War and Peace , then it would be that others
3
have read it”—that is true, as is its antecedent. And if in fact I did win the
aforementioned raffle, then the claim that I would have thrown a party had I won is true
or false depending on whether I threw a party With respect to afuture P, there is no
typical presumption by the speaker that P is false, rather, she may just take it to be
somewhat open whether P is true (“If I were to bring dessert, he might be insulted”, “If
you were to resign, another would step in”)—and indeed P may be true. So, calling these
conditionals counterfactual is a bit misleading. But it is customary among
philosophers, so I will stick with it. I will also follow the practice of calling them
“counterfactuals,” for short.
The counterfactual approach to analyzing event causation is to analyze it primarily in
terms of counterfactuals. The starting intuition is that to say event c was a cause of event
e is just to say that e would not have occurred without c: more carefully, c is a cause of e
if, and only if, had it been that c did not occur, it would have been that e did not occur
(for distinct, occurrent events c and e).
!
If the match-strike hadn’t occurred, the fire
wouldn’t have occurred, if the lightning hadn’t occurred, the thunder wouldn’t have
occurred, if the match strike hadn’t occurred, the thunder still would have (the analysis
rightly says that the match strike was not a cause of the thunder). For many simple and
common cases of causation, or a lack of causation, this simple analysis holds up fine.
1 By “distinct” in this context writers tend to mean the events necessarily do not overlap—i.e.. they are
essentially distinct. We can stay agnostic on this, though for clarity I will settle on essential distinctness by
the time we reach Chapter 3. An occurrent event is an event that actually occurs. It is also known as an
“actual ev ent.” My preference for “occurrent” stems from my adopted ontology of events (described in
Chapter 2), according to which events are properties and the occurrence of an event is the instantiation of a
property. Many philosophers allow that properties actually exist whether or not they are actually
instantiated; in this case, “actual property” need not mean instantiated property. But I want “actual event”
to mean occurrent event. It is most explicit just to say “occurrent event.
Throughout the dissertation, I use lower-case italic letters for event variables but also for event names.
It should be clear from the context whether a given letter is a name or a variable.
4
This point will be pressed in Chapter 3 (though ultimately we will see that this simple
analysis is inadequate).
One of the things that makes the approach attractive is how successful this simple
analysis is. But what recommends it most, I think, is the plausibility of the view that the
analysans is, without exception, sufficient for causation: if event e would not have
occurred without event c, then c is a cause of e (for distinct, occurrent c and e).
Counterfactual analyses of causation almost always accept this Dependence Thesis, I
think of it as the cornerstone of the counterfactual approach. I subscribe to it myself. (I
defend it at points in Chapter 4.)
This is a good place to introduce a central definition from David Lewis (1973b, pp.
164-6): Event b is counterfactually dependent on event a if, and only if, (i) were a to
occur, b would occur, and (ii) were a not to occur, b would not occur. I think (with
Lewis) that for any events a and b that occur, it follows that (i) holds, and the question of
their dependence thus reduces to whether (ii) holds. Given this, the simple analysis says
that, among distinct, occurrent events, causation is counterfactual dependence. The
Dependence Thesis is that counterfactual dependence between distinct, occurrent events
is sufficient for causation.
The counterfactual approach has accelerated in popularity recently, beginning with
the analyses of Ardon Lyon (1967) and especially Lewis (1973b). This appears to be
the result of the growing sense that counterfactual s can be well understood, can be true
or false, and can be given precise formal semantic analysis. We will get a taste of this
in Chapter 2.
5
Could the above simple analysis satisfy my skeptic? “How,” he asks, “do you know
that the flood would not have occurred without the storm? I didn’t observe that. Or did
something happen at the scene that implies it?” Nothing happened there that alone
implied the counterfactual. We did not observe anything the skeptic didn’t. But we have
a general knowledge of how the world works—of the laws of nature—and we know
that without the storm, things would have evolved in such a way that the rivers and
streams would have been at normal levels and there would have been no flood. It is the
combination of the situation supposed and the laws that govern that general region that
determines what counterfactual s are true (Lewis 1973a). Wherever, if anywhere, the
laws “are,” they are not fully within the causal scene in question. The observant skeptic
just failed to pull in his knowledge of the ways of the world. 2
Naturally the skeptic wants some information about how the laws and the relevant
situation imply counterfactuals. And he may complain now that the mystery of causation
has just become the mystery of laws: “I see no laws, either!” As to the first, some
information is provided in Chapter 2. As to the second, it should be pointed out that the
question of what are laws of nature is one that exists anyway, so that ifwe can reduce the
question of what is causation to the (very difficult) question of what laws are, progress
has been made by way of a reduction of questions.
2
1 am, of course, not talking about “causal laws,” law s of the form “every F causes a G.” If the
counterfactual were true in virtue only of causal laws, the counterfactual approach to causation would be
circular. I take it that causal laws, like causal facts and counterfactuals, are true in virtue of the nearby
pattern of events and the non-causal laws. (I try to remain otherwise neutral on the nature of non-causal
laws.)
6
There are many approaches to analyzing event causation (I shall not survey them
here.
3
) I need not claim that the counterfactual approach is the best 1 find it promising
for the reasons mentioned above. Other approaches are also promising
1.3 The Chapters in Brief
Chapter 2 explains some important background assumptions that I make regarding
counterfactuals, events, and the objective chances of events; on the subject of events, I
argue for a specific simplification of Lewis’s (1986b) theory of events. Chapter 3
examines apparent problems for the counterfactual approach, with the goal of homing in
on the definite ones, the ones that most need solving. Chapter 4 evaluates contemporary
analyses, with a focus on how well they address those definite problems.
Suppose an atom is bombarded with high-energy particles and the chance of its
nucleus emitting a particle within the next second thereby increases from
. 1 to . 9
,
and
then the emission occurs. It seems the bombardment should count as a cause of the
emission. This is an example of indeterministic causation: the effect is never determined
to occur (its chance is never 1). I am interested in both deterministic and indeterministic
causation in this dissertation.
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Here is a snapshot of the landscape: There are many views (e g., J. L. Mackie 1965) that take causation to
be primarily a matter of instantiating a lawful regularity (some of those views are probabilistic, a matter of
one event being, by law, more probable thanks to the other); this is made precise in various ways. Some
views take causation to be primarily the instantiation of one of a special class of laws (e g., Armstrong
1997). Some views are agent-centered, so that a cause is something some idealized agent could use to
bring about the effect, or make it more probable (e g., Menzies and Price 1993). Some define causation in
terms of some basic causal relation identified with an actual physical relation and disregard non-actual
possible worlds (e g., Fair 1979). Some take causation to be a theoretical concept, in the sense (Lewis
1970) that the causal relation is by definition whatever relation plays a certain (non-causal) role, this player
being one thing in some worlds but perhaps different things in other worlds (e g., Tooley 1987). Often
these views contain many elements, including some counterfactual conditionals, spatiotemporal constraints
or epistemic components. (It should also be noted that there are those w ho have thought there is no such
thing as causation (e g., Russell 1912-13), or that causation is primarily an epistemic phenomenon (Hume
7
To date, counterfactual analyses divide into those restricted to deterministic worlds
and those meant to handle both deterministic and indeterministic worlds. I will be
examining both the restricted and the broad analyses. A source of this division seems to
be the failure of the above simple analysis to handle simple cases of indeterministic
causation: notice that if the bombardment hadn’t occurred, the emission might have
occurred anyway. As we will see in Chapter 3, the broad analyses usually take a different
intuition as their starting point.
In Chapter 5 I propose my own deterministic counterfactual analysis. I do not have a
broad analysis to offer. However, in Chapter 6 I offer an analysis suited to worlds that
are purely indeterministic,” meaning that, at any time, any possible future pattern of
events has some non-zero chance of taking place. Our own, actual world appears to be
neither deterministic nor purely indeterministic: quantum theory implies that it is not
deterministic, while there are still plenty of deterministic constraints in physical theory
(such as that nothing can accelerate beyond the speed of light—the chance of something
doing so is always 0). Then why do we care about analyses restricted to the extremes of
determinism or pure indeterminism? To the extent such analyses are successful, they
may suggest, or be useable to create, a broad analysis. Second, the extreme analyses are
of some interest directly, since they may analyze two ways we habitually think about the
world—sometimes as deterministic, sometimes as purely indeterministic. The narrowed
concepts they define may therefore comprise important portions of our concept of
causation. (Despite the great attention that deterministic analyses have received in
1739, on some interpretations), and there are many who think that counterfactuals should be analyzed in
terms of causation rather than the other way around (e g., Kvart 1986).)
8
philosophy, an analysis for purely indeterministic worlds is, I think, in line with the more
common way people naturally or naively think about the world no occurrence or
nonoccurrence really has no chance, some are just very improbable, to the point of being
freaky or “miraculous ”)
Still, my purely indeterministic analysis is itself something of a draft. For it is, I
believe, unsatisfactory in at least two respects, and I am not presently able to improve
upon it. First, it is inelegant—inelegance, if irreparable, suggests to me falsity. Second,
as I explain in Chapter 6, certain components are not fully motivated.
9
CHAPTER 2
IMPORTANT BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 Introduction
The analyses discussed in this dissertation employ counterfactuals (Section 1.2) and
make reference to events and chances of events. Throughout, I rely upon certain
assumptions about these three things that I shall now describe and explain.
2.2 The Interpretation of Counterfactuals
The analyses I discuss throughout the dissertation generally assume David Lewis’s
views about counterfactuals, and I shall do so as well. Here I describe the important
components 1
It is intuitively plausible that when I say, “Were I to flip the switch, the lamp would go
on,” I am saying something like this: among possible worlds where I flip that switch, the
worlds akin to ours are worlds in which the lamp then goes on. Notice the loss of the
subjunctive mood; the intuition reduces the counterfactual to a certain similarity
comparison between kinds of possible world. Lewis (1973a) developed a semantics
along these lines, according to which a counterfactual “If P were so, Q would be” is
actually true iff (if, and only if) either (i) P is impossible or (ii) there is a possible world
at which P and Q are true and which is closer to—that is, more similar to—the actual
1
Throughout the dissertation, I assume a possible-worlds framework. A necessary truth (e g., 2+2=4) is
true at all possible worlds: an impossibility, or necessary' falsehood, is false at all possible worlds. Other
sentences, statements, propositions, are true at some worlds but not others; to be actually true is to be true
at the actual world For example, the proposition that there are diamonds is true at the actual world but it
could have been false, which means that it is false at other possible worlds lacking diamonds. (A
“proposition” P is often identified with the class of possible worlds at which P is true.) As some others do,
I take “actual world” to be “indexical”: like “I,” what it designates shifts with contexts and speakers, and it
can be used to refer to any possible world.
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world than is any world at which P is true but Q false For instances in which there is a
closest p-world (a closest world at which P is true), or a set of P-worlds tied for closest, it
follows that the counterfactual is true iff the closest P-worlds are all Q-worlds. For
simplicity, I will usually assume that if P is possible then there are closest P-worlds
(Lewis refers to this as the Limit Assumption (1973a, pp. 19ff)).
The semantics itself does not dictate the nature of the similarity relation relevant to a
proper interpretation of a given counterfactual. Lewis allows that in different contexts we
may intend different standards of similarity, weighting similarity with respect to some
properties more or less. We must look to our judgements in a given context of which
counterfactuals we take to be true and which false if we wish to know (roughly) what
similarity relation is in play in that context. Consider: “If Caesar were in command, he
would use the atom bomb”, “If Caesar were in command, he would use catapults” (Quine
1960, p. 222). The first sounds true when we take a world in which present-day Caesar
has adapted to modern warfare to be more similar to ours than a world in which present-
day Caesar has kept his ancient techniques, the second sounds true when we judge it the
other way. The first apparently invokes a similarity relation that gives a lot of weight to
general traits of Caesar such as his opportunism, his desire to utterly destroy an enemy
and his preference for the most effective weapons available; the second apparently
invokes a similarity relation that gives more weight to Caesar’s weapon-specific habits,
skills and knowledge.
It seems to some people, me included, that without exception no world is as or more
similar to a world w than w is to itself. Therefore, any counterfactual with true
11
antecedent is true iff its consequent is true (This is not a topic of controversy among any
authors discussed in this dissertation.)
A backtracking counterfactual is a counterfactual that says how the past would have
been different had the present been different (Lewis 1979, pp. 32-5). Lewis thinks there
is a certain standard use of counterfactual s on which the intended similarity relation
makes backtracking counterfactuals false. For example, suppose we know that Charlie
was on a high cliff with just his usual shorts, T-shirt and daypack. You say, “If Charlie
had jumped off the cliff, he would have gotten badly hurt.” But I say, “No, if Charlie had
jumped, he would have put on a parachute earlier (because Charlie would never jump
without a parachute, he s such a sensible guy) So if he had jumped, he would have
landed unhurt.” Clearly we are reasoning in different ways. This, according to Lewis,
reflects that we are invoking different sorts of similarity relations in our use of the
counterfactuals: my first counterfactual assertion invoked a non-standard sort of relation,
your counterfactual invoked a standard one On the standard sort, my assertion was
false—had Charlie jumped, the relative past would not have been different such that he
would have put on a parachute. As Lewis notes, it is often more comfortable to insert the
phrase “have to” when backtracking: “If Charlie had jumped, he would have to have put
on a parachute.” The natural inclination to use this special phrasing supports the idea that
backtracking is a special usage.
It is the more standard usage that Lewis intends for the counterfactuals in his own
causal analyses. Other analysts, myself included, have followed Lewis in drawing this
distinction between backtracking and non-backtracking sorts of similarity relations and in
restricting their analyses to the latter. The restriction is important, because it paves the
12
way for causation to be asymmetric on a counterfactual analysis. As I mentioned in
Section 1.2, counterfactual analyses generally imply that counterfactual dependence
between distinct, occurrent events is sufficient for causation Suppose 1 press the
doorbell button and this causes the bell to sound. We might be inclined to accept, “If the
sound had not occurred, it would (have to) have been that I did not press the button”
that is, the pressing is counterfactually dependent on the sound If counterfactual
analyses were not restricted to a similarity relation on which such backtracking
counterfactuals are false, the quoted counterfactual would imply that the sound was a
cause of the pressing.
While Lewis s view that backtracking counterfactuals are in some sense special has
been challenged, I will largely leave that debate aside. I am inclined to think that Lewis
is correct, at least for the sorts of event-based counterfactuals used in causal analyses, and
in light of the various challenges, it would be a major project to defend the view. I shall
just adopt it as an assumption.
The reasons Lewis is correct (if he is) must not include that we make certain causal
presuppositions in our standard interpretation of counterfactuals, else a causal analysis
relying on such an interpretation will be circular. But Lewis (1979) attempts to give a
general description of the sort of similarity relation we standardly invoke in
counterfactuals about events, and it does not rely on causal concepts. I take it as a
working assumption that some such non-causal description of the relevant sort of
similarity relation is possible, either Lewis’s or some other. I said that the restriction to a
non-backtracking kind of similarity relation “paves the way” for causal asymmetry, it is
this non-causal description of the relevant kind of relation that is needed to bring it home.
13
Lewis offers two interpretations of the “might” counterfactual. 2 The central one, and
the one I will always intend in my use of it, is this: (SI) “If P were so, Q might be”
means the same as (S2) “It is not the case that if P were so, Q would not be.” SI is
consistent with (S3) “If P were so, Q might not be.” So notice that since S3 means the
same as (S4) “It is not the case that if P were so, Q would be,” S2 is consistent with S4
Also noteworthy is that a “would” counterfactual always implies the corresponding
might
. if it is true that were P so, Q would be, then obviously it is false that were P so,
Q would not be, and hence by definition it is true that were P so, Q might be.
Both a “might” and the corresponding “might-not” may be true when there is
significant underdescription by a false antecedent. Thus, if Bizet and Verdi were
compatriots, they might have been French—and they might not have been French, but
rather Italian. (Perhaps also they might have been citizens of some other country—it
seems to me that in supposing that they are compatriots, one may or may not intend to
invoke a similarity relation whereby the two men might belong to some third country.)
To use events: If there were a musician practicing in the next room, we might be hearing
bassoon sounds now, and we might be hearing trumpet sounds. Likewise, even in a
deterministic setting we should say that if I were to flip this coin, it might come out
heads, it might come out tails. Were I precisely to specify the nature and circumstances
of the flip, then I could say truly that it would come out heads, or I could say truly that it
would come out tails.
In these examples, I suppose things were to obtain that did not. Most counterfactual
analyses are only concerned with supposing that events which did occur were not to
:
Discussed in Lewis 1973a (pp. 2, 2 Iff) and 1979 (pp. 63-4).
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occur. There is disagreement about how much underdescription this involves. Some
think that in supposing away an event we mean to suppose that the event is “completely
and cleanly excised from history” (Lewis 2000, p 190). Others (Michael McDermott
(1995a) and Stephen Yablo (2002)), including myself, think that we sometimes allow that
parts of the event might (and might not) remain. “If his bicycle trip across the country
had not taken place, he might still have at least started it
.
. though he might not have even
done that”, “If the Great Chicago Fire hadn’t occurred, still one bam fire might have
occurred or it might have been that all of the Chicago fire was absent”—these sound
fine, to me. (And as we will see in later chapters, such “might” counterfactuals are
needed to defend against certain alleged counterexamples to various analyses.)
A second situation in which both a “might” and the corresponding “might-not” can be
true is where (the antecedent is false and) the consequent involves an indeterministic
event: “If there were an unstable atom on my desk, it might decay in the next five
seconds ” It is also true to say that the atom might not decay in the next five seconds.
Lewis generally presumes, as will I, that if in some non-actual situation there would
be a non-zero chance that an event e occurs (does not occur), it is true to say that e might
occur (not occur), where the “might” here is interpreted in the way just described. (He
allows exceptions, but they need not concern us. )
3
1 have in mind Lewis’s “convergence quasi-miracles” (1979. pp. 58-64). He calls a pattern “quasi-
miraculous” when it results from chancy events "that seem to conspire” to produce it. He imagines that all
the traces of the pressing of a button—the signal down the wire, the heat in the insulation, the light images
of the pressing moving tow ard outer space, the fingerprint—have some chance of dissipating such that the
w orld is exactly as it would have been had no button-pressing occurred. Such a cover-up would be a
convergence quasi-miracle. We are drawn to say that, despite hav ing some chance (and thus not being a
miracle simpliciter), such a thing would not happen were the button to be pressed. Lewis agrees that it
would not; its occurrence, he says, would be too “unlike the goings-on we take to be typical of our world
(p. 60) for it to be among any of the closest worlds in which the button is pressed. However, he admits that
in such a case there is still a sense in which the quasi-miraculous event might occur, though not the sense I
describe in the main text. On this other sense, “it might be that P” means it would be possible that P. Since
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Now, we do say, “If he were to play the lottery, he wouldn’t win,” and “If all three
women had come to dinner, surely they would not all have worn the same dress.” Here
we deny that a certain thing might happen even while, it seems, being aware that it
would have some chance. It seems to me that in these examples, the motivation behind
saying that the improbable event would not occur is just how very improbable it is.
Should I not, then, allow that, due to an event’s very low (but non-zero) chance, it would
not occur?
In such statements as the above two, I think we may be suffering from the false
sentiment that things need a certain minimum non-zero probability in order to happen
—
“That’s so improbable, it could never happen!” Or, we may be engaged in the practice of
setting small chances aside: “The chance of that is negligible”; “The chance of that is so
small, I think we can just ignore it.” Exactly why and when we engage in this sort of
rounding down, I do not know. But counterfactuals that rest on it may fail to be literally
true. I think that when a statement that some future event would not occur is based only
upon the fact that its chance would be very low (but non-zero), the statement is false.
Imagine that 1 trillion people could draw straws and that, if they were to do so, exactly
one person would get the winning straw. Suppose that, just because of the odds, we are
moved to say, “If they were to play that game, #300 would not win—some other player
would.” We ought, then, to say the same of #1, #2, etc., since there is nothing special
about #300. Since no player is special, either all of these trillion counterfactuals are true
or none is. Yet they cannot all be true, unless they invoke different similarity relations.
the event’s chance would be non-zero, it would be possible for it to occur: it “might” occur (in one
sense) . . . even though it would not (in another).
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If they invoke the same one, then each one of the closest worlds in which the people play
is, according to the consequents, a world in which #1 does not win, #2 does not win,
and yet some player wins—impossible. But there is no motivation for different similarity
relations, since the counterfactuals all have the same antecedent and there are no relevant
differences between the different players mentioned in the consequents. There is nothing
more similar to actuality about a world in which they play, #1 loses and someone else
wins than a world in which they play and #1 wins, likewise for all the other numbers. 4
2.3 Chance
We will see analyses that use the notion of the “chance” of an event—the chance that
the event occurs. Chance is single-case, objective probability. It is “single-case” in that
it is not a ratio or frequency of any type (so we can ignore worries about what is the
appropriate “reference class”). It is “objective” in that it does not hold only relative to
some believer or body of information—it is not an epistemic probability of any type.
That right now there is a certain chance x that that nucleus will emit an alpha particle
within the next five minutes is an objective fact about the world, as believer-independent
as any other.
The most important point for us is that chances are standardly time-relative: At t, the
chance that S is x. The chance of an event may vary through time, as conditions vary.
Lewis (1980, p 91) gives the example of someone working through a maze. The person
begins with a moderate chance of reaching the center by noon. As he moves about, half
4
Imagine you are rationally justified in believing you do not actually play a certain lottery of very long
odds. If the reasoning I have just given is correct, it seems it should be rational to believe that if you were
to play that lottery, you might win. Now, it is often said that if you know you play a lottery of very long
odds, then it is rational to believe you lose—the belief is justified by its high probability. There is a curious
tension here, but I see no contradiction.
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an hour later he has reached a region from which it is much less probable he will reach
the center by noon Despite the odds, by 1 1 :45 he has escaped the difficult area and is in
a good position his chance of reaching the center by noon is now quite high. At 1 1 49
he has reached the center, so at this time his chance of reaching the center by noon is 1
And it will be 1 at any time in the future. Likewise, in quantum mechanics, the chance
that a system has, or will have, a given property can vary through time as the system’s
state varies. It is generally assumed that the chance of any past event is 1 if it occurred, 0
if it did not, and I follow that assumption.
I assume that the chance of an event at time t is determined by the world’s entire past
event history up through t and the (non-causal) laws of nature for the world. 5 Since this
history and these laws are contingent (they do not hold logically or necessarily), any
particular actual chance is relative to the actual history and laws—that is, relative to the
actual world. So throughout I shall assume a single chance function that takes a time, a
world, and a proposition that a certain event occurs and yields a real or infinitesimal
number in [0,1], (The emiss'ion-from-Xhe-nuc\eus-at-that-precise-time was an event
whose earlier chance was infinitesimal; so we ought to allow infinitesimal chances.)
2.4 Events
It will pay to assume some fairly precise picture of events, including a theory of the
part-whole relation between events. I shall largely adopt Lewis’s (1986b) views on these,
though I shall deviate a bit.
5
Throughout, I make no special assumptions about (non-causal) laws, except that their expression need not
involve any causal concepts: as discussed in the previous chapter, the causal facts exist partly in virtue of
the (non-causal) laws, not the other way around.
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2.4.1 The General Nature of Events
At least for present purposes, every particular event can occur only once. Thus I do
not count the Boston Marathon that occurs every year as a particular event, while the
different non-repeatable marathons are particular events. I will defend this stance in a
moment. For every occurrent event there is a smallest spatiotemporal region in which the
whole of it occurs and outside of which none of it occurs—I will refer to this region
variously as the region in which the event occurs, as the region o/the event, and as “the
event’s region.”
Each particular occurrent event is a certain property of the region in which it occurs.
Lewis takes such a property (event) to be the class of possible regions in which it is
instantiated (occurs). An occurrent event is any such class with a member from the actual
world. No event has more than one member from any one world (events do not recur, as
I said above). No event has a member from every world (no event necessarily occurs). If
a class of regions meets these criteria, it is what Lewis calls “formally eligible” to be an
event, then there are further constraints, which we will visit in Section 2.4.3.
It seems there may really be repeatable particular events, contrary to what I have said.
We say the Boston Marathon occurs every Spring, the eruption of Old Faithful occurs
regularly, the Olympics occurs every two years, high tide happens twice a day. Here we
talk as if repeatables are particular events. On the other hand, perhaps it is loose talk, and
we really mean that the Boston Marathon is a kind of event, each member of which
occurs in a Spring—exactly one Spring. We sometimes pick out this year’s Boston
Marathon by saying “this particular Boston Marathon is especially competitive”; we
count how many Boston Marathons we have seen, just as we count how many house fires
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or weddings we have seen; so it is also consistent with some of our talk that the
repeatable is a kind from which we pick out particular individuals, where the individuals
are not repeatable. I see nothing to settle whether the repeatable is a particular event or
not and it may even be both: sometimes we mean it one way, sometimes the other.
While there may really be repeatable particular events, I want to ignore them, so I
shall just declare that I am not counting them as particular events within this dissertation.
Why? It is not because they are not involved in causation, there is some evidence that
they are: “the Boston Marathon caused a traffic jam this year, but it did not cause one
last year
,
high tide is an effect of the moon’s position.”6 Repeatables are extra work,
because we have to agree on the causal facts about them (was the 1999 starting gun a
cause of the repeatable marathon?) and we have to decide what it means to suppose that
the repeatable were not to occur (that none of it occurs, past and future?). These are not
easy questions. I wish to ignore repeatables largely because we have a great deal ofwork
to do as is. It seems the analysis of causation among non-repeatables is a fine standalone
first step: as far as I can find, the repeatable Boston Marathon is a cause or effect only in
virtue of some of the non-repeatable Marathons that occur a year apart, so that
understanding causation among non-repeatables may be a useful first step to
understanding causation among repeatables. In ignoring repeatables I will not, by the
way, be skirting challenges that others have faced: repeatables have always (with little, if
any, comment) been excluded from analyses of particular-event causation.
6
Here I part from Lewis, who rejects (without argument) that repeatables ever “cause or get caused
simpliciter” (1986b, p. 243). I see no way to insist upon that. (Even if all causation among repeatables can
be reduced to causation among non-repeatables, it of course does not follow that there is no causation
(simpliciter) among repeatables.)
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Lewis allows that events may be very fine-grained (“allows” in that his constraints
will not prevent it, and he openly embraces it). He gives an example in which John says
“Hello” rather loudly—thereby there occurs, in one region, an event that is essentially a
hello and essentially loud as well as an event that is essentially a hello but is possibly soft
(1986b, p. 255). And given Lewis’s general discussion in 1986b, there surely occur in
that region even more variants, such as an event that is essentially a verbal greeting but
only inessentially a hello, and many others. How liberal we are to be is not pinned down
by Lewis. I shall try to pin it down in Section 2.4.3.
Such a generous ontology of events is unusual, 7 and it may seem excessive. I do make
use of it, so let us see how it may be justified.
Lewis argues that we cannot get by with just a hello that is essentially loud, nor just
with one that is not, because each plays a causal role, and they do not play the same role
(p. 255). The essentially loud hello is an effect of John’s state of tension (an event)—it
would not have occurred without that tension—but it is not a cause of Fred’s return
hello—the return hello might still have occurred even if the essentially loud hello had not
(because John might have said “Hello” at a soft volume). On the other hand, the hello
that is only ///essentially loud is not an effect of the tension—it would still have occurred
if the tension had not (it would have occurred as a soft hello)—and it is a cause of Fred’s
return hello, since the return hello would not have occurred without it (without it, there
would have been no hello at all, loud or soft).
Lewis’s causal claims here may appear to rely on the associated counterfactual
dependences, and one might doubt these or question whether they are decisive evidence
7
Not unique, however. Kim (1973b, 1976) also allows that ordinarily multiple events occur in one region.
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of causation in this story. So let me further champion the plurality of hellos without
relying on these subtle causal and dependence claims, by drawing attention to some work
that they do.
Suppose it is true that when John says “Hello,” only one hello occurs. Let me
embellish the story. This hello was John s greeting when he came in to work, and he
always greets his officemates with a hello. Officemates Fred and Fran always respond to
this greeting by saying “Hi.” This morning, when John, tense, says “Hello” rather loudly,
Fred says his usual “Hi,” and Fran says “Hi,” too, though she also thinks to herself, “Gee,
that was rather loud.
. .1 wonder if he’s alright.” Clearly, John’s state of tension was a
cause of Fran’s thought, and this causation was obviously not direct, but mediated by
John’s utterance, a hello—the hello, allegedly, since we are supposing there is only one.
And clearly, a hello by John was a cause of Fred’s return greeting. But if there is only
one hello in this story, then John’s tension caused the hello that caused Fred’s return
greeting. If causation is transitive, 8 we get that John’s tension was a cause of Fred’s
return greeting—surely that’s not right. Add that Fred wears a hearing aid that cannot
detect the additional volume in John’s voice, then it is even more counterintuitive that
John’s tension was a cause of Fred’s return greeting. The only way to deny that the
example refutes transitivity while denying that John’s tension is a cause of Fred’s return
greeting is to accept the remaining alternative, that two hellos occurred. Which should
we do?
On the one hand, the example does appear to refute transitivity. On the other hand,
something sneaky seems to be going on, and we should not sweep it under the rug. It is
8
Event causation is transitive iff whenever an event x causes an event y and y causes an event z, x causes z.
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alleged that there is a causal chain from John’s tension to the hello to Fred’s greeting
But our sense is that there is slippage at the middle link: what the tension is itself
responsible for is not anything that in turn is responsible for Fred’s greeting. The alleged
chain sits ill with that sense. We want to say something like this: the tension caused the
loudness of the hello, but this in turn is not what caused Fred’s greeting. These intuitions
should make us reluctant to reject transitivity just on the basis of the example. On the
theory that there are at least two hellos here—one essentially loud, one inessentially
loud—we can respect and make sense of these intuitions. Suppose we follow Lewis,
above, and accept that the tension is only a cause of an essentially loud hello, which hello
in turn is not a cause of Fred’s return greeting, and the tension is not a cause of a hello
that is ///essentially loud, though this hello is a cause of Fred’s return greeting. Then the
discomfitting causal chain is gone; the suspicion of slipperiness at the middle link is
vindicated and explained, the intuition that the tension just caused the loudness of the
hello is cashed out ontologically; and the preference against rejecting transitivity on the
basis of the example is satisfied. That is a good amount ofwork accomplished.
2.4.2 Spatiotemporal Mereologv of Events
I will have occasion to talk of event composites and event parts, and it will pay to be
clear about what I mean. Events are, I have said, classes. Perhaps the clearest way to
understand “part of a class” is that it means subclass
9
But, as Lewis says (1986b, pp.
258), when talking of event parts, we may—and I always shall—have something else in
mind, something spatiotemporal: a big event’s region has subregions that are the regions
9
Lewis takes subclasses to be parts of classes (1986b, p. 258; 1991)
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of parts of that big event, and events in two regions can make up a whole that is an event
that occurs in the union of those regions I need what Lewis refers to as a
“spatiotemporal part” relation for events. I will give a definition of this relation (and of
derivative relations, such as “overlap”). Then I will describe some general truths about it
A mereology is a theory about the part-whole relation; the general truths 1 describe can be
taken as axioms in a “spatiotemporal mereology” of events (Lewis 1986b, pp. 258-60).
An important fact about (spatiotemporal) parthood of events that needs to be respected
in this project is that some events could occur differently with respect to their parts—with
more parts, or with fewer parts, or with different parts: that concert, we usually think,
might have occurred with an additional encore, with no encore, with a different encore,
etc. So parthood needs to be world-relative: at the actual world, the concert had one
Beethoven encore, but at other possible worlds it had two of them, at others none, at
others Paganini. The “part of’ relation (and other related notions) will be three-place,
where a world occupies one place: e is a part of/ at w.
I shall use simpler definitions than Lewis’s. As I explain in footnote 10, 1 believe the
added complexity of Lewis’s definitions fails to achieve what he aims for it to achieve.
(Though if you wish, you are free to assume Lewis’s definitions
—
given in footnote 10
—
instead This will not compromise any of my important arguments in later chapters.) I
follow, by the way, the common practice of allowing that anything is a part of itself—an
“improper” part, as opposed to a proper part. Likewise, I take a spatiotemporal region to
be an (improper) subregion of itself. Here are the definitions: event e is a
(spatiotemporal) part of event/ at world w iff e’s region at w is a subregion of/’s region
at w, events overlap at w iff some event is a part of each at w; e is a sum of events/;, J~2,
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at w iff e overlaps at w all and only those events that overlap at least one of the/s at
w, eventsf1,f2, ... are distinct at w iff no event is a part of any two of them at w
.
10
As a point of comparison, let us note three common axioms of mereology
:
11
(Transitivity) if x is a part of y and y is a part of z, then x is a part of z, (Unrestricted
Composition) for any things, there is at least one sum of those things; (Uniqueness of
Composition) for any things, there is at most one sum of those things. We would need
world-relative versions of any of these we use. It will turn out that the axioms we need
are world-relative versions of two of them.
Here are Lewis s definitions. That of part proceeds in stages: e implies/iff, necessarily, if e occurs in
a region then also/occurs in that region; e is essentially part of/iff, necessarily, if/occurs in a region,
then also e occurs in a subregion included in that region (not necessarily a proper subregion); occurrent
ev ent e is part of occurrent ev ent/iff some occurrent ev ent that implies e is essentially part of some
occurrent event that implies/ (In terms of event classes, occurrent event e is part of occurrent event/iff
there are event subclasses of e andf—es and/—such that every member of/ has a subregion that is a
member of es, and/ has an actual member.) “Events overlap iff they have some event as a common part;
1 1 an event e is the mereological sum of events /,/>,... iff e overlaps all and only those events that
overlap at least one of the/’ s.” “Distinct” is never explicitly defined. (By the way, outside the context of
this discussion, I shall not mean by “implies” what Lewis means. By “e implies/” I will only mean that
necessarily, if e occurs, then/occurs.)
Parthood often holds contingently; an occurrent event is part of another occurrent event at the world of
occurrence. Without the indexicality of “occurrent,” Lewis’s “part” definition comes to this: event e is
part of event /at world w iff some e-implying event that occurs at w is essentially part of some/-implying
event that occurs at w. Since the remaining mereological notions are defined in terms of part, the w hole
mereology is as world-relative as the one I give above.
Lewis uses this definition of “part” because he thinks events that occur in the same actual region may be
actually distinct. One example he gives is of a philosophy conference and a battle of goblins composed of
matter that does not interact with ours. The idea is that, in such cases, it won’t be true that the two events
or any occurrent events that imply them stand as essential part and whole; where co-occupants are in fact
not distinct, there will at least be occurrent events w ith very narrow, strict essences that imply them and
stand as essential part and whole.
For that to work, it has to be that two distinct co-occupants never have a sum that implies both of them;
any such sum is, of course, an essential part of itself, so the co-occupants would come out actual parts of
each other on Lewis’s definitions. An example of such a sum would be an event that essentially occurs in
the region the two co-occupants occurred in and that occurs only if the two occur in that region. I see no
principled way to rule out such sums. I would go further and say that there are always such sums, since, as
I explain in the main text, I accept an unrestricted composition principle; this would mean that Lewis’s
definition just reduces to the simple one I am using. That is, I accept the following principle: for any
occurrent events a and b that occur in a region R, there is an occurrent event g that essentially occurs in R
and occurs only if a and b occur in R. Again, since g is an essential part of g, a comes out a part of b on
Lewis’s definition. Thanks to that famous Australian battle-conference of 1981 (g), the battle (a) and the
conference (b ) are parts of each other after all.
II Taken from Lewis (1991, p 74); he refers to these as the basic axioms of mereology.
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Spatiotemporal regions have a mereology that is transitive. A part of a region is a
subregion, if region x is a subregion of region y, which in turn is a subregion of region z,
then x is a subregion of z. This fact, in conjunction with the definition of “part,” forces
upon us our first axiom: (World-relative Transitivity) If a is a part of b at w and b is a
part of c at w, then a is a part of c at w. I assume this second axiom: (Unrestricted
World-relative Composition) For any events /7,/2, . . . that occur at w, there is at least one
event that is a sum of thef s at w. Lewis is explicitly undecided as to whether to accept
this axiom, because, clearly, it generates some peculiar sums (1986b, p 260). But I can
find no good reason to think there are no such events, peculiar as they are. I will defend
this stance in the next section Those are the only axioms of the mereology. We will see
just below why there is no uniqueness axiom.
The claims that not all events have their parts essentially and that different events, like
the different hellos, regularly occur in the same region, are substantive metaphysical
claims about events that, independently of the two mereological axioms, generate two
noteworthy facts about sums. First, since not all events have their parts essentially (the
concert could have had a different encore) it follows that an event may be the sum of
certain events at one world but the sum of other events at another world: the concert is
actually a sum of the main program and the Beethoven encore, but possibly it is a sum of
the main program and a Paganini encore.
The second fact is that events have multiple sums at one world. Recall the various
occurrent hellos—some essentially loud, some that could have been soft, some that, while
essentially greetings, could have been howdys instead of hellos (Section 2.4.1). They
occur in the same region, so they actually have all the same parts (including each other.
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as non-proper parts),
12
but then the parts have multiple sums at the actual world, namely
the various hellos themselves. An axiom of uniqueness of event composition would say
that for any events/;,^,
• that occur at w there is at most one event that is their sum at
w. But we see now that we cannot adopt this axiom.
Because of the many sums at one world, we have to be a little careful about talking of
ihe sum of the events. Of course, we ccui talk about the sum, on the presumption we
know at least roughly which one we are talking about. That is, we can make the sort of
presumption we generally do: when we talk about the dinner party or yesterday’s storm,
a variety of events, with varying occurrence conditions
,
13
could be intended, but we
ordinarily presume we have at least vaguely the same one in mind.
Another substantive thesis should be mentioned. Multiple events occur in one region
not only due to differences in essentiality of intrinsic features such as loudness, but also
due to differences in essentiality of spatiotemporal proper parts. Just as we may talk
about both a hello that is essentially loud and one that is not, in one region, also we may
talk about a concert that essentially has an encore as a part and one that does not, in one
region
14 How liberal we are to be about what sorts of variation in part essentiality there
1
2
To see this on Lewis’s “part" definition, notice that an occurrent hello with a very narrow, strict essence
will imply all the occurrent hellos and their parts and is essentially part of itself.
13 An event’s “occurrence conditions” are what is necessary and what is sufficient for the event’s
occurrence.
1
4
The motivations carry over. Imagine that John is the conductor. The applause at the end of the main
program is about to die out—the audience does not want an encore—but an encore occurs anyway because
John is nerv ous and fails to wait as long as he should for the applause to die out before beginning one.
Later that night, Fred reports to his mother that he saw’ John’s first concert—something he would have
reported whether there had been an encore or not. Was the nerv ousness a cause of a concert and this very
concert a cause of Fred's report? Was the nervousness a cause of the report? No, and No. The
nerv ousness was a cause of a concert that has an encore essentially, though not of one that has it
inessentially; and only a concert that ///essentially has an encore is a cause of Fred’s report. The relevant
counterfactuals support this; and it does the work of allowing us to deny the alleged causal chain that seems
a sneaky attack on transitivity.
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may be is not pinned down by Lewis, but I shall pin it down in the next section (Notice
that just as the multiple hellos in one region gave us multiple sums at one world, the
multiple concerts do, too, their parts, such as the main program and the encore, have as a
sum the concert that has the encore essentially and also the concert that has it
inessentially.)
2.4.3 Restrictions on “Formally Eligible” Event Classes
The classes that are “formally eligible” (Section 2.4.1) to be events are the non-empty
classes of possible spatiotemporal regions, no class with two members from the same
world, no class with a member from every world. Lewis never completely defines what
an event is, but he adds three eligibility requirements to the formally eligible classes. I
will argue that the second of these (in the order of my discussion) follows from the first
and that the third is unnecessary—really we need only the first. I shall also, as promised,
defend the mereological axiom of unrestricted composition. And I shall answer the
question of what sorts of variation with respect to essentiality of features and parts there
may be—I do this by giving a rough definition of “event.”
Thefirst requirement is that events be “predominantly intrinsic” properties (1986b, pp.
262ff). Events are not entirely intrinsic properties, because we want to differentiate
intrinsically similar events in different regions—we do not want to count them as the
same one event. Lewis gives as an example of an overly extrinsic “event” the widowing
ofXanthippe, which he defines as something that essentially occurs in region R and
occurs iff Xanthippe exists in R and her husband dies at that time (outside R). It is an
event whose occurrence is largely a matter of what goes on outside its own region.
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That is an odd event—I doubt we would ordinarily say that the widowing of
Xanthippe occurred where Xanthippe was sitting. If we knew where to place it at all, I
think we would be more apt to say it happened in a prison cell, where the death occurred
There are, in fact, many ordinary examples of very extrinsic events with clear locations:
an adultery (an act of committing adultery), a presidential assassination, a parking
violation, the breaking of a promise—we at least sometimes talk of these events with the
intention that, necessarily, they occur only if certain kinds of events outside their regions
also occur. For instance, we may take the adultery to require the presence somewhere of
a spouse, while also believing that it occurred in the bedroom (a region excluding the
spouse). We may take the presidential assassination, which occurred in the theater, to
be something that could not occur but for the victim’s being a president and thus having
engaged in a certain swearing-in ceremony. We may take the parking violation that
happened on that street corner to be an event that could not occur but for the passage of a
relevant law. And we may take a certain promise-breaking to be an event that occurs
partly in virtue of an earlier promise. Who is prepared to deny that these adulteries,
assassinations, parking violations and promise-breakings have their causes and effects?
Not me. And do they have their causes and effects only derivatively, by way of the
causal roles of more intrinsic versions—for instance, might the adultery be an effect only
by way of the bedroom activity itself being an effect? Not clearly so: The distant
husband promised he would sign the divorce papers by midnight, but unbeknownst to
her, he changed his mind at the last moment; she, not unreasonably, thinks his reversal is
a cause of her engaging in an act of adultery: the adultery is an effect, but not by way of
1
5
Like many others, I take the presence of an object in a region to be an event.
29
the bedroom activity itself, since the latter is obviously not an effect of the husband’s
reversal. How, then, can excluding very extrinsic events from an analysis of event
causation be justified?
Lewis assumes what in Chapter 1 I called the Dependence Thesis: counterfactual
dependence between distinct events is sufficient for causation. And he observes that
when the Dependence Thesis is applied to very extrinsic events, we get bad results For
example, if Socrates’ death had not occurred, the widowing of Xanthippe would not have
occurred
—
yet we do not want to count the death a cause of the widowing. The death, as
Lewis points up, is just an event in virtue ofwhich the widowing occurs, not a cause, it
simply satisfies an essential criterion for the widowing. We see the same thing in the
case of the adultery. If the simultaneous presence of Husband had not occurred, the
adultery would not have, yet the mere presence of Husband seems not like a cause of the
adultery, only a satisfier of a necessary condition for the adultery. Lewis uses such bad
results to justify the claim that very extrinsic “events” are not really events. Let me
explain the reasoning behind that move.
Lewis holds that there may be various sorts of event, one of these being the sort
involved in causal relations (1986b, pp. 24 Iff). The convergence of a numerical
sequence may, says Lewis, be an example of an event, but an event of another sort. In
developing a theory of events of the causal sort, we should be guided by the causal facts.
Lewis takes another step, saying he aims to develop a theory of events constrained by his
own analysis of causation, a theory that allows his causal analysis to be right (p. 243).
This, I take it, is at least one reason why he does not consider blaming the Dependence
Thesis for the bad results above, but rather blames the alleged events. (Perhaps he also
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figures that the alleged events are odd enough that we will not really miss them—all his
examples of very extrinsic events are quite strange But there are more ordinary
examples, as I showed above.)
I, on the other hand, am willing to question an analysis incompatible with the view
that adulteries and assassinations (construed extrinsically) are events of the causal sort.
So I must ask, is the Dependence Thesis to blame7 Might it not be improved? Perhaps it
might. I think it holds up fine when neither of the distinct events in question satisfies
some necessary criterion of the other one, as we saw that Socrates’ death does for the
widowing and Husband-presence does for the adultery. For those cases, the Dependence
Thesis’ requirement of spatiotemporal distinctness does not exclude them as causally
connected—we would need to require something more like a “logical distinctness.” But I
do not know exactly how to improve on the Dependence Thesis along these lines. I shall
exclude all very extrinsic events from the domain of our topic, because I (like everyone
else) do not know how to include them. Including them will just have to remain
unfinished business—either by special treatment or a new and improved Dependence
Thesis. Or, alternatively, it will have to be argued that very extrinsic events are never
causes and effects, despite appearances. Among predominantly intrinsic events, I see no
trouble with the Dependence Thesis. 16
(Lewis (p. 263) also complains about another kind of dependence situation between
very extrinsic events, other than the one where one event satisfies some necessary
criterion of the other’s occurrence. Here is an example: If the drinking of the hemlock
had not occurred, the widowing would not have occurred, so the drinking comes out a
16
1 fend off some unrelated prima facie counterexamples to the Dependence Thesis in the next chapter.
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cause of the widowing. In this case, the drinking does not itself satisfy an essential
criterion ot the widowing—rather, it is a cause of one, a cause of the death Lewis thinks
that also this sort of causal result is wrong 17 To my mind, it is not clearly wrong
Socrates drinking hemlock was a cause of the widowing, as deciding not to sign the
divorce papers was a cause of the adultery. These sound OK, to me. (Sure, there may be
an implication of causation faster than light, if Xanthippe’s region is very far from the
drinking or Husband s decision is very far from the bedroom, but obviously there is no
suggestion trom science that faster-than-light causation between very extrinsic events is
unlawful So that is a red herring.))
A second restriction of Lewis’s is that event essences should not be extremely “rich”
(1986b, p 256). Lewis gives as an example of an overly rich “event” the unit class of a
region of the actual world With his “part” definition, Lewis strove for the result that two
events can occur in the same region yet be distinct (see footnote 10). His complaint
about the unit event is that no distinct event can occur in its region. On my definition,
this sort of co-occupation is not possible anyway. (And as I explain in footnote 10, on
Lewis’s definition it is arguably less possible than it is supposed to be, if it is even
possible at all.)
But there is another problem with overly rich events, which was pointed up by
Jonathan Bennett (1988, p 65). An “event”/that is a unit class of an actual region will
be counterfactually dependent on every occurrent event e. “If e had not occurred,. .
”
takes us to non-actual worlds, and at none of them will there be a member off. (Bennett
1
That is not his very example, but it is relevantly akin. Lewis uses this: “If the widowing had not
occurred, the cooling of Socrates’ body would not have occurred." But my counterfactual is more clearly
true. One way for the widowing not to occur is for Xanthippe not to be present in R—we cannot msist that
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says a unit event would be dependent on almost every actual event—but I do not know
why he says “almost,” and he does not explain.) Thus, thanks to the Dependence Thesis,
every event that is distinct from/ will come out a cause of it
This draws our attention to what is so peculiar about/ not only is it (metaphysically)
impossible for it to occur in any other time, place or manner, it is impossible for it to
occur in any other setting, with things being any different outside its region. Thus
whether it occurs is very much a matter of what goes on outside it, in that occurrences or
non-occurrences outside its region are sufficient to imply that it does not occur, /occurs
iff the entire history of the world is as it actually is! As far as I can see, overly rich
events are overly extrinsic events. But then this second restriction, against richness, can
be dropped as redundant. (Excessive extrinsicness will not in turn always be excessive
richness, so we can drop the richness constraint but not the other. Consider the event that
occurs, in spatial region S at time t, iff somebody somewhere is jogging at t It is far
from rich, but it is very extrinsic.)
The third of Lewis’s restrictions is that disjunctive events must not have highly varied
disjuncts (1986b, pp. 266ff). Lewis defines a disjunction of eventsfufi-, as an event
that occurs in a region iff one of the /s occurs there He accepts that there are some such
events, such as, he says, a stamping that is a disjunction of an event that is essentially a
left-foot-stamping and an event that is essentially a right-foot-stamping. I would add that
we take events to be disjunctive quite regularly, since we think they could occur in a
variety of ways: the party could have been upstairs or downstairs, so it is a disjunction of
it is the extrinsic condition (Socrates' death) that would have failed rather than the intrinsic. Thus, the
cooling might not have occurred.
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a party that is essentially upstairs and a party that is essentially downstairs. However,
events, Lewis says, do not have disjuncts that are highly miscellaneous—disjuncts, he
says, such as an event that is essentially a walking and an event that is essentially a
talking His reason for rejecting such events is that they will often stand in counterfactual
dependence with other, distinct events when in truth there is no causation between them
Suppose Fred talks, and thereby, in the same region as the talk, there occurs a talking-or-
walking. Fred’s talk is a cause of Ted’s laugh: if the talk had not occurred, the laugh
would not have occurred. Likewise, then, the talking-or-walking, if it is a real event,
causes Ted’s laugh, since it will also be true that if the talking-or-walking had not
occurred, (the talk and) the laugh would not have occurred Lewis simply says this
causal result is counterintuitive.
There are two reasons it might sound false to say that the talking-or-walking caused
Ted’s laugh, even though it is true. The first is that to speak in such disjunctions is in
general odd and inappropriate. Suppose a sound is caused by a stamping that is actually
with the left foot but could occur with either foot (the stamping Lewis accepts, above).
Consider: “The left-foot-stamping-or-right-foot-stamping caused a sound.” That does
not inspire confident assent either Suppose we give the talking-or-walking entity a
nondisjunctive name Call it zyalking
,
or ayalk. Some yalks are walks, some are talks,
just as some stampings are left-foot stampings, some are right-foot. Now I say, “The yalk
caused Ted to laugh.” Is that so clearly false? I hope you agree it is at least less so. But
let me turn to the other, related reason we may feel inclined to deny it.
The second reason we may want to deny that the talking-or-walking—the yalking
—
caused Ted to laugh is that the event is strange to us, for we have no particular interest in
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grouping such disjuncts. No surprise, then, that claims involving it sound dubious. Even
//ortcausal ones sound wrong: “the talking-or-walking was loud” is no better than “the
talking-or-walking caused a laugh ” But we understand what a talking-or-walkiny is it
has been clearly defined for us. If we make an effort to see it as an event, which,
according to the Fred story, occurred in the region of Fred, or Fred’s upper body, perhaps
it will seem correct that it resulted in Ted’s laughter
—
just as the stamping, which occurs
in just the region of the left leg, causes a sound We can try to see it as an event by
imagining a context in which people genuinely care about it and then assessing whether,
in that context, it seems wrong to think of it as a cause. If it does not, we have to ask
ourselves whether we want to reject alleged events on the basis of a lack of interest.
Consider the following.
There is a land where talking and walking are difficult and rare, and they are
considered the ugly bodily actions. Such acts are referred to, with some disdain, as
“yalks
”
“Yalking” before strangers is considered very impolite Yalking during church
sermons is quite taboo “Absolutely no more yalking in church. Junior!” she scolded
Junior eventually gets suspended from church services. His last yalk caused quite a stir
among parishioners. He yalked by talking, and most folks consider talk-yalking in
church to be more rude than walk-yalking (since walk-yalks are quieter). “If his yalking
had been walking instead of talking, I might not have lost my temper,” said the minister.
They certainly think yalks have effects. It seems that once one stops to take an interest
in a certain disjunctive, alleged event with highly varied disjuncts, one can see it as a
cause, and as a genuine event. Do we want to be rejecting alleged events on grounds of
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disinterest9 That is, do we want an ontology of events to be relative to interests (or to
something keyed to interests, such as a context or a society)?
I think not, because there is a simpler option, which is just to allow miscellaneously
disjunctive events and to recognize that some events we care about and some we do not.
What good is the added complexity of keeping track of shifting event ontologies? Ifwe
change and come to care about yalks, we will have to say that now
,
orfor us, or given our
interests, it is true that Fred’s yalk occurred, though back in 1986, or given our old
interests, it was false. Why bother with this odd and tricky relativism? 18
Some sums we care about: we think that the sum of a murder and a nearby suicide by
the murderer is an event, which we call a “murder-suicide.” The mereological sum of the
passing of a comet and Larry’s cooking bacon is something we do not ordinarily take for
an event
. well, we don’t, but Larry does: Larry believes that cooking bacon while a
comet was near caused his sterility. “The combination of the bacon-cooking and the
passing comet caused my sterility,” he says. “It is a kind of ice-fire-carnivore
event.
. those are bad, the ice-fire-camivores poison your karma.” Larry might not be
mad, he might just be badly educated; or this may be a work of fiction, in which the
composite in question really does cause sterility! There is no particular problem with
accepting unrestricted composition; it just leads to events we (or must of us) do not care
about. Rather than go relativistic, it is simpler just to recognize that some sums we care
about, some we do not. This defends my adoption of the mereological axiom of
unrestricted composition.
18
Notice we are not talking about relativity of an interpretation here; the meaning of a given yalk statement
is the same before the interest -shift as after. We are talking about rejecting the property of being an event
in favor of a relation: x is an event relative to y.
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I think that, for the present project, we can simply take an event to be any formally
eligible class of regions (as defined above) that is not overly extrinsic. (I do not have a
definition of “overly extrinsic.”) This will give us events that are a hodge-podge of parts,
that are highly disjunctive, that have any random parts or features essentially, that could
occur in any manner at all, at any time, here, there or anywhere. For example, we have
the event that occurs iff some person and at least three mice or trees cough loudly or burn
in Asia or on Mars during the 14th century or any time after 2001, and it essentially
occurs in the union of those regions that contain the described activity. We also have the
event of something happening in Europe, which occurs throughout Europe as long as
something is happening there. And we have the event of something happening
somewhere, which occurs throughout the world as long as something is happening (it is
the class of all possible whole-world regions). To the intuitive oddness of these events
we can take the stance taken above: Yes, the events are odd, but this is primarily because
we are not interested in them, we can accept that they are events but of sorts we do not
care about. I cannot find that such liberality creates any problems.
In sum, it appears that, for the present project, we need the proscription against
excessive extrinsicness in constraining the formally eligible classes of regions, but no
other restriction is needed.
I will not be burdening you with bizarre events in the chapters that follow (though I do
hope you will not be very squeamish about what counts as an event). My purpose here is
to be specific about what I take an event to be. This will help in considering potential
counterexamples and responses to the various analyses, including my own. As we will
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see, when examples get even a little tricky, intuitions can get murky, yet it is often
clarifying simply to be specific about what we are taking the events in the examples
to be.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFINITE PROBLEMS FOR THE COUNTERFACTUAL APPROACH
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to home in on the definite problems for the
counterfactual approach to event causation. I begin by formulating two simple analyses
representative of the approach—the first is supposed to handle deterministic worlds, and
the second is supposed to handle all worlds. I then defend them against some alleged
counterexamples. I describe two types of genuine counterexample, representing two
problems that adequate analyses must solve: the preemption problem and the problem of
failed potential causes. Last, I describe alleged instances of the preemption problem that
I shall not accept. Chapter 4 will examine contemporary analyses with an eye to how
well they cope with the two problems.
3.2 Two Simple Analyses
The search for a counterfactual causal analysis begins here: Event c is a cause of
event e iff, were c not to occur, e would not occur. I assume (Section 2 4) that there are
nonoccurrent events (i.e., events that could occur but do not), in which case the analysis
delivers nonoccurrent causes and effects: it is true that if I were not to fly to the moon
now, I would not fly to the sun, but my flying to the moon is not a cause of my flying to
the sun, since in fact I do neither. So let us add to the right side that c and e occur. It
would also be an improvement to require that c and e be non-identical, lest we get that
every event is a cause of itself (“if the explosion hadn’t occurred, it wouldn’t have
occurred”). Further, even if c and e are allowed to be partially overlapping, we get
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unintended results: that writing “y” is a cause of writing “Larry ” 1 So, an improved start
is this: Event c is a cause of event e iff c and e occur, c and e are distinct (i.e., non-
overlapping), 2 and were c not to occur, e would not occur
In Chapter 1 we saw this definition from David Lewis: Event b is counterfactually
dependent on event a iff (i) were a to occur, b would occur, and (ii) were a not to occur, b
would not occur. I assumed (with Lewis) that ifa and b occur, (i) is true and the
dependence reduces to (ii). Thus the improved start, which will be our deterministic
simple analysis (DSA), says that c is a cause of e iff they are occurrent and distinct and e
is counterfactually dependent on c (this is “the simple analysis” of Chapter 1).
A different start is needed in order to handle indeterministic causation. If I place a
radioactive sample before a Geiger counter, the chance of a click within the next minute
is less than 1 If a click occurs, a cause of it is the placement of the sample. DSA
succeeds in getting that result, since if the placement had not occurred, the click would
not have occurred. However, consider the following sorts of case. An atom moves to a
higher energy state and its chance of emitting a particle within the next minute thereby
increases from
.
1 to
.9; the emission occurs. Someone smokes a pack a day for five
years, increasing his chance of getting lung cancer, and he gets lung cancer. The state
change and the smoking seem to be, in some good sense, causes, yet their respective
effects might still have occurred if they had not.
For this reason, the following starting point has looked better to many: Event c is a
cause of event e iff, were c not to occur, the probability of e would be lower (than it
1
This is a slight alteration of an example from Jaegwon Kim (1973a, p. 206).
2
See mereological definitions, Section 2.4.2.
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actually is) Such an approach is usually meant to accommodate not only indeterministic
causation but also deterministic, for deterministic, the idea behind the analysis is that
without c, e’s probability would be 0 instead of 1
This second, probabilistic start is improved by the requirement that e occurs: even if
the cancer had failed to take place, still it would have been less probable had the smoking
not occurred; we do not thereby want to count the smoking a cause of the cancer that did
not happen. Once this requirement has been added, there is no need to require that c
occur—if the requirement that e occur is met, then if c does not actually occur, the
counterfactual antecedent will be true and the consequent false, in which case the
counterfactual will be false (Section 2.2). But there is no harm in requiring that c occur,
so let us do it for aesthetic reasons.
We can make the start more precise with another notion of dependence, adapted from
Lewis (1986a, pp. 176-7)
3
The notion of probability at work in the definition is that of
objective, single-case probability, or “chance,” which I discussed in Section 2.3. Event b
is probabilistically dependent on event a iff, for some range R of chances, (i) were a to
occur, the chance of b at (the end of) a’s time would be within R, and (ii) were a not to
occur, the chance of b at that same time would be below R. (I will comment below on
this choice of time for chance comparison.) I use a chance range mainly because, as
Lewis says, sometimes there is no unique chance that b would have were a to occur. 4 I
will assume that if, for some R, a actually occurs and the chance of b at the end ofa is
3
Lewis never precisely defines a probabilistic dependence relation, but readers regularly infer something
along the following lines from what he says.
4
Paul Noordhof (1999, p. 97) reminds us to make the definition sensitive to this point (though he does not
use a range).
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within R, then for that R clause (i) is true So far, then, the probabilistic start is this: c is
a cause of e iff they occur and e is probabilistically dependent on c.
Similar definitions have been used by others. Some (including Lewis) prefer “very
much lower,” though I cannot find a need for this (Lewis does not offer one) Some
(including Lewis) focus on the time just after a; Paul Noordhof (1999, pp. 100, 104) uses
the time just before b 5 I do not like using the time just after a One reason is that it
makes the analysis just given unfit for temporally direct indeterministic causation, a kind
of causation I see no good reason to count as impossible. The problem is that, in such a
case, the time just after the cause is the effect’s time. 6 Suppose that ifa were not to
occur, at no time would b ’’ s chance be 0 (
b
is not counterfactually dependent on a), then
were a not to occur, b still might, which means that were a not to occur, V s chance at the
time just after a might be 1 (the chance of an occurrent event, at its own time, is 1). So a
fails to come out a cause, even though it is one. 7 One problem with using the time just
before b is that an event may cause another by way of causing a temporally late essential
part of it, here the cause may occur simultaneously with earlier parts of the effect, in
5
Lewis does not give reasons for his choice of time. Noordhof s choice, as he illustrates, helps fend otf
some examples in which simple probabilistic analyses overcount causes (not enough examples to convince
me it is a crucial time choice). We will return to Noordhof s approach in the next chapter.
6 Time may be discrete, or, if not, one of the events occupies a temporal interval open on one end. For the
case where ft is temporally extended, “the effect’s time” should read “a part of the effect’s time,” and in
order to make my case we will need to assume that every stage of the effect deterministically causes all the
later stages.
7
1 also find “just after” philosophically a bit odd If the chance, at t, of a future b is implied by (the laws
and) world history up to and including t, as is generally believed (see Section 2.3)—and if the part of
history' that is at / is not a vacuous add-on such that the portion of history preceding t will alone imply b's
chance at t—then events that occur at t matter to b's chance at t, such that without them, b's chance at t
might be different. If a occurs at t, then a may help determine b's chance at t, whatever that chance is; so
there is no need to look after t to capture the idea of a's “making b more probable." (It seems that, by
looking just after a, it is as if one is trying to find the direct effect a has on ft’s chances. And that is not
really our goal.)
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which case it cannot contribute to chances at times before the effect. But the time of, or
at the end of, the cause looks like an appropriate time for evaluating chance contribution
in such a case.
Now we can consider whether we need a distinctness requirement. Let e be a writing
of “Larry” that has its precise actual time essentially. At the time of the writing of “y,”
the chance of e was 1, since all of it was present and past, if the writing of “y” had not
occurred, then the chance of e at that same time would have been 0, since at that time e’s
nonoccurrence was assured, so a distinctness clause is needed to avoid counting the
writing of “y” as a cause of the writing of “Larry.” The improved probabilistic start,
which will be our probabilistic simple analysis (PSA), says c is a cause of e iff they
occur, they are distinct, and e is probabilistically dependent on c.
I am not sure whether the two simple analyses should require that c and e be
essentially distinct. The question has not been broached in the literature, yet it seems to
me that writers almost always have essential distinctness in mind when they use the
notion of distinctness. I have not found anything of clear importance that hangs on the
question, but at least to fix ideas, and to take what seems the more cautious approach, let
us interpret the analyses as requiring essential distinctness.
3.3 Some Merely Alleged Problems
3.3.1 Extrinsic Events
Jaegwon Kim (1973a) offers the following example to show that the analysans of
DSA is not sufficient for causation: 8 “If my sister had not given birth at t, I would not
8 Kim does this in the context of attacking Lewis 1973b, an analysis that takes counterfactual dependence
between distinct events to be sufficient for causation (Section 4.3). Kim also offers as counterexamples
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have become an uncle at /. ’ What are the spatiotemporal regions of these two events? If
they are the same—say, in the region of the sister at t—then the example does not fit the
analysans, which requires distinctness Perhaps it would be more natural to take the birth
to be in the region of the sister at t but my becoming an uncle to be in the union of that
region and the region in which I exist at t—but then once again the events are not distinct,
but overlap If the events’ regions are distinct, then perhaps the birth is in the region of
the sister at t and the uncle-becoming is in the region of me at /. The problem here is that,
in order for me to become an uncle, it is necessary that certain events occur outside the
region of my body, this makes becoming an uncle an overly extrinsic event, an event that
is not just a matter of what goes on in its own region As explained in Section 2.4, events
shall be assumed to be predominantly intrinsic properties of their regions.
3.3.2 Asymmetry
As mentioned (Section 2.2), the exclusion of backtracking counterfactuals
(“backtrackers”) provides defense against a problem of effects being counted as causes of
their causes. Let us look at that challenge and the defense more carefully.
Suppose a rock-throw is a cause of a window-break in a thoroughly deterministic
setting. One might reason this way: (1) If the window-break had not occurred, it would
surely have been that the rock-throw did not occur, (2) therefore, DSA counts the
window-break a cause of the rock-throw. The argument is invalid because (1) is a
backtracking counterfactual (if it is interpreted as a ww-backtracking counterfactual, it is
cases in which the events at issue are clearly not distinct (I can only assume he took Lewis’s use of
“distinct” to mean non-identical instead of non-overlapping). I shall ignore those two examples (#s 2 and 3
in his paper). Another of Kim’s example’s (#1) involves things he admits may not be events (e g.,
yesterday’s being Monday), and 1 think that indeed they are not events, so I ignore that example also.
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false): since the counterfactuals in DSA are non-backtracking, (2) does not follow from
(1). With respect to PSA, the challenge posed by this deterministic example would go
like this: (1 ) If the window-break had not occurred, it would have to have been that the
rock-throw did not occur, (2 ) therefore, if the window-break had not occurred, the
chance of the rock-throw at the time at the end of the actual window-break would have
been 0 instead of 1, (3 ) therefore, PSA counts the window-break a cause of the rock-
throw. (2 ) is not a backtracker; but (1) is. Then why does (2 ) follow from (1 ')? It
seems it does not unless it invokes a similarity relation from that same, prohibited
backtracking class. But then since PSA is restricted to the other class, (3 ) will not follow
from (2').
For indeterministic cases, I believe there is no asymmetry threat to begin with: chancy
events can fail on their own, so there can be no justification for supposing that were they
not to occur, it would have to be that their causes also failed, or that their causes’ chances
were lower. Let the rock-throw (c) be an indeterministic cause of the window-break (e),
so that the chance of e just before e occurs is .99 thanks to c. Note that at the time te at
(the end of) e, the chance of c is 1, since c is past. Even on a backtracking interpretation,
there is no ground for saying that if e had not occurred, it would (have to) have been that
c’s chance at te was lower (i.e., 0, since at te the rock-throw is in the past and its chance
can only be 0 or 1)—for, since e was never determined to occur, it might have failed to
occur even given that c occurred, which is to say, even given that c’s chance was still 1 at
te . (Parallel reasoning holds where a different chance time is used for comparison in
PSA. The chance of c, at any time, need not differ in order for e to fail to occur.) For
any occurrent event e whose chance is less than 1 at all times before it happens, no claim
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about how the past would have been different had it not occurred can be true, even in a
backtracking context 9
3.3.3 Common Cause
The proscription against backtracking also solves a problem arising from events
having a common cause. Assume determinism again. Suppose c is a direct cause of e,
and a direct cause ofe2
,
and is neither a cause nor an effect ofe2 . One might reason
like this: (1) If ej had not occurred, it would have to have been that c did not occur,
whereupon e2, too, would not have occurred, (2) therefore DSA counts e 7 a cause of e2 .
Since (1) depends on backtracking, (2) does not follow. Similarly: (1') If e} had not
occurred, then it would have to have been that c, and then e2, would not have occurred, so
if ej had not occurred, the chance of e2 at the time at the end of ej would have been 0
instead of 1; (2 ) so e t comes out a cause of e2 on PSA. Again, the argument is faulty by
relying on backtracking.
As before, there is no threat of a challenge of this sort in a chancy setting. Even under
a backtracking interpretation, the needed counterfactuals are false: for instance, it is not
true that if ej had not occurred, it would have to have been that c’s, or e2 s, chance was
lower (at e/s time)—for ej can fail with the chances of c and e2 being just what they are
at all times.
9
Perhaps in practice we accept backtrackers, in backtracking contexts, even while believing that the effects
at issue are chancy: one might say, “If the doorbell had not rung, it would have to have been that 1 did not
press the button.” 1 think that if the ringing is genuinely chancy, this counterfactual is false. If the doorbell
had not rung, it might have been that still the button was pressed, yet the bell failed to ring—if you do not
believe that, then you are not really thinking of the ring as chancy. Or, you believe that as long as the
button is pressed, the bell would ring, given how very improbable the bell's not ringing would be. On the
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3 3.4 Standard Non-preemptive Overdetermination
In instances of deterministic overdetermination of an occurrent event e, multiple
distinct events occur such that, were none of them to occur, e would not occur, yet e
would still occur as long as any of the multiple did In some such cases, some of the
multiple are causes and some are not—these are cases of preemption. I will address
preemption later in this chapter (Section 3 .4.2). In other instances of overdetermination,
either all of the multiple events are causes or none of them are—though it may be unclear
which of these is the case. This is ww-preemptive overdetermination.
Cases also divide according to whether they are intuitively asymmetric—that is,
according to whether they inspire any inclination to count some of the multiple as causes
but not others. Here is an example of the intuitively symmetric sort of case: two (or
three, or ten) assassins’ shots hit the mark squarely, such that either shot by itself would
have been enough to cause the death. Clearly, each shot is a cause of the death or neither
is, since neither shot is in any way special relative to the other. All intuitively symmetric
cases are uncontroversially non-preemptive. Intuitively asymmetric cases can be
controversial, many are generally accepted to be preemption cases, but some cause
disagreement. In Section 3. 4. 2. 2, we will look at controversial cases. Here I want to
address the intuitively symmetric, clearly non-preemptive cases.
There is indeterministic overdetermination as well. Here, the chance of e is
overdetermined: the chance of e would have been lower had none of the multiple
occurred, but it would have been the same as long as any of them occurred Due to the
incorrectness of saying that something improbable would not happen just because it is so very improbable,
see the end of Section 2.2.
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complexities of indeterministic causation, of which we will see more later on, the causal
relationships between these events and e could be of various sorts. All I want to address
here are the intuitively symmetric, non-preemptive cases. Example: two switches are
simultaneously flipped and each flip is enough to make the chance of the lamp coming on
what it was (at the time of the flips)— .99, say—and the lamp does come on.
I shall refer to intuitively symmetric, non-preemptive overdetermination, whether
deterministic or chancy, as standard non-preemptive overdetermination
For the assassin example (deterministic), DSA says that neither overdeterminer is a
cause: for each shot, the death would have occurred without it. PSA says this also, since
for each shot, the chance of the death would have been the same (=1), at the relevant
time, had it not occurred. In the lamp example (chancy), PSA gets that neither flip is a
cause of the lamp coming on, since for each, without it the chance of the lamp coming on
would have been the same. Are these the right results?
There is general agreement that intuitions waiver as to whether this sort of
overdeterminer is a cause. We are inclined to feel that in a sense it is and in a sense it is
not. Some writers lean towards the affirmative, I am undecided. I shall heretofore be
assuming that, as far as we know, it is acceptable not to count standard non-preemptive
overdeterminers as causes at all. I shall not, in my own analyses (Chapters 5 and 6), be
offering any way to count them.
Does excluding them leave a gap in the causal history of the overdetermined event?
No, because we may say that some composite of the overdeterminers caused the effect: if
the composite had not occurred, none of its parts would have, and so the effect would not
have occurred. This claim that none of the composite’s parts would have occurred if the
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composite had not has been attacked, by Michael McDermott (1995a, p 135) and
Stephen Yablo (2002, p 139): might not some of the parts still have occurred? The
answer depends on what is meant by “the composite Suppose the composite can occur
only if all its parts do each part is essential. For example, we might take “the 21
-gun
salute” to have all its parts essentially. I agree that it sounds fine to say that if the 21-gun
salute had not occurred, some of the guns might have fired. And it is consistent with the
occurrence conditions of the whole event, since the nonoccurrence of a single part
suffices for the nonoccurrence of the whole. But suppose the composite can occur as
long as any of its parts do each part is sufficient. Then in supposing away the whole,
we must suppose away all the parts. For example, we might take a ceremonial shotgun
blast to be an event that occurs as long as at least one barrel fires, though in fact both fire.
“Had the ceremonial shotgun blast not occurred, one of the barrels might still have fired”
is false. As long as “the composite” means a sum for whose occurrence any of the parts
is sufficient, the effect will depend counterfactually on the composite. The
aforementioned attackers simply do not take this sort of sum seriously. McDermott does
not consider it. Yablo simply asserts that we do not accept such a sum as an event (and
he erroneously cites Lewis for support—in fact Lewis never says that there are no such
sums (see Section 2.4.3 on disjunctive events, or Lewis 1986b, p. 266, last full
paragraph)).
3.3.5 Meta-prevention
Sometimes an event e depends on another c because c prevents some third event d that
would have prevented e—
c
prevents the prevention of e. Thus I murder the clumsy
trapeze artist by untying his safety net as he falls: the death depends upon the untying,
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thanks to the fact that the untying prevents a later presence of net from preventing the
death (again, like many, 1 count object presences as events) DSA counts the untying as
among the causes of the death (mind you, it does not say it is the cause). Likewise for
PSA: whether the situation is chancy or deterministic, if the untying had not occurred,
the chance of the death would have been less probable, at the time at the end of the
untying. This seems like a fine result, to me, but as we will see, some would disagree
with it. First, consider more evidence that meta-prevention counts as causation. 10
The removal of a pin from a grenade will cause an explosion; the destruction of a dam
will cause a flood, and the cutting of a climber’s rope, the opening of a gas valve, the
placing of a pillow over someone’s face, and the pressing of a button that merely opens a
trap door and allows a bomb to fall out of a plane all have serious effects. These causes
succeed by way of preventing that which could have prevented the final effect—the
pillow denies one a breath, the cutting prevents a complete rope, the destruction of the
dam removes a dam. This structure, it seems to me, is not hidden from view in these
cases, but rather is something intuitively apparent; and without reservation we speak as if
it is causal. The structure is also common and commonly perceived to be causal: we
regularly think that removing, releasing, unveiling, unblocking, untying, disconnecting,
letting go, cutting loose and turning off have effects—releasing the rope will cause her
to fall, untying that knot will cause the tent to collapse, unveiling the statue now could
cause quite a stir, turning off the power will cause the emergency lights to come on. So
10
Meta-prevention is variously referred to in the literature as “double prevention," “disconnection, and
“the prevention of prevention.’’ Of these three, 1 think the last is most apt, but it makes a clunky adjective.
Awareness of the structure of meta-prevention, as well as an appreciation of the plausibility of the idea
that meta-preventers are causes, appears in McDermott 1995b, p 529. But it is strongly suggested in
David Fair 1979 (Sections VIII and IX).
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DSA’s verdict on meta-prevention cases is strongly supported by ordinary (thought and)
usage.
11
And it is an important verdict, because meta-preventers are often the only causes we
are interested in, and it would be hard to do without them When the chandelier falls, we
do not want to hear that the fall was caused by a gravitational field (we already know
about that) we want to hear that the chain was cut. Wiien we want to know the causes
of the lake water flooding the town, we do not want to hear about gravity or the height of
the lake—we want to hear about the explosion at the dam, or the opening of too many
flow valves. Likewise for many examples. (Often we are not expecting the effect e,
because the status quo would not lead to it, then when e occurs, we are interested in the
violations of the status quo, and in the causes of those violations—the missing net, the
missing rope, pin, dam, breath of air, trap door, and the causes of those absences—and
often the causes are meta-preventers.)
Thus, if we reject meta-preventers as causes, it appears we reject much confident and
important ordinary talk. I know of no confident and important denials of causation in
meta-prevention cases such that in accepting meta-prevention as causation we must still
reject confident and important ordinary talk. There are just the cases, which I will
illustrate below, where we are a little reticent to claim causation, but we can still muster
sympathy. So it appears there is a real imbalance here, such that accepting meta-
prevention as causation is preferable to rejecting it.
11
See Jonathan Schaffer (2000c) for more good examples—though 1 think their meta-preventive structure
is not ordinarily obvious without examination, which is why I have pressed other examples here. I want to
emphasize that meta-preventive causation is not alien to our concept of causation; we claim causation even
when we see the meta-preventive structure right off.
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Ned Hall (2000) offers the following as a meta-prevention example for which we are
uncomfortable claiming causation (and rightly so, in his view). Suzy is on her way to
throw a water balloon at a dog. Billy is running at Suzy to intercept her before she does
it and he would have succeeded if he hadn’t tripped The wet dog yelps If Billy hadn’t
tripped on the root, the yelp wouldn’t have occurred, but it seems a little odd to say that
Billy’s trip is a cause of the yelp.
First, we should tweak the example. While it is true that, as Hall says, if Billy had not
tripped, the yelp would not have occurred, it is not clearly true that if Billy’s trip had not
occurred, the yelp would not have occurred. Only the latter counterfactual is at issue.
What is the trip? Picture it: a running boy kicks a root and goes forward and down. I
think that if this had not taken place, Billy might have been running toward Suzy, but also
he might have been stopped, or walking. To suppose away the trip is to suppose away a
stage of a journey of a moving object, and I don’t think we can say that without this stage
the object would have been moving in a certain different place and manner. 12 The
example is clearer ifwe put the disrupter outside the process that is being disrupted:
Amy leaps at Billy and tackles him. If the leap hadn’t occurred, the yelp wouldn’t have
occurred DSA counts Amy’s leap as a cause of the dog’s yelp. That, to my ear, sounds
less odd than counting the trip a cause; anyway, it may still, I take it, be something that
we are reluctant to accept, something that seems more off than, say, the claim that the
explosion of the dam was a cause of the flood.
12
Similar remarks apply to Hall’s other meta-prevention example in that paper. The candidate cause is a
group of men “stopping into a pub.” Hall says, if they hadn’t stopped in, they would have kept going.
Fine, but irrelevant. The question is what would have happened if the stop hadn’t occurred. What is the
stop? As I picture it, some men walk into a pub (what else?). It isn’t clearly true that if that liadn t gone
on, those men would have been on their originally intended course.
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But as I said, this reluctance does not carry much weight once we take into account
that with a little effort we can muster a good amount of sympathy for the claim after all
Imagine you expect Billy to stop Suzy from soaking your dog-perhaps Suzy attempts
every day to soak it, and Billy always stops her. Today, to your surprise, Suzy succeeds,
and your poor dog yelps. You learn that Amy wanted the dog to yelp, so she leapt on
Billy to that end. Naturally you hold Amy partly to blame for the dog’s misery and its
yelping in fright. Notice that Amy’s leap helps explain to you why the dog yelped, notice
that Amy’s leap was an effective means to the yelp, notice that it would be a bit of a
strain to blame Amy for the dog’s frightful yelp while maintaining that her action was in
no way a cause of it. In light of this, counting the leap as among the causes of the yelp
seems quite acceptable.
13
On balance, when we survey a variety of examples (which Hall, by the way, does not
do), counting meta-prevention as causation seems the better way to go. 14
Hall complains that counting meta-prevention as causation is inconsistent with various
intuitions that we have about causation—most notably (for Hall) the intuition that
causation is transitive, 15 but also the intuition that, in the actual world, no event causes
another at a distance without causing events in between, and the intuition that “the causal
structure of a process” is determined by its intrinsic, noncausal character plus the laws
that govern it (p. 217). Hall thinks that, in conjunction with our reluctance to posit
1
3
1 am not claiming that there are decisive correlations between causes and means, explanations, and
objects of blame. I am just pushing intuitions here.
14
Hall accepts that there may be a kind of “causation” on which meta-prevention counts as causation, but
he thinks this must be an unordinary and “second-class” kind of causation (2000, p. 202). Obv iously this
will not satisfy the above evidence, which, as I have stressed, involves ordinary and common talk.
15
1 won’t go into his examples here. We will see examples like them in Section 5.4.2.
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causation in some meta-prevention cases, these violations indicate that meta-prevention is
not really causation. But even if he is right about all those inconsistencies (though 1 am
not saying he is), there is still good reason not to give this any decisive weight For it is
reasonable not to let theoretical intuitions about the nature of a subject overturn good
evidence from ordinary usage, given that one’s project is the analysis of an ordinary
concept.
The wedding’s not occurring caused much weeping, his failure to brake caused a
crash, the absence of the predicted rain was a cause of the brushfire, the clock alarms
failing to sound caused the participants to be absent: there are many cases in which it
seems correct to talk in terms of causation by absence, or omission, or nonoccurrence.
Ultimately sense must be made of this talk. I will not attempt to do it in this dissertation.
However, throughout, I shall talk of nonoccurrences as causes and effects where it seems
natural and correct to do so. Cases of meta-prevention raise the first opportunity to talk
about causation by nonoccurrence. The cases reveal that sometimes one event is a cause
ofanother in virtue ofa causal intermediary that is a nonoccurrence, placing the pillow
on the face causes a nonoccurrence of breathing which in turn causes the death.
Intuitively, this is how the smothering causes the death, by way of this intermediate
nonoccurrence. Similarly for all cases of meta-prevention. This is a simple but important
fact about event causation that I will occasionally draw attention to in later chapters.
3.4 Genuine Problems
Now we turn to two genuine problems for the simple analyses. The first applies only
to PSA, the second to both PSA and DSA.
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3.4.1 Failed Potential Causes
Two radioactive samples are placed near each other, one meter away from a Geiger
counter Each placement of a sample is such that, were it not to occur, the chance of the
Geiger counter going “click” within the next minute would be lower (at the time the
placements occur) than it actually is, because there would be less radioactive material
One “click” occurs within the next minute. Each sample-placement made the click more
probable, but only one was a cause of it, because the click resulted from a particle emitted
from one sample but not the other. This illustrates the problem of failed potential causes,
events that at some point from the time they occur stand a chance of being causes of a
certain event but in the end do not succeed, though the event still occurs (by other
causes), often such events make the effect more probable. 16 The problem is that PSA
counts these non-causes as causes. There is no problem here for DSA, since the effect
will not be counterfactually dependent on such a non-cause—without it, the effect might
still occur, thanks to the other potential causes. (Clearly the problem of failed potential
causes arises even in thoroughly indeterministic worlds.)
Failed potential causes may be divided into two kinds. In the kind just illustrated, the
failure is the result of the failure of a causal intermediate: one sample-placement fails to
cause a particle emission, which in turn fails to trip the Geiger counter. Another kind is
pointed up by Jonathan Schaffer (2000a)—he calls it “overlapping”—and it need not
involve a failed intermediate. Here is one of Schaffer’s examples. Spells PK and PQ are
cast simultaneously. They are of different types: PK generates a .5 chance of the prince
16
This sort of problem for the probabilistic counterfactual approach was pointed up by Peter Menzies
(1989a), though he (1989a, 1996) casts it as a problem that arises only in preemption situations (described
below), which is not accurate. The example just given is not a preemption situation.
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and the king becoming frogs, while PQ generates a 5 chance of the prince and the queen
becoming frogs, the occurrence of each transformation pair is, in any situation,
probabilistically independent of the occurrence of the other and of the occurrence of
spells cast upon another pair, and neither spell generates any chance at all that only one of
its potential victims becomes a frog—it is both or neither. So the prince’s chance of
becoming a frog is .75. As it turns out, the king and prince, but not the queen, turn into
frogs. Then it seems only PK caused the prince to become a frog, even though each spell
made it more probable (without it, the chance of the effect at the time of the spells would
have been lower than it actually was).
Does this challenge apply to thoroughly indeterministic worlds? I think it does. Add
that the frog transformation of each royal person always has a slight independent chance.
(We can still leave it that a spell makes the chance of its corresponding pair .5
.) Suppose
that without either spell, this background chance is .01 for each person. Now an effect
pair will be independent of the other kind of spell and of the other pair modulo the
independent background chances: for example, with no spells, the chance of the queen
and prince both becoming frogs is .0001
,
add PK and it must go up, since PK makes the
prince transformation more probable—it goes up to (.5 x .01) + (.5 x .0001), or 00505.
If both spells are cast, the chance of the prince becoming a frog is still .75. If only the
prince and king change, it seems that, since PQ contributes only to the chance of the
prince/queen pair (and what it contributes to the other pair is only a byproduct of
contributing to the prince/queen pair), it did not help—did not cause—the prince to
become a frog.
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3.4.2 The Preemption Problem
3 4.2.1 Description and Simple Illustration
Suppose a cause of e prevents, or at least has some chance of preventing, another
event from being a cause of e. In many such cases, were the cause not to occur, e might
(or would) occur, or its chance might be lower. Where the prevention goes through, that
is preemption—a potential cause is preempted by an actual one—but even the
probabilistic potential of preemption can make trouble for PSA, as we will see Let the
preemption problem be that in virtue of (potential) preemption, analyses fail.
Independently, you order Roger to go ring the breakfast bell and I order Dolly to do it.
Dolly is very eager, and she pushes Roger aside on her way up the bell tower,
consequently, she rings the bell and Roger does not. The two orders overdetermine the
ringing, but only my order causes someone to go ring the bell, so it seems my order is a
cause of the ringing and yours is not. The problem is that if my order were not to occur,
your order would cause the ringing, since Roger would follow through. My order
preempts your order, and consequently DSA fails. A “neuron diagram” of the sort Lewis
uses (1986a, p. 200) will be helpful:
17
a b
1
Each circle-vvith-arrow(s) is a “neuron.” Solid neurons fired, dashed ones did not. Normal arrowheads
stimulate, reverse arrowheads inhibit By law, neurons will fire if, and only if, stimulated, unless they are
simultaneously inhibited. The system here begins on the left, upper and lower processes running
synchronously. Letters label the firing events.
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Although it seems a is a cause ofe, the backup process spoils e’s counterfactual
dependence on a without any such alternate process in the picture, e would be
dependent on a, but as it stands, were a not to occur, the backup process would go
through and e would occur anyway. The diagram can also represent (stages of) the
breakfast-bell story: a and d are my and your orders, respectively; b is some late stage of
Dolly’s journey, e is the ringing. 18
Now let us suppose the situation is indeterministic. Specifically, let the backup
process be very reliable, while the successful process is very unreliable, save for the
inhibitory power of a, which is at least moderately reliable (Menzies, 1989a, p. 646).
Then a makes e less likely instead of more, by increasing the probability that only an
unreliable process will be in place after a occurs—<?’s chance at the end ofa would be
higher were a not to occur. So PSA misses counting a as a cause. (One can see that this
problem, too, arises in thoroughly indeterministic worlds.)
Notice that if the inhibited neuron had beaten the odds and fired anyway, so that all
the neurons in the diagram fired, then still a would have failed to contribute to e’s chance
at the end of a’s time—for whether the inhibited neuron fires can have no bearing on
chances at times before it
19 We see, then, that even when the inhibition succeeds, it is
not in virtue of preempting d that a fails to be counted a cause, rather, it is in virtue of a’s
18
(I am assuming that in supposing away a we suppose that neither axon carries a signal. I think there are
common-sense identity conditions for a that demand this—but I will not defend that here One always has
the option simply of tacking on a stimulatory neuron before o and letting that be the preempting event
)
19
I am assuming that if the inhibited neuron fired and b occurred, each of those events would contribute to
e’s chance, as potential joint causes of e; in that case, at least, it is clear that a is a cause of e when both
processes go through (Where instead there is overdetermination of e’s chance by the two direct firings on
it, it is not clear to me that a , or any other single firing, should count as a cause of e.)
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significant potential to preempt d—a relatively potent potential cause ofe—that a fails to
be counted a cause.
We should consider the case where chances are extreme, all Os and Is. In such a case,
clearly e s chance at the end of a would still be 1 were a not to occur
Suppose the depicted situation is chancy throughout. Then were d not to occur, the
chance of e at the end of <7 would be lower (Menzies, 1989a, pp 646-7). So d'\s wrongly
counted a cause by PSA. It is important to see that this spurious causation is not part of
the preemption problem—
d
is counted a cause not in virtue of (potential) preemption.
Rather, this is just an instance of the problem discussed in the previous section, that of
failed potential causes. Notice that/ need not be inhibited by a cause of e in order to fail
to occur, nor, in fact, need it be inhibited at all, since the situation is chancy—/can
simply fail on its own to occur. But in these other situations, still d contributes to e’s
chance and is wrongly counted a cause of e. The fact that/s failure was made even more
probable by an inhibitor, and a preemptor at that, seems to add nothing of significance to
the problem, /failed because it was not determined, this would be so with or without a.
We can expect that a decent solution to the problem of failed potential causes will be
general enough to solve it for the cases that do involve preemption, so there is no value in
making the preemption problem’s solution more difficult by adding to it failed potential
causes that are also preempted.
There are other, interestingly different varieties of preemption, but we will take these
up in the context of proposed solutions in the next two chapters.
In Figure 3. 1, the backup causal sequence, or process, fails to go through, since/ does
not occur. As I shall push, all clear cases of preemption involve a backup sequence that,
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thanks to the preempting cause, does not completely come off—at the least, there are
possible parts of events in the backup sequence that are prevented by the preempting
cause. Several alleged examples of preemption have been offered that challenge this
Failure Thesis. I shall now discuss these and explain why I do not accept them as
genuine preemption examples.
3. 4. 2. 2 Alleged Preemption Set Aside
3 4.2.2.1 Allegedly Preemptive Prevention
If I stop a baseball with my hand before the ball hits a window, the presence of my
hand is one of the causes of the later presence of intact glass in the window (the latter is
dependent on the former). It is a meta-preventive cause (Section 3.3.5). Now suppose
that Ann’s raised hand was between me and the window and would have stopped the ball
had I missed it, we might still want to say that my hand’s presence was a cause of the
later intact-glass presence (John Collins 2000, p. 223 )
20
That is, we might just want to
count the presence of Ann’s hand as a backup potential cause that was preempted by the
presence of my hand. But then, the problem for the Failure Thesis is that the backup
process actually goes through just as it would without the (putative) preemptor: in both
cases we have the presence of Ann’s hand, the nonoccurrence of the ball flight between
her hand and the glass, and the presence of intact window.
Picture yourself in a special suit of 100%-reliable, bullet-proof armor. Someone
shoots at you (in the direction of your heart) with a 22-caliber pistol, and I, always trying
to play the hero, dive in front of you and take the bullet. Did I save your life? Offhand,
20 The example is a variant of the wall-backup version described below, which is due to Michael
McDermott (1995b).
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‘No seems like the better answer For given your armor, you were in no danger from
that bullet But take off the armor and my leap clearly does save your life Whether the
armor is present makes a strong intuitive difference, and the corresponding shift in
judgement as to whether the leap saves your life (is a cause of your later live presence)
seems appropriate. Now why was the corresponding shift not as clearly appropriate in
the previous story? That is, why was it more plausible that the first hand saved the glass
both with and without the backup? We must consider some other examples.
If behind my hand was, instead of a second hand, a “high, broad, thick, sturdy wall”
(Lewis 2000, p. 197), then we would, I think, be a little less inclined to count the first
hand’s presence a (preempting) cause of the intact-glass presence, though perhaps we still
might. If I were to block a lightly tossed, live hand grenade whose velocity vector at the
moment I stopped it was pointed at the future location of a flying eagle five miles off, we
would surely not be inclined to say that my hand’s presence saved the eagle’s life, or was
a cause of its later normal flight—here a backup is the gravitational field that would have
pulled the grenade down if my hand had not been there (this example is adapted from
Collins 2000, p. 224). Picture a bowling lane with a high wall of sandbags across the
middle of it. If I were to stop a ball that was rolling at a modest speed down the
beginning of the lane, would we say that I saved the pins from falling, that my act was
among the causes of the pins standing up shortly thereafter? Not likely. In sum, as I see
it, we have the grenade example and the special-armor example which we are very
disinclined to call preemption, we have the bowling example where we are pretty
disinclined, the sturdy wall example where we are a little disinclined but somewhat on
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the fence, and the two-hand example where we lean towards calling it preemption. How
can DSA reconcile this dynamic of intuitions?
I suggest that whenever there is this kind of backup disrupter in place, the first
disrupter is not a cause of the final event, and the main reason it sometimes seems better
to say otherwise is that, as has often been noted, we have a strong and pervasive tendency
to view the world as indeterministic. Surely this tendency is stronger the more the
situation involves human action and projectiles in the air. Notice that for the kind of case
at issue, if all is chancy, then the first disrupter makes the final event more probable,
because there is a chance the second disrupter will fail to stop the process that threatens
the final event. If the first disrupter makes the final event more probable, this
may make it look like a cause, and indeed it may be one. It is plausible that the stronger
the temptation to view one of these situations as thoroughly chancy, the stronger the
temptation to count the first disrupter a cause. But since DSA applies only to
deterministic settings, we ought to set aside any causal intuitions that arise only from a
sense that, contrary to stipulation, the situation is chancy. When I said, “special suit of
100%-reliable, bullet-proof armor,” this made intuitively clear the extreme improbability
of the projectile getting by the second disrupter, and the first disrupter did not seem like a
cause. To the extent I embrace the fact that there is really zero chance that the ball will
pass or penetrate the wall if the first hand is absent, the catch seems to achieve nothing.
As hard as it is intuitively to embrace extreme chances where we are not used to doing it,
it seems to me that, to the extent I do it, the first disrupter in all such stories is no more a
savior than my leap when I take a bullet in the armor story. As for the eagle example,
plausibly the catch so clearly does not seem like a cause because we are inclined to think
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that there is no chance the grenade will reach the eagle-we are in the habit of taking the
earth’s gravitational field as a definite given, something with no chance of vanishing. 21
Collins (2000) and Lewis (2000) (and perhaps Hitchcock (2001)) want an analysis to
be flexible in a way that respects our varying intuitions about these cases. Their general
idea is that whether the first disrupter is a cause is relative to the remoteness of the
possibility that the threat process, from a point between the two disrupters, could proceed
beyond the second disrupter and prevent the final event—if very remote, the first
disrupter is not a savior (not a cause); otherwise it is. How remote is “very” remote is
something we are not set on: our mood varies, and contextual factors may help to
(roughly) draw the line. I have no reason to think this tack cannot succeed, and I have
said nothing that tells against it. My point is that there is another answer that appears
satisfactory, and it leaves SCA in the clear: it is the range of our inclinations to view the
cases as chancy that explains the range of our causal intuitions; and since the cases are
stipulated to be deterministic, causal intuitions resulting from viewing them otherwise
need not be respected.
3.4.2.2 2 Paul’s Bullet
L. A. Paul (1998a, pp. 52-3) puts forward the following as a case of preemption 22
The final effect (e) at issue is the presence of a bullet in spatial region S. As it happens, e
occurs at tj. e’s occurrence conditions allow that e could occur later, at least as late as k.
2] On reflection, some may be able to locate a feeling that there is some non-zero chance of e, for any future
potential e. But I don’t think this is an intuition normally in play, and anyway if one truly accepts that there
is some chance that the gravitational field will vanish, I think one should be happy to say that the grenade-
catch was a cause.
:: The version of the example I discuss comes from a suggestion in her footnote 7.
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and that it could involve any bullet The bullet whose presence actually constitutes e is in
flight, so that a cause of e is the same bullet’s presence immediately beforehand (c) A
second bullet is not far behind, passing through S at t2 , and so if c had not occurred, e
would have occurred anyway, at t2, in virtue of this second bullet’s presence (So there
are actually two distinct presences of a bullet in S, both presences falling within the
temporal boundaries of e’s occurrence conditions.) In this example, none of the backup
process is missing, in apparent violation of the Failure Thesis.
But I think e is overly extrinsic. As discussed in Section 2.4, 1 take events to be
predominantly intrinsic properties of spatiotemporal regions (following Lewis). Very
extrinsic events are set aside as outside the scope of the present project of causal analysis.
Here is why we should count e as overly extrinsic.
First notice the trouble that e generates. In addition to e, let us talk about the two
occurrent presences of a bullet in S that essentially occur at the times they actually occur,
ti and t2 . call these events e/ and e2 (e/ and e actually occur in the same region, while e2
occurs in another region). The claim is that if c had not occurred, e/ would not have,
though both e2 and e would have. It seems pretty clear, then, that if ej had not occurred,
e2 and e still would have. But then it appears that if e had not occurred, e2 would not
have occurred—for in supposing away e, it is not enough to suppose away e/ and leave
e2 . Now if counterfactual dependence between actually distinct occurrent events is
sufficient for causation, e gets counted a cause of e2, which obviously it is not (remember
that e’s region is the same as e/’s). But as I said above (Section 3.2), it may be that it is
only dependence between essentially distinct occurrent events that is sufficient for
causation. But even then there is still a problem: e may wrongly get counted a cause of
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some direct effects of e2 , for it may be that some such effects would not have occurred if
e had not occurred, since in supposing away e we suppose away e2 . The problem arises
because in order to suppose away e we have to suppose away an event actually distinct
from it. This is because e’s occurrence is implied by goings on outside its region—by e2 .
Where an event is implied by goings on outside its region, it cannot be said to be intrinsic
to that one region, but largely extrinsic to it.
23
3. 4. 2. 2. 3 “Rumpelstiltskin II”
This is from Michael McDermott (1995b, p. 534—the second Rumpelstiltskin story in
the paper). He does not advertise it as specifically a preemption-type challenge, but it is
one. I ask the prince his name. One witch has cast a spell that will turn him into a frog if
he answers “Rumpelstiltskin,” and a second witch has cast a spell that will turn him into a
frog if he does not answer “Rumpelstiltskin.” The prince answers “Rumpelstiltskin” and
turns into a frog.
A stated intention is that the spells and the saying work directly, so that there are never
any causal intermediates between them and frog transformations.
McDermott says that the saying of “Rumpelstiltskin” is a cause of the prince’s
transformation. Yet had the saying not occurred, the effect still would have. It seems,
and McDermott claims, that the second spell is not a cause, notice that if the saying had
23
It may be that e occurs iffe t occurs or e2 occurs. There is nothing wrong with that disjunctiveness, for it
is true generally that events that can occur in various ways have an occurrence condition that is a
disjunction of occurrences of the specific possible variants (see Section 2.4.3). The real problem is that the
regions of occurrence do not track the disjuncts: When both e, and e2 occur, e is in e,'s region only. The
occurrence condition just given is silent on e’s region of occurrence—that does not make it false, but in
order for e to be a genuine event, it must also be true that e occurs only if e occurs in the union of the
regions of w hichever of e, and e2 occur Otherw ise, that e occurs can be implied by goings on outside e's
region, and e is thus not intrinsic enough to its region.
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not occurred, the second spell would definitely have been a cause, one on which the
effect was counterfactually dependent Therefore, the example threatens to be an
instance of preemption, where the saying preempts the second spell
I think there is an intuitive temptation to view the saying as somehow “cutting off’ or
“deactivating” the second spell. But it is the author’s intention that there is no such
failure in or between the second spell and the effect. A “neuron” example, using
analogous laws, may be clearer, the clearer is the intended structure, the more my
response can be appreciated, so let us consider the following.
r is the firing of an R-type neuron, sj of an Si -type, etc. By law, a P neuron will fire if
fired upon simultaneously by Si and R neurons, and, by law, a P neuron will fire if fired
upon by an S2 neuron while no R neuron also fires upon it. All neurons fire. If r and Sj
cause p, and s2 does not, then r preempts S2—preemption without any failure in the
backup process.
McDermott’s example has been ignored. No counterfactual analysis (save perhaps the
one McDermott proposes in the paper) counts r but not s2 as a cause .
24
But the example
24
McDermott uses a somewhat complex maneuver (based on counterfactual sufficiency rather than
necessity) that I w ill not go into. Most analyses count both or neither of r and s2 as causes; my defense will
imply that counting both or neither is acceptable.
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has intuitive pull, some response is called for There is a response that I hope you find
good enough to justify setting the example aside as being not clearly successful
Fortunately, an analogous response will apply also to allegedly preemptive "tramping”
cases, which I take up in the next section.
Let C represent a thorough characterization of the background circumstances of r and
s2 : the presence of the P neuron in a suitable environment (wet, pressurized, warm, etc ),
the absence of potential inhibitors ofp (inhibitory neuron firings, meteorites, etc ), the
absence of other neurons connected to the P neuron other than those shown in Figure 3.2,
and the occurrence of Sj. C does not lawfully imply (the occurrence of) p. But C plus r
does, and, less obviously, C plus s2 does (various derivative laws make this so for
example, “If Si and S 2 neurons fire on a P neuron, the P neuron will fire”). Thus/? is
actually implied by C plus r but also by C plus s2 . This double implication is not obvious
at first, but when I look at Figure 3.2 and attend to it, the case looks to me a lot like a case
of standard non-preemptive overdetermination: in the example in which two assassins hit
their target at the same time, the background circumstances plus either shot implies the
victim’s death, just as C plus r and C plus s2 both imply p. And when I see the case in
this light, I have to some extent the same reaction that I have generally for standard non-
preemptive overdetermination: for each candidate cause, it seems it’s helping and it
seems it’s not—it seems it’s not, I think, because it is occurring in surroundings that
intuitively are already enough for the effect, namely the background circumstances plus
the other candidate—and consequently it seems acceptable to count each candidate as a
25
Throughout, when I say “the occurrence of e," I mean that e occurs.
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cause but also acceptable to count neither The upshot is that 1 can see the case as not
preemption, and as one for which DSA gets an acceptable result
(The ways C plus s2 and C plus r imply e are not quite symmetrical arguably C plus
implies/; only with laws that are derivative. But the intuitive question remains: isn’t
C plus 52 enough for If the answer is not clearly Yes, still it seems, to me, it is not
clearly No, either. For some derivative laws, the antecedent situation implies the
consequent situation by way of implying some third situation (a common cause, perhaps):
e g., falling barometers are followed by falling rain. We do not think the falling
barometer is enough for the rain, and it isn’t—we need that third thing, too, namely low
air pressure. But no such back-door implication is involved in the case at hand: 5
; plus s2
does not imply p by way of implying some other event that causes p. So we should not
dismiss the question of whether C plus s2 appears to be enough forp simply because
derivative laws are involved.)
When the two assassins hit their target, we blame them for the death. We say that they
are responsible, and we feel inclined (rightly or wrongly) to say that each is responsible,
that each is a murderer. If the bullet of one assassin were to arrive first, knocking the
victim down so that the second bullet missed, we would hold only one assassin
responsible for the death (even if we would punish the other for his attempt); this assassin
would be convicted of murder, and the other assassin of attempted murder. Thus our
intuitions about responsibility vary depending on whether we perceive an
overdetermination case to be preemptive. Suppose p is the prince’s undeserved death.
Mr. R and Ms. S 2 both want that p occur, they know that a process has been set in motion
that will bring about si at /, they know all the relevant laws (including derivative ones);
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neither knows or cares what the other is planning to do Shortly before s,, each orders
his/her servant to bring about r/s2 at /, and, as each knew would happen, the prince dies. I
think a jury would hang both Mr R and Ms S2 for murder. 1 would The jury would be
loathe to accept that Ms. S 2 lucked out, that thanks to the other process she is guilty only
of attempted murder. Perhaps the jury would be wrong here, but note this contrast: if
Ms S 2 s servant had held back once she saw that Mr. R’s servant was going to go ahead
(standard preemption), then the jury would be quick to accept that Ms. S2 lucked out, that
she was not guilty of murder, but of attempted murder. Why the contrast? The moral
setting seems to bring out the overdetermination take on the case. Consequently it is not
clear to me that the example counts as preemption. 26
3.4.2.2 4 Trumping
Suppose that, by law, the prince’s fate corresponds to the spell cast by the tallest
person, and warlocks are taller than witches—warlocks “outrank” witches, as I’ll put it.
Thus, if a witch casts a goat spell while a warlock casts a frog spell, the prince becomes a
frog (warlocks trump). Today, a warlock and a witch each cast a death spell, and the
6
Perhaps I should point out that in ordinary preemption cases there is a background circumstance at the
time of the cause such that, in conjunction with either the preempting event or an actual preempted one at
that time, the effect is implied (this fact implies the similar, but more oft-noted, fact that not only
preempting but also preempted actual events belong to minimal sufficient conditions for the effect). Take,
for example, the preemption depicted in Figure 3.1. Say a and d occur at time t. At t, certain neurons are
properly positioned in an appropriate environment, and many events with the power to prevent b,for e do
not occur (e g., meteorites, inhibitory firings other than a)—these /-circumstances do not lawfully imply e,
but in conjunction w ith (the occurrence of) a they do, and in conjunction with d they do. In conjunction
with d they do because the only lawful way that/could fail to occur after d occurs (given we pack enough
nonoccurrences into the /-circumstances just described) is for a to occur—
a
is the only event left that can
prevent/ But, my point in the mam text is an intuitive one, with which 1 am hoping you can sympathize:
For “Rumpelstiltskin II,” once I attend to the sy mmetry of the lawful implication, intuitively the example
looks a lot like standard non-preemptive overdetermination, in that it looks as though the alleged cause is
not really helping under the circumstances. This is in contrast to ordinary preemption: once aware of the
lawful symmetry as it exists in Figure 3.1, it still seems there is a strong sense in which a is helpmg under
the circumstances.
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prince dies. Call these two spells war and wit, respectively. 27 Let’s say spells act
directly, there are no intermediate stages whatsoever This is a variant of a spell example
that Schaffer (2000b) gives to illustrate “trumping preemption ”28 He would claim that
war caused the prince’s death and wit did not. The death does not depend on war, since
without war, wit would be the highest-ranking spell and the death would still occur. So
the example threatens to be a case of preemption involving no failure in the backup
process.
As with “Rumpelstiltskin II,” it is tempting, I think, to view war as somehow blocking
or “deactivating” wit. But it is Schaffer’s stated intention that there need be no such
failure in or between a trumped event and the effect. A “neuron” example may make it a
little easier to resist this temptation.
29
a
Figure 3.3
To be clear: war is essentially a warlock spell, and wit is essentially a witch spell. I remain open as to
whether each is essentially a death spell—either way is fine.
His spell example is one in w hich the earliest spell of the day matches the prince’s midnight fate. 1
forego this example for now because I think the use of a temporal trumping property makes things
intuitively less clear and raises some special issues. (Anyway, it is clear that Schaffer does not want to
confine trumping preemption to cases of temporal trumping properties.)
29 The following example is a variant of one from Ned Hall (not in print). Schaffer also gives non-spell
examples. One involves fields, but 1 think it is easy to be tempted to view a field as blocking or
neutralizing another. Other examples involve human understanding and reacting—no crispness there, in
my view. So I opt for this “neuron” example.
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Suppose neurons fire in colors, and they fire in the color of the smallest neuron to fire
upon them, a and b are both white firings, so e is a white firing Here there is an
intuition that only a, the firing of the small neuron, caused e—as before, preemption
without failure in the backup process.
Say a and b occur at t,, and e occurs at t2 . Let C be a thorough characterization of the
background circumstances ofa and b at t,\ the presence of the well-positioned e neuron
in a suitable wet environment, the absence of any potential inhibitors of e (meteorites,
etc ), the nonoccurrence of non-white firings upon the e neuron, the nonoccurrence of
neurons non-identical to the a and b neurons firing upon the e neuron. 30 C does not
lawfully imply e But C plus a does, and, less obviously, C plus b does (the occurrences
of the white a and b firings are the only t, firings consistent with C; so given C plus b, the
death will occur: if <7 does not also occur, b is smallest, and ifa does occur, a is smallest,
yielding e either way). Thus, under the circumstances, e is actually implied by b as well
as by a. This fact is not ordinarily apparent
,
but when I look at Figure 3.3 and attend to
it, the case looks to me a lot like an overdetermination case, and it seems acceptable to
count both or neither of a and b as causes. Again, the motivation for saying “neither” is
the same as in standard non-preemptive overdetermination cases generally: each
overdeterminer is occurring in circumstances that are already “enough” for the effect (C
plus the other firing), so that neither is, under the circumstances, “helping.” (It is
crucial—so let me emphasize—that the point here is not that C plus b would be enough
for e even without a. Rather, it is that C plus b is enough in the actual situation.)
30
I am assuming that the neurons, and their firings, are essentially the size that they are (C would merely be
more cumbersome to state, otherwise).
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The point carries over to the spell case Let C represent a thorough characterization of
the background circumstances of the two spells: the presence of a live prince, the
nonoccurrence of all spells that are not death spells, and the nonoccurrence of other witch
and warlock death spells (and the nonoccurrence of spells of any other rank besides witch
and warlock, if there be such a thing). C does not imply the death But C plus war does,
and, less obviously, C plus wit does (the occurrences of the war and the wit death spells
are the only spell occurrences consistent with C, if at least one occurs, a death spell is
highest-ranked). Thus, under the circumstances, the death is actually implied by wit as
well as by war. When I attend to this hidden fact, the case looks to me a lot like an
overdetermination case, and it seems acceptable to count both or neither spell as a cause.
In particular, when I see that war's circumstances already imply the death, it seems that
war is not adding anything, not “helping.”
As with “Rumpelstiltskin II,” in a moral context, the overdetermination is more
apparent. Imagine that Princess A and Princess B want the prince dead. They know that
C will obtain. Each is ignorant of the other’s plans. Princess A orders the warlock to cast
war
,
Princess B orders the witch to cast wit, and the orders are carried out. As each knew
would happen, the prince dies. It seems to me that, given the princesses’ knowledge that
C would obtain, the king would convict them both of murder, but if the witch had
refrained because she witnessed A’s order to the warlock (ordinary preemption), the king
would convict B only of attempted murder. I am sure I would do as the king here.
Perhaps the king and I are in error, but I submit that it is not at all clear that we are.
A family of examples involving ranking commands and orders is intuitively more
compelling (for many) than the magical examples. Schaffer gives this one: the major
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and the (lower-ranked) sergeant both order the corporal to charge, and the corporal
decides to charge We know that good soldiers always obey the highest-ranking order. It
seems it was the major’s order that caused the corporal’s decision, and not the
sergeant’s.
31
Knowing that soldiers obey the highest-ranking order, we are drawn to think that the
corporal obeyed the highest-ranking order and not the other order. The corporal heard,
understood, and acted in accordance with both orders; thus, in thinking he obeyed only
the major’s order, we are thinking of obeying an order as involving more than hearing,
understanding, and acting in accordance with it. Indeed, as I will illustrate, it seems the
notion of obeying, or complying with, or following an order has causal connotations, at
least pragmatically if not literally, so that we are inclined to hear the relevant law—that
soldiers obey the highest-ranking order—in a way that involves causal language. That is,
the law (pragmatically) implies a causal law, which in turn begs the question of what are
the causal facts of the case. Ifjust before one of my peers leaves to eat lunch I deign to
command him to eat lunch, and he understands me, and then he eats lunch, he may scoff
at the notion that he was following orders, or obeying me: “I was going to eat anyway!”
The claim that he was obeying my order sounds as if (even if it does not literally imply
that) my order was a cause of his eating, that he ate because I told him to—not just that
he acted in accordance with the content of the order. To say that soldiers obey (follow,
comply with) highest-ranking orders connotes that highest-ranking orders cause soldiers
to act, and probably this is a reason why the realistic command examples have more force
than the magical examples.
31
Schaffer credits Bas van Fraassen with this particular example (p. 175),
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(Schaffer does not use obey” or anything like it—he avoids explicitly stating the
operative law, relying on our background knowledge of the military instead But it is
precisely in such terms that our background knowledge exists.)
Despite this, in a moral setting, even the realistic command examples look a lot like
standard non-preemptive overdetermination. For thefact is, if both a major and a
sergeant order a unit to burn a village and kill all the civilians, they will both be court-
marshaled and (hopefully) convicted of war crimes—even if both orders are given and
heard together by obedient soldiers. By contrast, if the major’s order is transmitted in a
way that interrupts the sergeant’s order so that the sergeant’s order is never received
(ordinary preemption)—and this is known by the judges—then the sergeant will not be
convicted of the slaughter (only of the illegal order, or the attempt to slaughter).
Schaffer points up that causal relations are often associated with other relations:
causes tend to explain (via Deductive-Nomological argument32 ), to be evidence of and to
be means to their effects, causes and effects are subsumed under the laws (see previous
footnote), differences in the cause counterfactually imply differences in the effect (were
neuron-firing a blue, e would be blue, while this is not true of b ). He argues that
sometimes all five of these relations hold between the trumping event and the effect while
none hold between the trumped event and the effect. I will not take up all these
arguments in detail. I accept the counterfactual implication point. I think the means
argument he gives is incorrect, as I will explain below. The D-N explanation, evidence
32 A D-N argument is one in which, using a law as a premise and also a non-law fact subsumed by the
antecedent of that law, a conclusion is deduced: (PI) If x is a smallest fmng upon a neuron y, then y fires
in the color of x; (P2) a is a smallest firing upon neuron N; (C) N fires in the color of a. In this way, a
explains why N fired white. (By the way, I do not think philosophers usually point to D-N explanation in
particular when they note that causes explain their effects. But this is the sort of explanation Schaffer is
pointing up here.)
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and subsumption asymmetries depend on a wholesale exclusion of derivative laws—
clearly, given C, both trumper and trumped can play these three roles, if derivative laws
are used. (Schaffer (p 167) decries ‘‘tricky” laws, but we cannot simply label all
derivative laws “tricks ”) There is no question, for instance, that derivative laws can be
used to collect evidence: given C in the neuron example, b is evidence of e, derivative
law or not. That said, there is a partial asymmetry with respect to evidence As Schaffer
points up, usually the more we know about the cause, the more we can predict about the
effect. Let D be the absence of other a-sized and smaller firings. Given D, the fact that
an tf-sized firing (a) occurred is evidence that the third neuron fired but not evidence that
it fired white, while the further fact that a is white is evidence that the third fired white.
By contrast, 'mb's case I can find no background circumstance (counterpart to D) to
support this sort of evidentiary relation of scale, C will not do it, for given C, the fact that
any firing upon the third neuron occurred at all is evidence not only that e occurred but
that e is white.
In sum, I do not think the asymmetry is as strong as Schaffer makes it out to be, and
not strong enough to compel me to count one a cause and not the other.
The means argument is based upon Schaffer’s original trumping example. In that
example, the midnight fate of a prince matches the content of thefirst spell cast on that
day, one day, Merlin casts a frog spell and, later, Morgana also casts a frog spell; there is
an intuition that Merlin’s spell, and not Morgana’s, causes the prince to become a frog.
33 The description of C suggests the relevant derivative law. In the spell case, we can have a very simple
relevant derivative law on the assumptions that there are no ties for highest-ranked spell and that there
cannot be infinitely mam spells cast upon the prince: any spell not outranked by a different kind of spell
matches the prince’s fate. Given this law, each spell is subsumed and explains and is evidence for the
effect.
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The claim is that Merlin’s spell, but not Morgana’s, is an “effective means” to the
prince s fate Schaffer spells this out in the way Peter Menzies and Huw Price (1993) do
using what they call “agent probability”: c is an effective means to e iff the probability
that e occurs given that c occurs, where c is something an agent freely does or realizes, is
greater than the probability that e occurs given that c fails to occur, where the failure is
something an agent freely does or realizes (The point ofc or its absence being freely
brought about is that it then has its own independent (and very brief) causal history, this
is supposed to keep it from raising the probability of past events, such as its genuine
causes, thereby avoiding counting effects as means to their causes (Menzies and Price
1993, p. 191).) The idea that being effective, in the probability-raising sense here, is
sufficient for causation is refuted in the probabilistic case—failed potential causes
(Section 3 .4.1) illustrate that—but the example here is deterministic. To my knowledge,
there are no deterministic counterexamples. If Merlin’s spell can be viewed as this sort
of probability-raising means to transforming the prince, that should weigh strongly in
favor of counting it a cause.
But I think neither spell is a probability-raiser in the sense required: the circumstances
of each of the two spells include the other spell, also a frog spell, the example assumes
determinism, and the spells are causally independent, so for each spell, whether or not
that spell is freely realized, the probability of the other spell is 1, and so also the
probability of the effect is 1
.
Schaffer argues to the contrary. He says Merlin’s spell is
effective because Morgana’s spell might not happen—‘"Morgana is assumed free, so she
34
The probability is to be objective, though beyond that, Menzies and Price (1993, p 190) leave somewhat
open how to make the probabilistic notions precise. Schaffer says that for his purposes we may take the
inequality to say that P(e occurs and c occurs) / P(c occurs) is greater than P(<? occurs and c does not occur)
/ P(c does not occur), where, again, it is assumed that c’s occurrence and nonoccurrence are freely realized.
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might not cast her spell”—while Morgana’s spell is not effective because Merlin’s
definitely will (did) happen (p 169). But a mistake is made here in counting Morgana’s
spell as freely realized when the effectiveness of Merlin’s is being tested In using agent
probability to assess the effectiveness of an event, we are not to take as freely realized
other events we might wish to assess. In a deterministic world, it would only be c that we
suppose to be freely brought about in assessing its effectiveness as a means to e
35
One last issue. There is a kind of probabilistic trumping that is interestingly different
from the deterministic (Schaffer 2001, p 80). Suppose warlock spells trump witch spells,
in that, if both are cast (at any time on a given day), the type andprobability of the
prince’s transformation are given by the warlock spell. Suppose warlock spells confer a
.6 chance of transformation, witch spells a 9 chance. So, for example, if a warlock frog
spell and a witch spell are cast, there is a .6 chance of a frog transformation and no
chance of any other transformation, regardless ofwhat type of spell the witch cast. One
day, a warlock frog spell and a witch frog spell are cast on the prince, and the prince
becomes a frog. The warlock spell may seem like the cause, even though the chance of
the transformation would have been .9 without it, rather than . 6
.
Under the circumstances, the warlock’s spell acts as an inhibitor: it reduces the
chance from .9 to .6. The warlock may well have cast his spell in an effort to prevent the
35 Would it help to have Merlin be the caster of each spell? No. While assuming that his first spell is freely
brought about by him, we would still have to assume that all else is determined, including his other actions.
(The “agent” in agent probability is supposed to be arbitrary: the question is whether an arbitrary agent's
freely bringing about the first spell would make the pnnce’s transformation more probable—in a
deterministic world in which the second spell occurs—than would bringing about its absence. Clearly it
would not. Having characters in the story play the arbitrary agents is slippery business: we must not
simply make them free agents through and through, since the story is deterministic; only with respect to the
realization of one action can they be assumed free. And remember that the two spells are causally
independent, so the first's being freely realized cannot imply that the second is undetermined.)
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transformation. Similarly, in a chancy version of the ordinary preemption situation
depicted in Figure 3 1, or thwarts what may be the more reliable backup process, thereby
reducing the chance of e—yet here we Jo count a as a cause However, in this latter
situation there are elements that seem to redeem a
,
such as the chain of probabilistic
dependence via b—
a
helps an event that in turn helps e. There seems little, on the other
hand, to redeem the warlock spell’s damaging influence. In light of this, it is plausible to
me that the warlock’s spell is not a cause in these circumstances. I could go either way. I
will not count it a cause.
78
CHAPTER 4
CONTEMPORARY COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSES
4.1 Introduction
Here I describe most of the various contemporary counterfactual analyses of event
causation, and I say why I think they are unsatisfactory. My major focus is on how well
they handle the two central problems discussed in Chapter 3. I will take up deterministic
analyses first (which need to solve only the preemption problem), then the broad analyses
geared to handle all causation (these need to solve both problems).
Two recent deterministic analyses are very similar to the one I propose in Chapter 5:
Christopher Hitchcock 2001 and Stephen Yablo 2002. I do not discuss these in the
present chapter. I want to comment on how they relate to my proposal, so I will discuss
them at the end of Chapter 5, after I have presented my analysis.
4.2 Ardon Lyon’s Analysis
The first contemporary counterfactual analysis was offered by Ardon Lyon (1967).
He was apparently unaware of the extent of the preemption problem and did not
explicitly discuss it, rather, his main concern was that standard non-preemptive
overdeterminers should count as causes.
Lyon had two requirements for causation. One was that the cause of e not be a
“precondition” for e (p. 12). We need not discuss that, since it is the second requirement
that preempting causes fail to meet: c is a cause of e only if at least one of the following
holds (where S is some set of occurrent events preceding e and including at least c and
one other, b): (1) If c had not occurred but all other events in S still had, then e would not
have occurred; (2) if neither b nor c had occurred but all other events in S still had, e
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would not have occurred, and if exactly one of b or c had not occurred but the other
events in S still had, e would have occurred (pp 8, 15-16)
Consider again the preemption problem. My dart-throw pops the balloon Lucy was
winding up to throw her dart, but she held back once she saw me throw. So without my
throw, the pop would have occurred anyway, via Lucy. My throw preempted her
windup, and consequently the pop is not dependent on my throw. The preemption
diagram from Chapter 3 shows the essential structure of this kind of case {a is my throw,
d is Lucy’s windup, and e is the pop):
a b
Now, for Lyon’s clause (1) to be satisfied by a and e, there need to be (occurrent) events
for S such that, were they still to occur, yet a not, then e would not occur. But there do
not appear to be any such events. Let us consider (2), then. (2) was designed to count
standard non-preemptive overdeterminers as causes, at least where there are only two
overdetermining events: if neither overdeterminer had occurred, the effect would not
have, but ifjust one had not, then the effect still would have (
S
can contain some other
arbitrary events from the past). (2) succeeds in counting a as a cause of e, since e would
not have occurred if neither a nor d had, and e would have occurred ifjust one of them
had. Unfortunately, (2) also counts d as a cause, for the exact same reason (2) fails to
differentiate preemptive from non-preemptive overdetermination.
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4 3 David Lewis s Fir st Analysis and the Aftereffect Preemption Problem
David Lewis’s first analysis (1973) identifies causation with the ancestral of what the
deterministic simple analysis (DSA) identifies it with: e is causally dependent on c iff c
and e are (essentially) distinct 1 and e is counterfactually dependent on c, c is a cause of e
iff there is a finite sequence of occurrent events from c to e wherein each but the first is
causally dependent on the one just before it (such a dependence chain Lewis calls a
causal chain from c to e). As Lewis pointed up, this analysis allows a preempting event
such as a, above, to count as a cause of the final effect, e. If nr had not occurred, b would
not have, and if b had not, e would not have. Here it is important to remember the
proscription against backtracking (Section 2.2): we cannot say, “if b had not occurred, it
would (have to) have been that a did not occur, hence e would still have occurred.”
Remove b and the neuron it involves from the scene, and let there be laws of delayed
action so that it seems a directly causes e at a (spatial and temporal) distance. Then there
is no dependence chain from a to e In his 1986d (pp. 202-3), Lewis addresses this case.
He admits that his analysis’ failure to count a as a cause of e is a shortcoming2—but he
does not think it is a very important one, since it may be that our intuitions regarding it
are not to be trusted. He seems to accept the possibility of such odd laws (he says, ‘^that
is possible, I take it”); but he thinks that our “common-sense judgements” about the
causal facts may be wrong because we are not used to exercising causal judgements with
action at a temporal distance in mind—such cases “violate the presuppositions of our
habits of thought.” I agree that the case at hand is of secondary importance, but I think it
1
Lewis does not say whether he means essentially distinct, but it seems he does (see Section 3.2).
2
“It would be better to agree with common sense about these cases, to be sure” (p. 203).
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is so for a different reason. If we are going to count “action” at a distance as causation in
simple scenarios not involving backup causes, then I think we should definitely count a
as a cause of e in the described at-a-distance preemption situation. The only question, in
my mind, is whether delayed action is really possible at all, despite seeming that it is. It
takes a back seat for that reason.
In his 1986d, Lewis argues that, unfortunately, there is not always a causal chain, as
defined, connecting preemptor and effect. He offers the following sort of diagram. Here,
the upper process is two steps ahead, so that d and e are simultaneous.
In this situation, the final effect itself stops the alternate process. This might happen if
two rock-throwers were about to try to shatter a bottle and one thrower held back once he
saw that the other had succeeded: the shattered bottle prevents the second throw. We see
that e is not counterfactually dependent on b, since if b had not occurred, the lower
process would have gone through and e would have occurred anyway, just a little later.
So there is no causal chain from a to e.
This argument assumes that e is an event that (logically, metaphysically) can occur
later than its actual time. Let me here inteiject some terminology that will be convenient
from here on. Say an event is (temporally, spatially, etc.) inflexible if it could not occur
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differently at all (with respect to time, place, etc), say it is flexible if it could An event’s
occurrence conditions or essence may be called flexible or inflexible as well, accordingly.
Flexibility comes in degrees, whereas inflexibility is absolute. 3 The argument at issue
assumes that some events are temporally flexible. A natural reaction to the argument is
to deny this, to claim that if b were not to occur, the V’ that would occur would not
really be e, but a different event. Lyon (1967, p. 8) glanced at this sort of case and had
just this reaction to it; Lewis (1986d, p. 204) claims to have seen the matter this way
when he wrote his 1973.
But Lewis later rejects this line, for two reasons (1986d, pp. 198-9, 204-5). First, we
do not generally consider events to be temporally inflexible. We think that if the
wedding had been delayed a minute, it would still have occurred. To the extent we wish
to analyze our ordinary notion of event causation, it is preferable to stick to our ordinary
views of events. Second, by insisting on temporal inflexibility it seems we will get
spurious causes. Any event that affects the time of an event will come out a cause of it.
Lewis gives the example of a poison victim’s eating a big dinner before being poisoned.
If the eating had not occurred, the poison would have taken hold earlier and the death
would have occurred earlier. If the actual death is temporally inflexible, then it would
not have occurred if the eating had not occurred. Yet, intuitively, the eating is not
actually a cause of the death. For these reasons, Lewis and many others have preferred to
accept that the type of scenario illustrated in Figure 4. 1 constitutes preemption and
probably refutes Lewis 1973.
3 Lewis has a related term that often appears in the literature. He calls an eventfragile “if. or to the extent
that, it could not have occurred at a different time, or in a different manner” (1986d, p. 196). The built-in
ambiguity of “if, or to the extent that” often calls for extra modifiers to be resolved; and the term has no
obvious or generally employed antonym. So 1 will use my terms instead.
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In fact, it appears the analysis already counts the eating a cause of the (temporally
flexible) death, at least if we tweak the example just a bit. Let’s just add that upon death,
this poison will always dissolve away quickly (this doesn’t alter the intuitive verdict that
the dinner is not a cause of the death). Let t be some time before the actual time of the
victim’s death but after the time he would have died without the dinner—
t
falls within the
delay period. Let poisoned-mcm-at-t be the event of the victim’s presence in a poisoned
state at t. If this event had not occurred, the death would not have occurred (because
there would have been no poisoned man then or, as a result, thereafter); and poisoned-
man-at-/ is dependent on the dinner. When I see this causal path from the dinner to
poisoned-man-at-/ to the death, I am not sure it is wrong to count the dinner a cause of
the death. So I think it is not clear that temporal inflexibility will give spurious causes.
We could explore other examples, but I find none entirely compelling. The first of the
above two motives is enough of a motive for me.
Preemption cases have to date been classified primarily along temporal lines, rather
than by causal structure. The scenarios in the above two figures are universally referred
to as “early preemption” and “late preemption,” respectively, following Lewis (1986d,
pp. 200ff). As Lewis originally cast the terms, they correspond to whether the failed
backup process is cut off before the successful one has completed (where the final effect
does not count as part of these two processes). Thus Lewis counts (alleged) preemption
at a distance, as described above, as a kind of (alleged) late preemption. Throughout the
literature, late preemption is supposed to be a kind of preemption in which there is no
chain of causal dependence from cause to effect. That is the case in the at-a-distance
example and in Figure 4. 1 . But not all cases of late preemption lack such a chain. Let
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the dinnertime ringing be an event that can occur by way of a certain bell ringing within a
few minutes of 6:00 pm At 5:00 p m, you order Carl to ring the bell at 6:01, while I
give a (single) order for Amy to ring it at 5:59 and Betty to remove and lock away the
bell at 6:00 (regardless, I tell Betty, of whether the bell has been rung). Amy rings the
bell at 5:59, Betty removes it at 6:00, and Carl then fails to hit the missing bell. It seems
my order is a cause of the dinnertime ringing, since it causes someone to go ring the bell.
If my order were not to occur, Carl would ring the bell, and^ow/- order would be a cause
of the ringing. So my order preempts your order. The preemption is late, since the Carl
process is cut off after the Amy process has completed (5:59). But there is a causal chain
from my order to the ringing: If my order had not occurred, Amy’s striking of the bell
would not have occurred, and if this latter had not occurred, the dinnertime ringing would
not have occurred, since Betty would have removed the bell at 6:00. Thus examples of
late preemption display an interesting variety of causal structures, including dependence
chains of the sort found in early preemption. As far as I can see, late preemption not
involving delayed action makes trouble for Lewis 1973 only where the effect itself—or
some effect of the effect—foils the backup process, as in Figure 4 .1. In such examples,
the disruption of the backup process is not simply after the effect but is an aftereffect of
the effect at issue. In the dinnertime story, it is the effect-independence of the disruption
that allows Lewis 1973 to escape trouble. If I instruct Betty to remove the bell only if
Amy has rung it, then the disruption is an aftereffect, since the effect—the ringing—then
contributes to Carl’s failure, via Betty’s removal, and the causal chain from my order to
the ringing is thereby lost: If my order had not occurred, Amy’s striking would not have
occurred, but if Amy’s striking had not occurred, Betty would not have removed the bell
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and Carl would have rung it anyway. Let us call this aftereffect preemption. These are
the specific late preemption cases that pose a threat to Lewis 1973
At the end of Section 3 .4.2. 1, 1 said that preemption involves an incomplete backup
process (Failure Thesis). This may seem doubtful, because the failed backup process
preceding but not including the final effect need not be cut short at all, in that all of it
may occur (Noordhof 1998; Paul 1998a). Take the case of two rock-throwers. As I told
it, one potential thrower refrained when he saw that the bottle had been shattered. But we
can imagine that both throws occur, and one rock just gets there first. In this case, the
backup process is not cut short, save for the potential version of the effect that would
have occurred had that process been successful (here we ignore the missing intermediate
of rock-contacting-bottle, or, we can just make this the final effect at issue). Or in the
dinner-bell example, if Betty mutes the bell instead of steals it, and if Carl strikes the
muted bell, then the Carl process (preceding the potential 6:01 ringing) is complete.
But the Failure Thesis counts the final effect as part of the backup process. Ifwe add
the effect to the processes just described, then a potential part of the backup process fails
to occur in the sense that the backup-process version of the effect does not occur: the late
shattering, which would have occurred had the first throw not occurred, does not occur,
and likewise the 6:01 version of the ringing does not occur. (Such a version, were it to
occur, would be a non-proper part of the flexible effect at issue—see Section 2.4.2.)4
4
There are other noteworthy failures, w hich perhaps an analyst could capitalize on. One process leading to
the shattering is the persistence of the bottle. This persistence at the time just before the bottle would have
shattered if the second rock had been the cause is a backup that is foiled by the first shattering (the bottle is
shattering at that very time). In the bell case, the nonoccurrence of a muting hand on the bell is a backup
cause foiled by Betty’s muting hand, if we count nonoccurrences as causes.
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4.4 Marshall Swain’s Analysis
Marshall Swain (1978) modifies Lewis’s analysis so as to be able to count standard
non-preemptive overdeterminers as causes. But like Lyon’s analysis, Swain’s ends up
counting as causes not only non-preemptive overdeterminers but also preempted backups,
and thus it constitutes a step backward with respect to our main concerns here. 5 On
Swain’s analysis, a sufficient condition for c being a cause of e is the following (where
“causally prior” is a certain complex world-theoretic relation designed by Swain to
“guarantee” that causation is asymmetric—it is not relevant to preemption, nor does
Swain, who is well aware of preemption, claim that it is):
Some set of events D - (dj, d2
,
d„) occurred (possibly having only one member)
such that
(a) if c had not occurred, and if any member d, ofD had occurred, but no other
members ofD had occurred, and ife had occurred anyway, then there would
have been a causal chain [in Lewis’s sense] from d, to e consisting wholly of
occurrent events, and d, would have been causally prior to e\ and
(b) if no member ofD had occurred, and if c and e had occurred anyway, then
there would have been a causal chain from c to e consisting wholly of
occurrent events, and c would have been causally prior to e. (p. 16)
The preemption examples above refute the sufficiency of the condition. To be sure I am
applying it correctly, I will just mimic one of Swain’s own applications: he applies it to a
simple overdetermination case involving three occurrent events; I will use his exact
words, just substituting the names of three occurrent events from one of the above
preemption scenarios. Consider either of the above diagrams, and let us see whether the
condition yields that d is a cause of e. “To see that d is a cause of e we may note that
there is a set of events D, consisting of the event a alone, such that ifd had not occurred
5 Swain was pursuing various other refinements; he considered the preemption problem solved by Lewis.
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but a had occurred anyway, then there would have been a causal chain of occurrent
events from a to e and a would have been causally prior to e Moreover, if a had not
occurred, but d had occurred anyway, then there would have been a causal chain of
occurrent events from d\o e and d would have been causally prior to e” (p. 16, with
altered event names). This all appears to be true, so d comes out a cause of e. (Note that
the requirement that there be a chain of occurrent events does not save the condition. For
despite the fact that actually nonoccurrent events would occur between d and e in the
antecedent situations invoked, a causal chain” of occurrent events would exist because
there would be a one-step dependence of e on d
,
and both of those are occurrent
.)
4.5 Lewis’s “Quasi-dependence” Solution for Aftereffect Preemption
Lewis (1986d) attempts to amend his analysis to accommodate aftereffect preemption.
On the revised analysis, still an event c is a cause of an event e iff there is a causal chain
from c to e. But now a causal chain is a finite sequence of occurrent events such that
each one (except the first) is either causally dependent or “quasi-dependent” on the one
just before it. Quasi-dependence is supposed to capture the intuition that “whether the
process going on in a region is causal depends only on the intrinsic character of the
process, and on the relevant laws”
6
(1986d, p. 205). Lewis never explicitly lays out a
definition of quasi-dependence. I have culled one from what he does say: Occurrent
event b is quasi-dependent on occurrent event a iff a is first and b is last in some ordered
6
I leave alone the question of whether this intuition is correct. (If standard non-preemptive
overdeterminers are not causes, then surely it is not. Other cases are less clear, because they involve a law
whose very relevance to the process depends partly on factors extrinsic to it. Consider a law that invokes
circumstances; or consider perhaps the sorts of extrinsic laws involved in the examples of Sections
3. 4.2. 2.3 and 3. 4.2.2.4 (the latter, “trumping,” which Lewis takes seriously).)
7
1986d, pp. 176-7 and 205-6—especially bottom p. 205. I am aware (i)-(iii) may contain redundancies.
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process p of events that is such that, with respect to the ordering, the great majority of
lawfully possible processes intrinsically just like/7 (i) have their later parts dependent on
their earlier ones (as Lewis puts it), (ii) have their last event dependent on their first, and
(iii) are causal, according to [the] original analysis.” Lewis says that the “great
majority” is to be measured by varieties of surroundings, though he does not say what
constitutes great or how to carve up the possible surroundings into varieties. Of a
process he says only that it is a “course of events” that may or may not be causal (this
is not my use of “process” above, which has always meant causal process).
There are some puzzling things here. Does (i) mean that each event is dependent on
the one just before it in the ordering? (iii) is puzzling because “causal process” is not an
element of the original analysis. It seems that (i) and (iii) are calling for a causal chain
,
as originally defined. I think we can press on here without answers to these questions.
In the situation of Figure 4 . 1
,
arguably e is quasi-dependent on b, and b is causally (as
well as quasi-) dependent on a, so a and b come out causes of e. Presumably e is
supposed to be quasi-dependent on b because it is only in very special circumstances that
a course of events just like b-e is accompanied by overdeterminers, of one sort or another,
of e. d is not a cause, since e is neither quasi- nor causally dependent on it: it is not the
case that in the great majority of varieties of circumstances where a course of events just
like d-e occurs there is dependence, since d and e are simultaneous. (As for c, it is at a
spatial distance from e, so plausibly there will not be dependence there in the great
majority of varieties of circumstances.)
I do not think it is clear that this works. Quasi-dependence introduces vague and
undefined terminology. “Intrinsic” and “course of events” are not too troubling to me
—
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we have a strong intuitive understanding of the first, and for the second I think Lewis
could get by with sequence of events instead—rather, it is the idea of the great majority
of varieties of surroundings: we do not know how to carve the possibilities into varieties,
or how great great is. Thus I think it is not clear that e is in general quasi-dependent on
b, even if it is in the case of neurons. Take the aftereffect example where two rocks are
thrown at a bottle, one arriving first and shattering it. A late stage of the first throw is a
(direct) cause of the shattering, but it is not clear that in the vast majority of varieties of
surroundings for that precise <stage, shattering> process (sequence), there is no backup
cause of the shattering around. For on the face of it, there are many varieties of event that
can shatter a bottle—different types of projectile, but also many various sources of
vibrations, shock waves, sudden heat, cold, and air-pressure change. (Such events could
occur simultaneously with, or after, the shattering, so that the intrinsic nature of the
causal sequence is as it actually is.)
That is a potential counterexample to the necessity of the chain of the disjunctive
relation dependent or quasi-dependent for causation. In the literature, there are various
alleged counterexamples to the sufficiency of quasi-dependence for causation. I find
them all to be of doubtful success and shall not discuss them
.
8
But I have another kind of
apparent counterexample to the necessity of the disjunctive chain to offer, as follows.
8
Jonardon Ganeri, et al. (1996); Douglas Ehring (1997); Ned Hall (1997); L. A Paul (1998a). ( I think
Ehring’s example is promising but that it needs changes to be more convincing. The way 1 see to change it
turns it into a trumping case, where the effect quasi-depends on a trumped event; as I argued (Section
3.4.2.2 4), it is not clearly wrong to count the trumped event a cause. The other three examples use
uncharitable interpretations of “great majority of varieties” or of “intrinsically just like” and can, I believe,
be resisted in a principled way.)
90
4 5 1 Meta-prevention Preemption
As the trapeze artist begins to fall, I commit murder by untying the rope holding up his
safety net The untying was among the causes of his death—a meta-preventing cause (it
prevented a later presence of net from preventing the death, Section 3.3.5). But had I not
done it, my partner Clyde would have cut the rope—as it was, he just stood and
watched—so the death would have occurred anyway. As Figure 4.2 makes clear, there is
no disjunctive chain of dependence or quasi-dependence from the untying to the death.
(v,ct,m) O KD KD O
(net
persistence)
(me)
(Clyde)
Figure 4.2
Here is a potential repair. We could allow “nonoccurrences” into the chain, such that
for a nonoccurrence of e not to “occur” is (by stipulation) just for e to occur. Now notice
that if the untying hadn’t occurred,/s nonoccurrence wouldn’t have, and if that hadn’t,
the death wouldn’t have. This way we can count the untying a cause of the death. 9 This
is a decent idea. After all, as meta-prevention shows us, sometimes nonoccurrences seem
to be causal intermediates, so it is fitting that a causal-chain approach should utilize them.
9
Schaffer (2000c) suggests that every event is a pair <Property, Region> where the property may be
negative: e g., <absence of firing, neuron region>. To suppose this event to occur is to suppose there is no
firing in the neuron region; to suppose it not to occur is to suppose there is. Admitting such events may be
another solution.
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That example had nothing to do with aftereffect preemption The message it sends to
Lewis 1 973 is that, since preemptors can be meta-preventers, you are going to have to
include nonoccurrences in your chains. But when now we notice that meta-preventers
can be aftereffect preemptors, we find that Lewis 1973 is still in hot water, and quasi-
dependence is the wrong kind of tool for getting it out. Thus imagine there is a small
earthquake, Rose tries to reach for the Ming vase on the table to prevent its fall, but I
maliciously hold her back and prevent her from doing so, the vase falls. A second
afterward, Rose’s big dog bumps the table, and this would have caused the fall had the
vase still been on the table. Ifwe are serious about counting meta-preventers as causes,
then my holding Rose should count as a cause of the fall despite the preemptive setting.
Figure 4.3 shows that the causal structure here can be made precise and leaves no room
for a quasi-dependence solution
(me)
(Rose)
(earthquake)
(dog)
fall
4.6 L A Paul’s Solution for Aftereffect Preemption
L. A. Paul (1998b) proposes a simple solution to the aftereffect preemption problem
again identify causation with the ancestral of causal dependence, but redefine causal
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dependence such that e depends causally on c iff, were c not to occur, then either e would
not occur or <? would occur later than the time it actually occurred Looking at Figure 4 1,
we see that ifa had not occurred, e would have occurred later, while ifd had not
occurred, e would have occurred just when it actually did—
a
comes out a cause and d
does not. Similarly for the example of Figure 4.3: without the hold, the fall would have
occurred later, while without the dog’s bump, the fall would have occurred when it
actually did. The proposal will not handle the trapeze example (Figure 4.2), but as before
we could allow nonoccurrence links in the chains.
The analysis has the result that to hasten an event is always to cause it. But there is no
implication that events are temporally inflexible, or that they cannot occur later: an event
is caused when it is hastened, but no claim is made that this is because a later effect
would have been a different event.
Other writers (e g., Jonathan Bennett (1987) and Penelope Mackie (1992)) have
expressed sympathy for the idea that hastening is always causing. I know of no
compelling case to be made either for or against it, I will not delve into that literature
here. It seems to me not an unreasonable idea, if not particularly compelling. Anyway,
there is yet another brand of preemption that Paul’s proposal falls prey to, as follows.
4.7 The Process Preemption Problem
The 1000-meter fall was a cause of the man’s death; the bowling ball’s journey down
the lane caused the pins’ fall; the train journey caused the train arrival, the loud bang was
caused by the door’s swing shut: we regularly take events that are causal processes
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leading to some final event as causes of that final event 10 And the corresponding
counterfactuals seem to support this: If the door’s swing shut hadn’t occurred, the bang
wouldn’t have occurred, without the fall, the death wouldn’t have occurred 11 This is no
less so in preemption contexts: the beginning of the bowling ball’s roll down the lane
may prevent someone else from rolling her ball at the pins, but no less does the first
ball’s roll cause the pins’ fall.
Consider Figure 3.1 again. It appears the composite event a-b is a cause of e. But
DSA fails to count it as such. Clearly, if a-b were not to occur, a either would not or
might not occur (nothing licenses us to say that ifa-b were not to occur, a would still
occur, any more than that if the 1000-meter fall were not to occur, all but the last bits still
would ), but then ifa might not occur, by the same token the backup process might go
through and e might still occur. DSA suffers from the process preemption problem : A
“process cause” of e fails to be counted as a result of its having a preemptor as a part.
10
But doesn’t this have punch: “Not the whole door-swing was a cause of the bang, only the last bit was”?
I hear it, but it is too mysterious what is intended by this statement to give it any serious weight. Clearly
other small or instantaneous parts besides the last (if there is a last) were causes, just as a is a cause of e in
Figure 3. 1, so it is clearly false that only the last bit was. Then what is the quoted statement trying to
express? Perhaps the intent is “not all smallest parts were direct causes of the shattering, only the last one
was.” But it is too hard to say.
" If we try, we can begin to doubt these counterfactuals by invoking inflexible occurrence conditions for
the process: if the door-swing cannot occur much differently, then it seems it might fail to occur by the
door swinging a little slower, whereupon the (temporally flexible) bang still occurs. But let us not go out of
our way to falsify’ what sounds true. A charitable and common-sense interpretation of the event-
designators can apparently allow the counterfactuals to be true: just let the occurrence conditions have a
certain moderate flexibility. An event fails to occur iff none of its possible versions occur, so if we take the
door-swing to be moderately flexible, its nonoccurrence will imply that nothing moderately similar to the
actual swing occurs: and we would accept that had nothing at least moderately similar to it occurred, then
there would have been no bang.
12 Our rejection of these claims suggests the need for a revision of Lewis’s view that the antecedent-worlds
closest to actuality are ones in which the past matches the actual past as much as possible consistent with
the truth of the antecedent and a smooth transition (1979). For apparently, we do not hold the past fixed
into the time ofthe antecedent event itself even when doing so would maximize past match.
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Lewis 1973 also falls prey, since there are no causally intermediate events to generate
a chain from a-b to e. And so does Paul’s revision, since her temporal disjunct is of no
use here: if a-b were not to occur, e might occur just when it actually did (And clearly
the addition of nonoccurrence links is no help.)
Now ifwe permit quasi-dependence links in a causal chain, perhaps process
preemption poses no special difficulty perhaps there is quasi-dependence of effect on
process. But now we are stuck with a less clear, and not clearly successful, analysis, due
to the notion of quasi-dependence (Section 4.5), and we are stuck with a fairly clunky
analysis, a link in the chain can be one of counterfactual dependence (maybe involving a
nonoccurrence), or quasi-dependence, or that the one event would have occurred later
without the other. It would be better to have something more unified in form and in
motivation, and something more clearly adequate.
One might reply that it is fair for analyses to be restricted to atomic, or at least
instantaneous, events, as we may start with that as a first step and build broader analyses
from there. Perhaps, but not all analyses need to duck composites. Many of the analyses
below (including my own, in the next chapter) do not try to solve the preemption problem
by assuming that preempting causes are always indirect; they do this by focusing on the
failure of the backup process, which is independent of whether the preemptor is indirect,
consequently process preemption poses no special difficulty for them. Ifwe do not need
to address composites as a separate step, all the better. Doing so would add complexity;
also, it does not look easy, and no one has proposed how it might be done. Nor is it just a
minor addendum to causal analysis, for the actual events of which we know and talk tend
to be extended, and we often think of them as extended (I do not see that we generally
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idealize large events as atomic or instantaneous, though perhaps sometimes we do), an
analysis for instantaneous or atomic events would appear to have little application on
its own.
4 8 The “PCA*” Analysis
Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof and Murali Ramachandran (1998) revise their
original “PCA” analysis (1996) in response to counterexamples by Alex Byrne and Ned
Hall (1998). The revised analysis—dubbed “PCA*” by its authors—is given as follows
(the events in the two definitions need not be occurrent (actual)).
Def 1. For any events x and y, and any set of events Z, y Z-depends on x iff (i) if
neither x nor any of the events in Z were to occur, then y would not occur, and
(ii) ifx were to occur without any of the events in Z, then might occur. 13
Def 2. For any events x and y, and any set of events Z, x is a Z-ancestor of.y iff
there is a chain of events, zj, such that Zj Z-depends on x,
.
.
.
,
and y
Z-depends on z„.
(PCA*) For any actual, distinct events c and e
,
c causes e iff
there is a (possibly empty) set of possible events Z
such that
(i) c is a Z-ancestor of e
,
and
(ii) every Z-ancestor of e is an actual event.
The central intuition is that a sequence forms a causal chain when, had certain extraneous
events (still) not occurred (certain backup causes, for instance), each element would have
been counterfactually dependent on the one before and done so without the mediation of
13
“Might” here will do no noticeable work over “would.” Ganeri, et al. use it to deal with what they call
“‘accidental’ causation.” Imagine we take it to be a “fluke” or “accident” that someone’s action c succeeds
in causing e, so that even though the situation is deterministic, our general feeling is that c might have
failed to cause e. The authors want to allow that if things had been a little different in such-and-such a way
causally irrelevant to c and e, and yet still c had occurred, e might not have occurred (p. 221). Iam not sure
I agree, but I do not see anything that hangs on it.
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any non-actual events. Speaking loosely, we may say causes are ‘potentially complete
ancestors’ of their effects” (p 222).
Where E = 0, E-dependence between actual events reduces to clause (i) of Def. 1 If
x and all the events in 0 were not to occur, then y would not occur. We see that among
actual events, a chain of causal dependence, in Lewis’s sense, implies a chain of E-
dependence, with E empty. Thus in Figure 3.1, a is a 0-ancestor of e. And all 0-
ancestors of e are actual: no actual event can be 0-dependent on a non-actual one, so no
non-actual event can be a 0-ancestor of an actual one. Thus a chain of causal
dependence implies causation on PCA*
This is no help with aftereffect or process preemption, but that is because in
identifying E with 0 we are not yet taking advantage of the machinery. Let E be {/}.
For either Figure 3.1 or 4 . 1, ifa were not to occur and (still)/were not to occur, then e
would not occur, so a is a E-ancestor of e; and every E-ancestor of e is an actual event,
because supposing away some non-actual event in addition to/leaves us at the actual
world and can thus never generate a E-dependence step. This all holds for a-b as well as
for a, so PCA* handles process preemption. Do spurious causes arise in these scenarios?
No. We need to put a or b in E in order to get e to be E-dependent on an event in the
backup process. But then not every event on which e is E-dependent will be actual, for
it will be E-dependent on/: If/ and every member of {b} had not occurred, e would
not have.
Consider the sort of aftereffect case in which a failed backup process preceding the
final effect is not cut short—e g., two rocks are thrown at a bottle, one gets there first and
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does the shattering Ganeri, et al consider a similar example (1996, p 221). Let r2 be a
stage of the second rock’s journey Let us see whether r2 comes out a cause Let Z
contain a stage, ru of the first rock’s journey. The shattering is Z-dependent on r2 ,
satisfying clause (i) ofPCA*. How about clause (ii)? Ganeri, et al. say that the
shattering is Z-dependent on the non-actual event of the second rock contacting the
bottle: without that contact and without r} , the shattering would not occur. True, but as
Paul (1998a) points out, there appears to be trouble if we back up a little. That is, let
rock-contact-with-bottle be the effect at issue (where this is an event that can involve
either rock). Then what non-actual event will be a Z-ancestor of the effect? Paul says
none. Well, arguably there are two, as we have already seen, so there is no real trouble
after all. For one, there is the presence of intact bottle at the actual time of the shattering.
If r} and this presence had not occurred, no rock-contact would have occurred. Second,
there is the essentially late, temporally inflexible rock-contact that would have occurred
had the first rock not been thrown. If ri and this late contact had not occurred, there
would have been no contact. So there is, after all, a non-actual event that is a Z-ancestor
of the contact .
14
PCA* is quite effective, then. And there is a bonus: at-a-distance preemption is
handled. In a revised Figure 3.1, where b is removed so that a directly causes e at a
distance, let Z be (/} as before and a comes out a cause of e according to the same
reasoning as that two paragraphs up. Nothing hangs on intermediates in these examples.
14
This same response applies to Byrne and Hall s time-delay version of aftereffect preemption (1998,
footnote 6, p. 44).
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One can easily see that PCA* counts standard non-preemptive overdeterminers as
causes. Some may take this as a good result It counts trumped events and s2 in
“Rumpelstiltskin II” as causes (let £ contain the trumping event in the first case, sj in the
second)—some may take this as a bad result, though I have argued that it is not clearly
wrong (Section 3. 4.2.2).
The result I do not want to accept is that for allegedly preemptive prevention (Section
3 4.2.2. 1) PCA* counts the backup disrupter as a cause (Byrne and Hall 1998). We had
the example from McDermott where I catch a ball that is headed toward a window, and
between me and the window is a brick wall. I do not want to count the presence of the
wall as a cause of the presence of intact glass. But let I contain my lunge for the ball, the
presence of the brick wall is a I-ancestor of the intact glass, and no non-actual event is.
4.9 Lewis’s “Influence” Analysis
Lewis (2000) recently produced a new and very different counterfactual analysis of
event causation. It goes as follows.
Afragile event is one with little flexibility—it cannot vary much with respect to time,
place or manner. An alteration of event e is “either a very fragile version of e or else a
very fragile alternative event that is similar to e, but numerically different from e” (p.
188). Lewis does not want to worry about whether these alterations are numerically
different events from e or just different versions of e. “We ought to make sure this
distinction bears no weight in our analysis.” Note that ife occurs, an alteration ofe
occurs
—
just one, in fact, according to Lewis (suggesting that these alterations are
absolutely fragile, inflexible in every respect). Lewis writes, “where c and e are distinct
actual events, let us say that c influences e if and only if there is a substantial range Cj, c2t
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of different not-too-distant alterations of c (including the actual alteration ofc) and
there is a range c ; , e2, ... of alterations of c, at least some of which differ, such that if c,
had occurred, e, would have occurred, and if c2 had occurred, c2 would have occurred,
and so on.” Causation is defined as the ancestral of influence (pp. 190-1).
A few expository comments are in order. The correspondence between the c’s and the
e’s need not be one-one and can be as askew as many-two. This is a result of the phrase
at least some of which differ, which permits that there be only two c alterations named
by the “c,”s. Thus imagine a prince susceptible only to hog spells cast in exactly the right
fashion. A hog spell is cast, and the prince becomes a hog. Of course, were the actual
cause alteration to occur, the actual effect alteration would occur—there is one mapping.
Were the cause at all different, then in place of the actual effect alteration would be a
different one, a standing man, so all the close, non-actual cause alterations map to this
one non-actual effect alteration. In this way, such all-or-nothing effects can still be
counted.
Lewis: “Influence admits of degree in a rough and multidimensional way
. . . .
Plainly,
there are many ways in which something can be more of a cause of some effect than
something else is, even if it is not an all-or-nothing difference of influence versus no
influence” (pp. 190-1). Lewis indicates that degree and way of influence are sensitive to
how numerous and varied the c’s are, how distant (dissimilar) they are from each other,
how distant they are from the actual alteration of c (this one is especially important, he
says), and how much the c’s differ from one another. Perhaps there are other factors, as
well, he seems not to rule it out.
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The requirement that the range of c’s be “substantial” appears to be without
consequence, for if some close c range R maps to multiple e’s, it seems the entire superset
S of c,ose c ’s will, too. The S members will map either just to those same e’s or to those
plus some others. This will be false only if the members ofS-R map to things that are
not alterations of e at all. In light of Lewis’s general discussion and examples, I cannot
imagine such a case, Lewis never offers one. But even if “substantial” makes no
difference to whether one event counts as a cause of another, it may still have a point. As
just explained, the degree and way of influence are sensitive to how c-alterations map to
e-alterations, the analysis tells us to look at a substantial range of c’s when assessing the
nature of a mapping.
Gravitational effects abound. We do not want to count my driving toward the beach
as a cause of the local high tide.
. . well, not unless we are, in fact, concerned with
extremely miniscule aspects of the tide. Lewis’s idea is that, in our use of “cause,”
pragmatically we ignore small amounts of influence that fall outside the range we are
interested in at the time
—
just as whether we count a vessel empty depends on what sorts
of things we are ignoring (often air, a little dust) (pp. 188ff).
Lewis writes that in supposing away an event, we usually imagine it to be “completely
and cleanly excised from history, leaving behind no fragment or approximation of itself,”
(p. 190, my italics). He also says, “alterations may include some in which [the event] is
completely excised,” and he explicitly allows that some such alterations count as “not too
distant” from the actual alteration
15
Thus, what is in the region of an event after we
15
Lewis 2000, p. 190, second full paragraph. I read it that “these alterations” (fourth sentence) are the ones
we “could look at” and the ones he is trying to capture in the analysis, later in that paragraph.
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suppose it not to occur may count as an alteration not too far from the original while
being no approximation to the original Apparently, then, there are two similarity
relations at work here. I think the “no approximation” is with respect to how we would
intuitively compare two regions for intrinsic similarity, “off-the-cuff’ and without any
special interests, the closeness of alterations is something different, which presumably we
are attuned to in causal contexts. Lewis does not discuss this second similarity relation,
and I am not sure I really have a sense of it.
In Section 3. 4. 2. 2. 4, 1 discussed an alleged kind of preemption, “trumping
preemption,” and said that I was not convinced it was truly preemption. Lewis says his
analysis rightly takes it as genuine. He considers the example in which the major’s order
trumps the sergeant’s and they simultaneously order the troops to advance. Different
orders from the major would have been followed by different actions by the troops, while
this is not so for the sergeant; so it appears the analysis counts the major’s order a cause
and not the other.
But it seems to me that if either order had occurred earlier, the obedient troops would
have acted earlier—and if the earlier order had also been different, the troops would have
acted earlier and differently—so it appears that both orders come out causes. Lewis does,
mind you, explicitly allow that temporal alterations may count as close, and he insists that
there is nothing special about temporal alterations (p. 187). We can imagine that we
know that the sergeant and the major habitually try to find the opportune time to issue an
order; then, intuitively, an earlier order will not seem far-fetched at all (while still, I
think, it will seem that, if the orders are given simultaneously, only the major’s order
caused the troops to advance).
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Lewis could fairly say that the analysis correctly counts the major’s order more of a
cause than the sergeant’s: close alterations of the major’s map to a wider array of effect
alterations than do close alterations of the sergeant’s, since the alterations to which they
map include present ones as well as earlier ones, second, present alterations are generally
closer to the actual alteration than past ones. Still, the mapping for the sergeant’s order is
fairly rich, and I had thought—we were told—that the goal was to exclude it as a cause.
Perhaps the claim will be that it is only a cause in a subtle and special way that we are not
interested in when we first hear the example—a way quite different from the way in
which the major’s order is a cause. But I do not see what this is: judging from the
alteration mappings, it seems both orders influence the time and manner of the effect.
Perhaps, despite Lewis’s claims, temporal alterations are special somehow, and somehow
we should discount the earlier alterations of the sergeant’s order.
By going through the diagrams, one can easily see that the analysis appears to count
preempting causes: there is always a chain of influence from cause to effect, sometimes
via a nonoccurrence—or “absence,” as Lewis prefers—sometimes in virtue of
influencing the time the effect occurs (absence counts as a kind of alteration, according to
Lewis (p. 190)).
I do not think that “influence” suffices for causation. Consider the Merlin/Morgana
trumping example (Section 3. 4. 2. 2. 4). Suppose that within range of Merlin’s and
Morgana’ s frog spells was a second prince, but that he was immune to frog spells. So at
midnight this second prince remained human, whistling as he strolled through the garden.
This second prince is sensitive to other kinds of spell, so had Merlin cast a different one,
the whistling would have been absent; yet it seems wrong to me that Merlin’s actual spell
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should therefore count as a cause of the prince’s whistling. If it were true that, had
Merlin s frog spell not been cast, a different spell would have been cast instead, then it
would be true that his spell was a cause of the whistling, because then it would be true
that if it had not occurred, the whistling would not have occurred. But we can just
stipulate that there are no special circumstances to make that true—instead, any variety of
spells or none might have occurred if Merlin’s frog spell had not
.
16
Here is a similar, this-worldly example. Suppose two rocks are thrown at a window
that has a hole in it a little bigger than the rocks. One rock arrives first and passes easily
through the hole, not touching the glass at all; the second rock hits the glass and shatters
it. The second throw by which I mean here the windup and release, excluding the rest
of the rock’s journey—was a cause of the shattering, and it seems the first throw was not.
After all, we want to say that the first throw almost caused the shattering, because that
rock almost hit the glass (first), we don’t want to say that it did cause it. But it may be
that some, or many, of the slightest differences in the first throw would have been
magnified as that rock moved through the turbulent air such that it would have missed the
hole and shattered the window, in which case it “influenced” the shattering. Notice that
this could be true in an aftereffect preemption version, too: it may be that some, or many,
slight alterations in the second release would have allowed the second rock to overtake
the first before they reached the glass .
17
16
Schaffer (2001a) makes a similar objection.
17
Notice that the nature of the alteration mapping in these examples is similar to that between trumping
event and effect. But you did not think of the trumping event as a cause in this slipping-through-the-hole
way, did you? (After all, trumpers make intuitively more compelling candidates as causes than do the
alleged causes in these other examples.) To the extent the analysis counts trumpers as causes, still it seems
not to count it in the right way.
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My second complaint is that Lewis’s analysis cannot handle complex events. Let us
first look at spatiotemporally composite events: The conference lasted four days. On day
4, a tiger s entrance through the window influenced the conference, the conference
influenced the newspaper headlines on day 2, since on day 1 several shocking conference
papers were delivered. So by a two-step chain, the tiger’s entrance on day 4 comes out a
cause of the newspaper headlines on day 2. In this way, with enough steps (or just large,
scattered events), we can get almost any event to be a cause of any other.
This flaw is a step backward, in that Lewis 1973 does not have this problem. Let us
suppose that the difference the tiger’s entrance made to the conference is that there was a
commotion on day 4 in place of a certain paper being delivered. Clearly, conferences
that either essentially have this commotion or essentially lack that paper are
(counterfactually) dependent on the tiger’s entrance. Any conference that only
accidentally has this commotion and paper-lack is not dependent on the tiger’s entrance,
since without the entrance, nothing essential would be missing. So only conferences that
essentially have this commotion or paper-lack are dependent on the tiger entrance. But
the headlines on day 2 are dependent on no such conference, since such a conference
might fail to occur simply in virtue of a lack of commotion or a paper delivery (as these
things are essential), thus leaving room for the shocking papers still to occur on day 1
(they might still have occurred)—hence no conference is a middle link in a chain of
dependence from the tiger’s entrance to the headlines. Lewis 1973 is safe.
In that example, the tiger entrance affects one part of the conference, but a different
part affects the headlines. Likewise, there are cases in which the intermediate event is an
effect by way of one feature, or aspect, and a cause by way of another. Jig-chuen Lee
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(1988) proposes a counterexample to causal transitivity generated from such an example
Here is a rendition of it. Someone pours green food coloring into the poisoned drink.
Blind Billie drinks, dies. Claim: “The pouring is a cause of the drinking of a green
drink, since the latter is dependent on the former, the drinking of a green drink is a cause
of the death, since the latter is dependent on the former, but the coloring is not a cause of
the death.”
The solution is as before. Only essentially green drinkings are dependent on the
coloring, while the death is not dependent on an essentially green drinking (plausibly any
such drinking might fail to occur in virtue of being a drinking of another color). 18 Lewis
1973 is safe. Lewis 2000, however, is not, since undeniably the coloring influences the
drinking and the drinking influences the death. 19
To avoid these troubles, Lewis 2000 needs either modification or limitation to atomic
events. I have already commented on the weaknesses of limiting analyses to atomic
events (Section 4.7).
4.10 Michael McDermott’s Analysis20
Michael McDermott (2002) first develops an analysis for what we may call strict
events, events that are inflexible in every respect; he then extends it to cover our talk of
flexible events. I have two serious objections to the limited analysis. I will not go
18
Jig-chuen examines how various views of events might avoid his attack. But he does not consider
Lewis’s (1986b).
19 (These transitive worries have led some to want to reduce causation to a relation between simple tropes,
or property instances, only—for example, Douglas Ehring (1997) and Daniel M. Hausman (1998).)
20
1 discuss only the second of his two analyses. The first (1995b) is very similar but relatively complex
and clunky. It clearly suffers from the same objections I will point up here. (Plus one more: an inability to
handle composite events
.
)
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beyond that analysis here, since what lies beyond does not escape those objections, and
McDermott’s whole approach is substantially different from the one I pursue in Chapter 5
and to the others discussed in this chapter.
First a background point McDermott regularly talks of nonoccurrences as events,
naming them, for example, “not-c” (so, too, in his 1995b). No definition is provided He
expresses doubt that there is a serious distinction between events and omissions” (2002,
p. 96). He takes these negative events to be causal relata relevant to his analysis. It is,
for instance, only by way of them that he can count meta-preventers as causes (which he
wants to do
—
p. 94, and 1995b): this is because his analysis relies on chains of direct
causation, and there is no such chain ofpositive events connecting meta-preventer and
effect (see Section 3.3.5). We could leave our understanding of these negative events at
an intuitive level, or we could interpret them in some specific, appropriate way. A
suggestion of Schaffer’s (noted above) could serve: every event is a pair <Property,
Region>, where the property may be negative—e g., <lack of firing, neuron region>. To
suppose this event to occur is to suppose there is no firing in the neuron region, to
suppose it not to occur is to suppose there is.
McDermott defines a sufficient condition for e as “a condition on what happens at a
point, or a conjunction of such conditions, such that given its satisfaction e would have
occurred whatever had happened at other points,” including past and future ones (pp. 96-
7). There is no discussion of “condition” or “point.” As for “point,” it is clear that
McDermott does not mean spacetime point—nor could he, since typically only larger
direct causes are sufficient. A minimal sufficient condition (MSC) for e is “a sufficient
condition in which no conjunct could be replaced by a weaker condition on what happens
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at that point without losing sufficiency” (p. 97). (No discussion of, or motivation for, this
definition of minimality is provided. 21 ) Where c and e are distinct actual events, c is a
direct cause of e iff c’s occurrence satisfies a conjunct in some satisfied MSC for e
(McDermott, like most writers, says “actual event” where I say “occurrent event ”)
One might now take the ancestral, so that c is a cause of e iff there is a chain of direct
causation from c to e. But McDermott thinks this would be a mistake. Suppose that,
while I desire to press a certain button, a dog bites off my right finger. Without the bite, I
would have pressed the button with that finger, but instead I use my left. The button-
pressing then causes a bomb to explode (pp. 95, 99). McDermott does not want to count
the bite as a cause of the explosion, but there is a chain of direct causation, as defined,
connecting them, bite, pressing with left hand, explosion (McDermott is idealizing here,
of course, in counting these causal connections as direct). (It may not be obvious how the
pressing with the left hand satisfies a conjunct in an MSC for the explosion. McDermott
does not say, but one natural suggestion is that it satisfies “the button is pressed with
moderate force ”) So McDermott tries a different approach.
He gives us the notion of a sustaining condition (p. 98). It is not precisely defined, but
my understanding of it is this: suppose c’s occurrence satisfies a conjunct in some
satisfied MSC, the remaining conjuncts in that MSC comprise a sustaining condition for
c. If a train’s going down a track is a cause of an arrival, then a sustaining condition for
that cause, according to McDermott, is the presence of the track on which the train rides.
In McDermott’s examples, the events that satisfy sustaining conditions are all, I would
21
Standardly, a (contingent) proposition P is a weakening of another Q iffQ entails P but P does not entail
Q. “A concert occurred” is weaker than “A loud concert occurred.” And “No concert occurred” is stronger
than “No loud concert occurred.”
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say, joint causes with c. McDermott then talks of a channel as a series of sustaining
conditions for a given chain of direct causes: channels support chains, c is a cause of e
iff ( 1 ) there is a chain of direct causation from c to e, and (ii) had c not occurred, then
either e might not have occurred at all or, if it would have, it would not have occurred by
the same channel that actually supported that chain.
The sustaining condition for the bite as direct cause of the pressing was that I desired
to press the button. The sustaining condition for the pressing as direct cause of the
explosion was that the button, wires, bomb, were set up a certain way (p. 99). The desire
and button-bomb connection together make a channel from the bite to the explosion. Had
the bite not occurred, the explosion would have occurred via this same channel, so clause
(ii) is not satisfied: that the bite did not occur and the desire did is an MSC for the
pressing with the right finger, whose first conjunct is satisfied by not-bite; then that the
button is pressed with moderate force and the button-bomb connections are in place is an
MSC for the explosion, whose first conjunct is satisfied by the pressing with the right
finger; so via the same desire-button-bomb channel, there is a chain of direct causation
from not
-bite to explosion.
One can see that, in Figure 3. 1, the analysis will count a and a-b as causes of e. Due
to the use of negative events, meta-prevention preemption (Figure 4.2) is not a problem
(Section 4.5.1). (Aftereffect preemption does not arise for an analysis limited to strict
events.)
Before McDermott gives his analysis, he says (p. 92) he wants to count (standard non-
preemptive) overdeterminers as causes. But he never returns to show us how his analysis
delivers that result, and it seems to me it does not He imagined a case in which a pair of
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(stimulatory) neuron firings (a, b
)
overdetermine the firing of a neuron E. One MSC for
the firing of E is that a stimulatory neuron in a certain location and orientation fires, E is
present, and no inhibitory events occur nearby, a satisfies the first conjunct, so it fits the
definition of a direct cause. But ifa had not occurred, E’s firing would have occurred via
the same sustaining conditions, namely those described by the other conjuncts in that
MSC—so a does not come out a cause. If there is an MSC by which it does, I do not see
it. (All this applies to b, too, of course.) Perhaps McDermott should add a disjunct to his
analysis to make direct causation sufficient for causation.
Now to my first serious objection. First consider Figure 4.4: neuron A is an
inhibitory neuron that fires upon C, although there is no potential firing of C to inhibit,
since B does not fire
Let a be the (possible) firing of A, b of B, c of C. Pretheoretically, does it seem a is a
cause of not-c? That an inhibitory neuron fires in such-and-such location and orientation
is an MSC for not-c (no sustaining conditions required), and it is satisfied by a So a
comes out a direct cause of not-c. Incidentally, and of importance to us later, a also fits
the definition of cause: Ifa had not occurred, not-c would have occurred via (different)
sustaining conditions: not-£ would satisfy (only) the first conjunct in the MSC that b
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does not occur and no other stimulations occur. Likewise, we get that my holding up my
hand {a) is a (direct) cause of the absence of a certain ball flight beyond my hand (not-c),
even if no ball was thrown toward my hand (not-b). This is odd We would certainly
never say that just by holding up my hand I prevented a ball flight, if there were no ball
around at all. It gets worse. Suppose not-c is a direct cause of some event d—perhaps an
actual neuron-firing that c would have inhibited, or the presence of intact glass that a
certain ball flight would have prevented
.
22
Then a will come out a cause of d, for we just
saw that without a, not-c would occur via different sustaining conditions, in which case d
would as well (the channel to d would differ at a’s point). Likewise, my holding up my
hand counts as a cause of the intact window even if no ball was thrown. Now we surely
have an embarrassment of causes. Every time you walk by a window you cause its intact
presence. And the presence of the book on the shelf is a cause of your breathing, by way
of causing the absence of a poisoned dart between it and your heart a few moments ago
—
though there was no dart on the way.
My second serious complaint is that apparently the analysis is not consistent with a
Humean view of laws, and it seems bad for a causal analysis to rule out such a general,
and not especially implausible, view. On a Humean view of laws, the actual pattern of
events in the world determines the laws: the laws hold in virtue of that pattern, such that,
while laws are contingent, if worlds wj and w2 have the same pattern, they have the same
laws
.
23 On McDermott’s analysis, for an event e to be a direct effect, there must be an
MSC, C, such that, were C to occur, e would occur no matter what else happened. But
22
Not-c would satisfy a conjunct in this MSC for d. c does not occur and no other inhibitory event occurs.
23 E g.: Nelson Goodman (1955), Carl Hempel (1965), Lewis (1973a and 1994).
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perhaps by way of things happening very differently throughout the world (including
very relevant parts such as those properly containing conditions that duplicate C), the
laws would be different enough that e would not occur, on those new laws. Perhaps there
is always some MSC large enough to avoid this problem, because it covers so much of
the world. Since any event whose occurrence satisfies a conjunct in an MSC counts as a
direct cause, such a large MSC will have to contain conjuncts that cover large portions of
the world that include the sorts of events we ordinarily count as direct causes—events
with portions just prior to, and spatially contiguous with, e—if there is to be any
plausibility to the claim that its satisfiers are direct causes; there will need to be MSCs
that contain not only that sort of conjunct but contain also conjuncts that merely cover
those ordinary direct causes, since we certainly want to be able to count the ordinary
direct causes and therefore need conjuncts that they can satisfy. Is all this doable? It
appears not The events that satisfy the big, monstrous conjuncts covering large regions
of history are in turn going to have (ordinary) direct causes far and wide, including, in
many cases, in e’s present and future. So we can get a chain of direct causation from
an event/in e’s future to e. And surely it will sometimes be the case that clause (ii) of
the analysis is satisfied: had/not occurred, e would have occurred not by the same
channel, in virtue of the fact that the supporting conditions by which/is actually a cause
of the monster event would not, in/s absence, be supporting conditions for any cause
of it.
At this point I turn to analyses intended to accommodate both deterministic and
indeterministic (“chancy”) causation. Now we will be evaluating analyses not only for
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their ability to handle deterministic preemption, but also for how they deal with
probabilistic (potential) preemption and the problem of failed potential causes.
4.11 Lewis’s Probabilistic Analysis
Lewis (1986d) proposed the first counterfactual analysis meant to accommodate both
deterministic and chancy causation. It identifies causation with the ancestral ofwhat the
probabilistic simple analysis (PSA) identifies it with, except that in the definition of
probabilistic dependence the time of counterfactual chance comparison is just after c
instead of at the end of c—an unimportant difference, for us (see Section 3.2).
Let us focus on preemption first. In Section 3.4.2. 1, we considered a chancy version
of the situation depicted in Figure 3.1: suppose that the backup process is very reliable,
while the successful process is very unreliable, save for the inhibitory power of a, which
is at least moderately reliable. Then a makes e less likely instead of more (at the time at
the end of a). But the ancestral analysis succeeds in counting a as a cause, because V* s
chance would be lower without a, and e’s would be lower without b (at the appropriate
times). Obviously this works also in the deterministic case, where chances are extreme.
So far, so good.
However, the deterministic process preemption problem remains unsolved: If a-b had
not occurred, the chance of e at the end of a-b might have been the same as it actually
was (=1), since/ might have occurred. And there are no events causally between a-b and
e whereby the ancestral will help. And it is not just the extreme case that gives trouble
—
the process preemption problem carries over to the chancy environment. Suppose that
each process, at any stage, is exactly as reliable as the other process at that stage. Then,
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again, if a-b had not occurred, the chance of e at the end of a-b might have been the same
as it actually was, since/ might have occurred and b not.
Further, the analysis is no help with deterministic aftereffect preemption. Take any
cause in Figure 4. 1 : where chances are all 1, if the cause had not occurred, the chance of
the effect would still have been 1 Presumably Lewis intended that quasi-dependence
(Section 4.5) would come to the rescue here (with probabilistic dependence in place of
counterfactual dependence in its definition). But the same objections lodged above
would still apply.
{Chancy aftereffect preemption is not an instance of the preemption problem. Where
two rocks are thrown at a bottle, one getting there first, (each stage of) the first rock’s
journey does make the shattering more probable and thus does not go uncounted. Rather,
the problem here is failed potential causes: early stages of the second-rock flight are also
probability-raisers.)
So the ancestral of probabilistic dependence is not much help with the preemption
problem. It is no help at all with the problem of failed potential causes. In a chancy
setting, ifd (Figure 3.1) had not occurred, the chance of e at the end ofd would have
been lower. And clearly the ancestral maneuver does nothing to help combat the
overlapping variant of failed potential causes (see Section 3 .4.1). (The analysis was not
intended to solve the problem of failed potential causes, the problem was first raised, by
Peter Menzies (1989a), in response to the analysis.)
4.12 Peter Menzies’ Probabilistic Analysis
Peter Menzies 1989a is the first attempt to solve both our central problems. Causation
is still the ancestral of a certain relation R. But R is now connection by an ‘Unbroken
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causal process” (p. 656): There is an unbroken causal process from c to e iff, for any
finite sequence of n (>0) times <t], t2
,
.
..,
tn> between c’s time and e’s time, there is a
sequence of actual events <x} , x2, . x„> at these times (respectively) such that there is a
chain of probabilistic dependence <c, X]
,
x2, . . .,xn , e>
24 One event causes another iff
there is a chain of unbroken causal processes from the one to the other.
Consider Figure 3.1 again, where the backup process is very reliable and the
successful process is very unreliable, save for the inhibitory power of a, which is at least
moderately reliable. Then a makes e less likely instead of more. There is no “unbroken
causal process” from a to e
,
because for the finite sequence of n=0 times there is not the
needed dependence chain, <a, e>. But there is a chain of unbroken causal processes:
where n=0, there is an unbroken causal process from a to b, since <a, b> is a dependence
chain, and likewise for <b, e>, for these two processes, there are no times between the
first and second event, so 0 is the only n value to consider. Recall that e probabilistically
depends on d, so that PSA and its ancestral variant count it a cause (Section 3.4.2. 1).
There is not an unbroken causal process connecting them, since at/s time there is no
actual event dependent on d and on which e is in turn dependent, and further, there is no
chain ofunbroken causal processes, as clearly no other event on the scene will serve as
an intermediate link. Thus d is not counted a cause of e. Some success, then, on both our
central problems.
But the analysis is no help with process preemption. There are no events between a-b
and e, and e is not (probabilistically) dependent on a-b.
24 (Not really for any finite sequence of times between c and e. surely, but rather any where /,+; is later than
Otherwise there will be no causation, since there will not be a dependence chain where an xi+I is earlier
than an at,.)
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The analysis falls apart, with respect to both problems, in the face of aftereffect
preemption. Consider Figure 4.1. In the deterministic case, there is no dependence of e
on b, and there are no intermediates (as Menzies himself (1996) points out—he there
rejects this analysis25 ). Thus a preempting cause goes uncounted. In the chancy case, the
failed potential cause c comes out a cause, d and e are simultaneous, so that c is just
before e. Thus <c, <?> is a dependence chain, so there is an “unbroken causal process”
from c to e (noted in Noordhof 1999, pp. 99-100). (And failed potential causes of
overlapping effects come out causes, as they are direct chance-raisers, see Section 3.4.1.)
4.13 Murali Ramachandran’s Analysis
Murali Ramachandran (1997, 1998) offers an analysis that, while intended to
accommodate chancy causation, makes no use of probabilities. The analysis employs the
concept of a dependence set (D-set) for an event e, which is a set of possible events such
that, had none of them occurred, e would not have occurred. A minimal dependence set
(M-set) for e, is a D-set for e with no proper subset that is a D-set for e. A temporal D-set
for e is a set of possible events such that, were none of its members to occur, e would not
occur at the time it actually occurs. A temporal M-set for e is a temporal D-set for e with
no proper subset that is a temporal D-set for e. The analysis goes as follows.
For any actual events c and e
,
c causes e iff
(i) c belongs to a temporal M-set for e
,
and
(ii) c belongs to an M-set for e, M, such that for any M-set for e, N, that differs
only in that it contains one or more events in place of c, at least one of the
events replacing c is actual and belongs to a temporal M-set for e. (1998, p. 466)
25 He says (1996, p. 96) that he had believed events have their times essentially, so that without b, e would
have no chance. But he now considers this defense “ad hoc” (for reasons I do not quite understand).
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Clause (i) is supposed to capture the idea that causes are relevant to the time an event
occurs. Clause (ii) is supposed to capitalize on the idea, which I have been advocating,
that preempted processes “do not run their full course” (1998, p 273). The way it does
this will emerge from some of the examples below.
Let us first examine how the analysis handles deterministic causation. Consider
Figure 3.1. a is a cause of e. LetM = {a,d). M is an M-set for e and also a temporal M-
set for e. So (i) is satisfied. AndM appears to meet condition (ii) with respect to a. to
get an M-set, N, for e by replacing a in M, we need to include exactly one actual event
from the successful process, no proper subset ofN will be a temporal M-set for e, so N
itself will be a temporal M-set for e. d, on the other hand, does not come out a cause, as
condition (ii) is not met: any M-set for e that contains d will be one for which/, a non-
actual event, can take the place ofdio make another M-set for e.
The analysis is also able to count the process a-b as a cause of e. letM- {a-b, d), and
the reasoning is the same as that above for a.
Consider the aftereffect preemption diagram Figure 4.1. a is a cause of e. a belongs
to a temporal M-set for e, namely {a}, so (i) is satisfied. LetM~ {a, d}. M is an M-set
for e. Any substitute for a will be an actual event in the successful process, and the unit
set of this substitute will be a temporal M-set for e, so (ii) is satisfied. Precisely the same
reasoning applies to the process a-b. d will not come out a cause of e, for the simple
reason this time that it is not in a temporal M-set for e. The reasoning here applies
exactly to the aftereffect case where two rocks are thrown at a bottle, one getting there
first and shattering it.
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Thus the analysis handles deterministic preemption quite well. Like PCA*, it also
handles preemption by delayed action. Consider the case where b is removed from
Figure 3.1 and a causes e at a distance. The above reasoning by which a is a cause of e
when b is not removed still applies to this delayed-action version
Ramachandran offers a simpler analysis as a stepping stone, but rejects it: (SIMPLE)
c causes e iff c is in an M-set for e, M, such that no other M-set for e differs fromM only
in that it contains non-actual events in place of c (1998, p. 465). Consider Figure 3.1
LetM be {a, d) a is counted a cause of e
,
becauseM is an M-set for e and a cannot be
replaced by non-actual events while keeping Man M-set, d, however, can be replaced by
/ But Ramachandran rejects SIMPLE because, for aftereffect cases like the two-rock
case, where one rock arrives first and shatters the bottle, the analysis appears to count (a
stage of) the second rock’s journey as a cause of the shattering: letM be {sj, s2}, where
S] is a stage of the first rock’s journey and S2 is a stage of the second rock’s journey,M is
an M-set for the shattering; in place of 52, to get another M-set we can only substitute
other actual stages involving that same rock, because no part of that journey is non-
actual. Or so his reasoning goes, it is why he brings temporal M-sets to the rescue. But
why not substitute the essentially late shattering that would have occurred if the first rock
had not been thrown? Call this event If h and sj were not to occur, there would be
no shattering, and since h is a non-actual event, S2 fails to count as a cause. We still get sj
as a cause, using M: substitute h for sj, it is false that without h and 5?, the shattering
would not have occurred. So it seems that even SIMPLE does a good job of dealing with
deterministic preemption.
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In case there is some reason not to allow non-actual versions of the effect into the M-
sets, let me point out that temporal M-sets are not adequate What is needed instead are
spatiotemporal M-sets. Let the lunchtime ring be an event that can occur as the ringing
of either of two bells, or of both, in a certain bell tower at noon. 26 You order Lefty to
ring the left bell, I give an order for Righty to ring the right bell and Molly to mute the
left bell (all at noon). Consequently, Lefty’s attempt is muted as the right bell rings My
order preempts yours as a cause of the lunchtime ring. Figure 4.5 may be helpful here, r
is Righty’s bell-striking, m is Molly’s muting, and / is Lefty’s bell-striking:
Figure 4.5
DSA fails here, because the ring is not dependent on my order. But the problem this
example poses for Ramachandran, if non-actual versions of the effect are not allowed in
M-sets, is that / comes out a cause. LetM - {/, my order ) . M is a temporal M-set for the
effect at issue. M is also an M-set for it. Substitutions for / will have to be other actual
events in the backup process, and the result will also be a temporal M-set. So both
conditions (i) and (ii) are met.
26
Events have not only temporally flexible occurrence conditions, but spatially: the trumpet solo could
have occurred as a sitting or a standing event. And occurrence conditions can be flexible with respect to
object involvement: the solo could have occurred with the silver trumpet instead of the brass one. There is
no motivation for counting time as the only respect in which occurrence conditions can be flexible.
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The repair: change the definition of temporal M-set to read “in the region” instead of
“at the time,” and call it a spatiotemporal M-set Just as aftereffect-preempted events are
not in temporal M-sets for the effect (reflecting the fact that they do not actually
influence the effect’s time), so / is not in a spatiotemporal M-set for the lunchtime ring
(reflecting the fact that it does not actually influence the effect’s region).
As should be clear, Ramachandran’s analysis (and each variant I have discussed)
counts standard non-preemptive overdeterminers as causes. Some may take this as a
good result. And one can see that it readily counts trumped events and in
Rumpelstiltskin II as causes—some may take this as a bad result, though I have argued
that it is not clearly wrong (Section 3. 4. 2. 2).
Like PCA*, the analysis counts the backup disrupter as a cause in cases of allegedly
preemptive prevention. We had the example from McDermott where I catch a ball that is
headed toward a window, and between me and the window is a brick wall. I do not want
to count the presence of the wall as a cause of the presence of intact glass. But my lunge
and the presence of the wall make an M-set that allows both to be causes, on any of the
versions of the analysis above (consider SIMPLE, for instance, and notice that there are
no non-actual events that can be substituted for the wall to keep the set an M-set—flights
of the ball will not do it, since in their absence, the glass is still intact). This is the main
disappointment, for me, in its handling of deterministic causation.
How does the M-set approach handle chancy causation? On any of the versions we
have considered, a cause must be in an M-set for the effect, but can this requirement
always be met? In some cases of chancy causation, there will still be counterfactual
dependence: without the presence of the radioactive nucleus, the particle emission would
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not have occurred—even though it was never determined to occur. So here, the cause is
m an M ' set for the effect But we can imagine two events, a and b, jointly and directly
causing an event e by way of contributing something independently to e’s chance Here,
if aW had not occurred, e still might have. Are a and b in M-sets for e? a and b may
themselves comprise an M-set for e, so that each comes out a cause. Ramachandran’s
idea is that we can always find enough events, and a minimal set of them, to be able to
say that if they had not occurred, e would not have occurred.
But this is not right, for two reasons. First, it is conceivable, however unrealistic, that
an event could have some background chance of occurring entirely spontaneously, with
no events as direct causes, while yet it does not actually occur that way but occurs with
direct event causes that make it more probable. In such a case, the direct causes will not
be in M-sets for the effect. (This situation arises constantly in purely indeterministic
worlds, since every effect would have some chance even if all its direct causes were not
to occur
)
Second, take a standard example which is often given to motivate the need for a
probabilistic analysis: a radioactive nucleus with a certain chance of emitting an alpha
particle in the next minute absorbs another particle so that the chance of the emission
increases; the emission occurs; the absorption seems like a cause, yet without it, the
emission might still have occurred. The absorption is not enough to make an M-set for
the effect. Yet anything else that is added to do it—the presence of the radioactive
nucleus, for example—will by itself make an M-set for the effect, so that the absorption
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will be extra and the set will not be minimal (Noordhof 1998, p. 45927 ). Ramachandran
(1998, p 469-70) holds out hope he can escape this problem if there are some events
inside the atom to combine with the absorption to make an M-set But this is a red
herring, in my opinion, since conceptually the damaging situation is clear, whether or not
there are real cases of it. The structure of it is simply that a cause c can only be in a D-set
with necessary causes; the necessary causes will always make an M-set on their own, so
that c can never get in. It can be made vivid with a simple neuron example: neurons A
and B fire directly upon E, A and B are of different types, such that each one’s firing
makes E’s firing more probable, yet A’s firing is necessary in that, without it, the chance
of E’s firing would be 0. And intuitively we see this sort of situation day-to-day. You
don’t know if the small fire in the fireplace is going to grow big; to improve the odds,
you add a log, the addition in fact causes a big fire, as you had hoped. The addition is in
a D-set with the small fire, but it is not in an M-set: the small fire is necessary, so it
makes an M-set by itself, while the log-addition does not make an M-set by itself. 28
Consequently, I do not take the M-set analysis seriously as a broad analysis suitable to
indeterministic causation.
4.14 Paul Noordhof s Probabilistic Analysis
Paul Noordhof s (1999) analysis is exceptionally complex. To run through the
motivations behind its various components would take (as it takes Noordhof) a great deal
27
Noordhof does not quite say this. He says there is no D-set for the emission that includes the absorption,
since there is no D-set for the emission at all! But there are many, such as the presence of the atom.
28 (This problem does not arise in purely indeterministic worlds, though the previous one does.)
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of space. Here is the compressed motivation, supplied by the author after he presents the
analysis in full (the clauses mentioned are described below):
Although this formulation might appear complex, the final conception of a
cause it articulates is relatively simple. A cause, ej, is something which
(independently of its competitors) both makes the chance of an effect, e2 ,
very much greater than its maximal background chance (clause (I)) and
’
actually influences the probability of the effect in this way at the time at
which the effect occurred (clauses (III) and (IV)) via a complete causal chain
(clause (II) and the way in which probabilities are assessed), (p. 120)
“The way in which probabilities are assessed” is a reference to the fact that the chance
time of counterfactual comparison is the time just before the effect. Recall, again, that in
Figure 3.1, if all is chancy, the chance of e would have been lower at (the end of) cT s time
had d not occurred, and thus PSA counts d a cause of e. But it is not true that the chance
at the time just before e would have been lower ifd had not occurred—it might have been
the same. Thus, utilizing this chance time solves one case of the problem of failed
potential causes. It does not solve them all: in Figure 4. 1, c is a failed potential cause
that makes the chance of e more probable at the time (at the end of) of c—but this time
just is the time just before e, so assessing probabilities in the new way is no help.
Noordhof is aware of this, but since the new way is partially helpful, he embraces it.
The presentation of the analysis is unclear, because different, very important sentences
are labeled with the same numbers in the text, and a key definition seems to be missing a
label
30
But I think the intended analysis goes as follows.
29
(In Section 3.2, 1 describe a problem with using the time just before the effect. Whether this problem
arises in the context of Noordhof s analysis I shall not investigate.)
30
Clause (I), below, appears to be given on pp. 109-10, though “(I)” labels other sentences in the paper.
The label Noordhof actually uses for the second clause below—“(II)'”—is used for a different definition as
well, on p. 114.
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For any actual, distinct events e, and e2 , e, causes e2 (if and)
31
only if there is a
(possibly empty) set of possible events E such that (I)-(IV) is true:
(I) e2 is probabilistically Z-dependent on ey.
(1) If ej were to occur without any of the events in I, then for some time
it would be the case that, just before t, p(e2 at t) > x,
32
(2) if neither ej nor any of the events in Z were to occur, then for any time
t, it would be the case that, just before t, p(e2 at t) <y,
(3) x is much greater than>>.
(II) For any superset E* of Z, if e2 probabilistically Z*-depends upon eu then
every event upon which <?2 probabilistically E*-depends is an actual event.
(HI) occurs at one of the times for which p(e2 at /) > x and x is much greater
than y.
(IV) e2 probabilistically ,4-time depends upon ey
Where t0 is <?2 ’s actual time, there is a possibly empty set of possible
events ,4, meeting constraint (C), below, such that
(1) If ej were to occur without any of the events in A, then it would be
the case that p(e2 at t0) > x;
(2) if neither ej nor any of the events in A were to occur, then it would
be the case that p(e2 at t0) <y,
(3) x is much greater than j'.
(C) No event e, is in^ if both
(a) If it is a member of^, then <ej, e2> satisfies (IV),33 and
(b) if it is not a member ofA, and we replace (IV)(1) and (2) with
( 1 *) If e; and e, were to occur, with none of the events in A occurring,
nor e, satisfying any of (I)-(III) regarding e2 , then it would be the
case that p(e2 at to) ^ x
(2*) If e, were to occur with neither ej nor any of the events in A
occurring, nor e, satisfying any of (I)-(ni) regarding e2, then it
would be the case that p(e2 at to)
then <ei, e2> does not satisfy (IV). (pp. 109-10, 1 16-7, 120)
31 Noordhof uses parentheses here because he is not confident that the analysis is—or that extant
counterfactual analyses generally are
—
generally asymmetric (pp. 120ff). He doubts Lewis's claim that
backtracking counterfactuals are special, are standardly false (see Section 2.2).
32
“p(^2 at 0” means the probability of the proposition that e2 occurs at t.
33 (IV) save “meeting constraint (C), below,” we must assume, else we are caught in a circle here.
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I think the analysis is unacceptably complex. The clauses have a certain common
style, but they are not common enough to defeat the charge of complexity—the analysis
is too long, fragmented, and difficult. Despite its motivations, it is not intuitive enough
for me to believe that people (and children) have anything like it in mind, however
tacitly, when they employ the notion of causation. It is implausible that our sense that
causation is a fairly simple concept is this far off. And it is, I dare say, impossible to
convince oneself that the probability of serious counterexamples is low, especially once
one has seen how counterexamples to much simpler analyses can lay hidden.
I shall not attempt to evaluate how well the analysis handles our two central problems,
because I do not think it is worth it. Even if it handles them (or appears to handle them),
a much simpler analysis will be wanted 34
4.15 Conclusion
For deterministic causation, PCA* and the M-set analysis get good results overall.
But they count the second potential disrupter in allegedly preemptive prevention cases as
causes, which I think is a bad result. Also, I believe I can produce something more
elegant and intuitive than these analyses.
As for indeterministic causation, it appears that no counterfactual analysis to date has
come close to being acceptable. It may be necessary to proceed more slowly, to retreat to
a special case and see if we can produce a decent analysis at least for it, this is what I am
aiming for in Chapter 6.
34
The analysis does appear to suffer from the overlapping problem. Noordhof admits (p. 100-8) that he is
relying on the idea that all cases of failed potential causes are cases involving failed intermediates; but
overlapping cases do not. Intermediates and time issues are irrelevant to overlapping, and those are the
only issues his analysis addresses.
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CHAPTER 5
A NEW DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS (AND TWO SIMILAR RIVALS)
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I propose my own analysis of deterministic event causation Recently
two similar analyses have been published (Christopher Hitchcock 2001 and Stephen
Yablo 2002). In commenting on these views I want to draw comparisons to and contrasts
with my own, so I have reserved discussion of them for after I present mine; this will
come at the end of the chapter.
5.2 The Analysis
Consider again the preemption situation depicted in Figure 3.1, and assume
determinism.
a b
a is a cause of e, but e is not dependent on a. However, notice that ifa were not to occur
and (still)/were not to occur, e would not occur. Similarly, if a-b were not to occur and
(still)/were not to occur, e would not occur. For the analogous dart-balloon story
(Section 4.2), where my dart-throw (a) preempts Lucy’s windup (d) as a cause of the pop
(e), we can say likewise: Were my throw not to occur and still Lucy’s throw (/) were not
to occur, then the pop would not occur. And if the whole journey of my dart {a-b) were
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not to occur and still Lucy’s throw were not to occur, then the pop would not occur By
holding fixed that a certain event does not occur (a certain part of the backup process) we
seem to regain a kind of dependence of effect on cause.
This holds for the case where a causes e by delayed action, and there is no
intermediate, b if a and/were not to occur, e would not occur.
Consider the lunch-bell example (Figure 4.4) in which I issue an order for Righty to
ring the right bell and Molly to mute the left bell, thereby preempting your order to Lefty
to ring the left bell If my order had not occurred and (still) the left bell had not rung,
there would have been no lunchtime ringing. Likewise, if the process from my order up
through Righty’s bell-striking had not occurred, yet the left bell were not to ring, there
would be no lunchtime ringing.
Consider the dinner-bell example in which I give an order for Amy to ring the bell at
5:59 and Betty to remove it at 6:00, thereby preempting your order to Carl to ring it at
6:01. If my order were not to occur, and there were no 6:01 ringing, there would be no
dinnertime ringing. This is as true of the process from my order up through Amy’s bell-
striking.
We can say analogous things in the aftereffect preemption cases. Where the 5:59
ringing causes the absence of the 6:01 (by causing Betty to remove the bell), it is no less
true that without my order and without the 6:01, there would be no ringing; and, without
the Amy process and without the 6:01, there would be no ringing. In the two-rock
example, there is a merely potential shattering (h) that essentially occurs at or shortly
after the time the second rock would have hit the window had the first rock not been
thrown. If the first rock throw were not to occur and yet h were not to occur, then the
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shattering would not occur—whether this “throw” is a stage of the rock’s journey or the
whole process.
Consider the example of meta-prevention preemption where my untying the safety-net
rope is a cause of the trapeze artist s death, and the untying preempts someone else’s
cutting of the rope (Figure 4.2). If the untying hadn’t occurred, and still the cutting had
not occurred, the death would not have occurred.
We might describe this regained dependence as counterfactual dependence holding
certain things fixed. The fixing, thus far, has worked like this: instead of saying, “if a
were not to occur, b would not occur,” we hold fixed the nonoccurrence of events/;,f2 ,
... by saying, “if tf,/y,/2, . . were not to occur, b would not occur.” But let us notice
another kind of fixing that needs doing. Consider the following example.
Eleven people are on a sinking ship Crewman Jill tells Captain Jack she thinks the
raft can handle only ten. Jack is skeptical, but unsure. He tells her, “If I’m not on the raft
in 5 minutes, go without me.” Jill promises herself that if Jack does get on the raft, she ’ll
stay with the ship instead. But Jack doesn’t. Jill and the nine passengers wait out the 5
minutes, then float to safety. Jack is swallowed by the sea. The survivors eventually
learn (from the raft manufacturer) that indeed the raft would have sunk with 1 1 people.
The passengers also learn of Jill’s willingness to stay with the ship, and they thank her for
that. They say a prayer for Jack and thank him in their hearts; they say they owe their
lives to Jack; they wish he knew that he made a worthwhile decision, that it wasn’t a
waste after all, and that its end was achieved, they tell their grandkids how Jack saved
their lives.
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These people view Jack’s decision to stay with the ship as a cause of their survival, of
their safe arrival home, I agree. Now, if Jack’s decision hadn’t occurred, Jill would have
stayed back, true to her promise, so the arrival wasn’t dependent on Jack’s decision.
Jack’s decision preempted Jill’s promise as a cause of the arrival However, if Jack’s
decision hadn’t occurred and still Jill had remained on the raft
,
the arrival wouldn’t have
occurred, because the raft would have sunk. This preemption challenge is met by holding
fixed an occurrence in the preempted process—Jill’s sitting in the raft. It is by
preventing oneself being on the raft that one’s decision or promise has the potential to be
a cause of the arrival. The Jill process is failed because Jill is on the raft, and this is what
we need to hold fixed 1 In general, hold fixed the occurrence of events/;,f2, ... by
saying, “if a were not to occur andfhf2, • were to occur, b would not occur.”
In these examples, while things are held fixed, not only would the effect not occur
without the cause, it would occur with the cause—as it does. The cause and the fixed
background constitute a situation given which the effect would occur, and the cause is
necessary for that occurrence in the context of that situation: the cause is
(counterfactually) necessary as part of a situation (counterfactually) sufficient for the
effect. Counterfactual dependence is a limiting case: the cause itself comprises a
situation given which the effect would occur, and it is necessary for the effect. Thus both
preemptive and non-preemptive causes are necessary as parts of situations in which the
effect would occur. Now, it may seem that the trick at this point is to define the sort of
situation that can play this role—to say what can and cannot be held fixed. But I doubt
1 A neuron diagram will reveal that no nonoccurrence can be held fixed to gain dependence of effect on
cause. (I spare you that diagram, due to its complexity.) But regardless, I hope you agree that the fact that
Jill is on the raft is a fairly natural choice for something to hold fixed to gain dependence.
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there is any such need My proposal, roughly, is that one event causes another iff it is
necessary as part ofsome situation sufficient for the other. Later on, 1 will try to allay
fears that this is overly permissive. Right now, some precision.
Let a simple event proposition be any proposition that a certain event occurs or that a
certain event does not occur, to be symbolized, for example, 0(e),
-O(e). (An event
proposition is any result of Boolean complications of simple event propositions.) Let a
situation be any non-empty set of simple event propositions whose involved events are
all essentially distinct. A set holds iff all its members are true propositions; it implies
whatever the conjunction of its members implies (0 always holds, never implies). An
actual situation is one that actually holds. Call a situation’s members its parts, and say
an event e is part ofa situation S iff 0(e) is part of S.
Then, b is situationally dependent on a, in virtue of situation S iffa is part ofS and (i)
ifS were to hold, b would occur, but (ii) if S-{0(a)} were to hold and (0(a)) were not to
hold, b would not occur. The antecedents of (i) and (ii) imply that ^-{O^)} holds; this
set, when nonempty and actual, is a situation that represents what is “held fixed”, the
things we held fixed in the examples above belong in such a set. The limiting case arises
when a is necessary as part of the situation {0(a)} sufficient for b, iff that is so, b is
counterfactually dependent on a. I propose that c is a cause of e iff e is situationally
dependent on c in virtue of some actual situation. More colloquially: iff c is necessary as
part of some actual situation in which e would occur.
For all cases where b is situationally dependent on a in virtue of a situation S that is
not identical to {0(a)}, we could say that b is thus conditionally dependent on a: b
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depends on a given £-{0(a)}. If instead S is {0(a)}, then we can say b is outright
dependent on a. Situational dependence is dependence either outright or conditional. 2
As far as I can see, every case of outright dependence is also a case of conditional
dependence: there is always some occurrence or nonoccurrence that can be taken as
given. In fact, there are always actual ones that can be taken as given (held fixed): the
occurrence of some event in the distant past, or the nonoccurrence of some unlawful
event (if I were to flip the switch, the light would go off, but then it is also true that if I
were to flip the switch and not suddenly turn to stone, the light would go off).
Therefore, not only in preemption but also in non-preemptive causation we can find
some actual situation F (distinct from cause c) such that e depends on c given F. Since F
is actual, it is natural in such cases to say, “holding certain things fixed, e wouldn’t have
occurred without c,” or, “e is dependent on c certain other things being equal.” (E g.,
“Certain other things being equal, the balloon wouldn’t have popped if I had not
thrown ”) Then we can amend DSA with just this kind of qualifier: c is a cause of e iff
they occur, they are essentially distinct, and e is dependent on c certain other things
being equal. This analysis is equivalent to the one in terms of situational dependence,
thanks to the fact that we can always find something actual to hold fixed. Both are
simple and intuitive and may correspond to ways we think about particular cases.
Our causal intuitions differ in character according to whether causation holds in virtue
of outright dependence or only conditional dependence. Consider the bell stories of the
2 The definition of conditional dependence here can be taken to descend from a broader conception of it
that may perhaps have some use in other arenas: given P, (i) ifQ were so, R would be, and (ii) ifQ were
not so, R would not be—for any propositions P, Q, R. (That is, if P and Q were so, R would be, and if P
were so but Q were not, R would not be—for any P, Q, R.)
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previous chapters: we feel that my order is in some sense not really helping, it hampers
as much as helps, by blocking the other process, and consequently it makes no net
difference to whether the effect occurs. We could capture this by saying the order is not a
cause outright, but given certain of the circumstances (the failure of the backup ringer),
the preempting cause is a help it is a cause conditionally. The distinction between the
two kinds of dependence provides an analysis of the intuitive causal distinction just
noted. The analysis explains our inclination to see preempting causes as a little less
deserving of the name “cause”: only one of the two kinds of dependence holds, and, this
kind would seem to be the less basic or fundamental.
5.3 Comparison to John L Mackie’s Theory
The proposal is reminiscent of John L. Mackie’s (1965), though for sure they are also
importantly different
.
3
According to Mackie, a cause is a member of every actual,
minimal lawfully sufficient condition for the effect (though there are some further
requirements, the most important of which pertains to asymmetry). Thus, as Mackie
says, a cause is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for the effect. Mackie and I
seem to mean roughly the same thing by “condition” and “situation” (he does not define
“condition,” but he composes conditions by conjoining propositions that roughly
correspond to occurrences and nonoccurrences). Mackie’s condition is lawfully sufficient
for the effect, while my situation is counterfactually (or subjunctively) sufficient; but in
fact Mackie’s condition is sufficient in both senses, since a condition that implies e is also
3 The similarity between Mackie’s view and dependence certain-other-things-being-equal was pointed up to
me by Phillip Bricker, which observ ation motivated the situational-dependence picture, necessity as part of
a situation in which e would occur.
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one given which e would occur, and, my analysis is equivalent to one using situations
that also are sufficient in both senses (at least for worlds with laws disallowing action at a
distance). How so?
If b is situationally dependent on a in virtue of an actual situation, it will be so in
virtue of many actual situations, and some of these will lawfully imply that b occurs. For
instance, for Figure 3.1, e is situationally dependent on a in virtue of the situation
~0(/)} da were not to occur and still S— (O(tf)} were to hold, e would not
occur. Ifwe add to S enough to characterize just the state of the world at (the beginning
of) a s time, then the result, S*, will lawfully imply that e occurs (since the world is
deterministic), and it will be true that ifa were not to occur and S*-{0(a) } were to hold,
e would not occur—it will be true because its being true for ^-{0(0)} did not hang on it
being the case that certain a-simultaneous extras would not or might not obtain in the
antecedent situation, and thus adding that they would hold is innocuous. So situational
dependence between occurrent, essentially distinct events arises only if it arises with
respect to a situation that lawfully implies the effect. And thus without loss the analysans
can be restricted to such situations: A cause is counterfactually necessary as part of a
situation that lawfully implies the effect. It may be that in thinking of an event as a
cause, we often have some of this larger, lawfully sufficient situation in mind: The
balloon was still at last, I had a nice clear line of sight to it, and my dart was newly
sharpened; I threw the dart, and Lucy didn ’t throw hers—clearly, then, my throw was a
crucial ingredient in bringing off the pop.
There is, of course, a big difference in the ways the analyses count the cause
“necessary.” For Mackie, it is necessary in that the condition to which it belongs is
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minimally lawfully sufficient for the effect; for me, it is necessary in that, with its
absence, in conjunction with the balance of the situation, the effect would not occur, 4
5 4 Defensive Comments. Concessions
As I said, one would have expected that we needed to specify which occurrences and
nonoccurrences can be held fixed, rather than allowing any (apart from c
)
to be fixed
Have I succeeded in counting lots of preempting causes by being overly permissive? I
consider three ways my proposal may appear to overcount causes. Then I return to some
of the undercounting allegations made against DSA, which could as easily be made
against my view, we need to see whether there are explanations for (what I claim are) our
erroneous causal judgements in those cases that are consistent with my analysis.
5.4.1 Movers as Causes 5
A safe is falling towards a jelly doughnut on the sidewalk. I bump the doughnut left a
few inches, so Squash occurs in spatial region S instead ofR Let R-squash and S-squash
be squashes that essentially occur in R and S, respectively (R-squash being
nonoccurrent). Squash, the effect at issue, is more flexible and could occur in either
region. Now, we might say this: (Q) “If the bump hadn’t occurred and (still) R-squash
hadn’t occurred. Squash wouldn’t have occurred.” IfQ is true, the bump is a cause of
Squash. And that result may look wrong.
4
It may be that a version of my analysis restricted to situations that are minimally lawfully sufficient is also
true. If so. my view is Mackie’s plus the counterfactual necessity just mentioned. Whether that is so or
not, we can see that the counterfactual does all the work for my analysis, since 1 do not need to add a
requirement of either lawful sufficiency or minimal lawful sufficiency.
5
Here I rely more heavily than elsewhere on your familiarity with the semantics of counterfactuals. see
Section 2.2.
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I do not find Q compelling To say that, in the antecedent situation, Squash wouldn’t
have occurred at all, is to suggest that it would have been that, say, the safe did not fall,
or did not fall near there, or the doughnut was absent or in a region outside Squash’s
essential range. But if those things might have been, then why might the doughnut not
also have been in S? There is a slight arbitrariness in ruling that out, it seems to me So 1
have a hard time accepting Q.
But suppose the doughnut is on a train-track rail, instead (let this be region “R” now);
just before the train arrives, I bump the doughnut over onto the other rail (S), where it is
squashed. Consider Q again, applied to this new scenario. I think it is a reasonable
claim. In the absence of the bump and R-squash, it would be that either the train stopped,
or the doughnut was off the rail, but its being on the other rail seems a little fanciful, a
gratuitously neat hypothesis, a bit far-fetched.
The analysis is flexible, then, with respect to this sort of case. It counts the mere
spatial mover from R to S a cause when the movement accomplishes a substantial
change, a change that, without the mover, we cannot even say might have occurred in the
absence of the R version of the event.
Probably some will be unhappy counting the mover a cause even in such cases as the
rail version. I concede I am not sure it is a good result; but I think the flexibility captures
a genuine variance in our causal intuitions: in general a mover seems more responsible
for the (flexible) effect when it is responsible for a version that seems “a far reach” from
the actual version.
Note that the analysis definitely excludes some movers as causes. Causation arises
only when the relevant counterfactual-antecedent situation would leave the consequent
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event without sufficient parts (parts whose occurrence entails the occurrence of the
event). Let us assume that the Great Chicago Fire could have occurred a little differently,
including a little smaller or larger, a bit to the north or south Imagine that a gust of wind
in fact caused the whole fire to occur a bit south of where it otherwise would have, say
one hundred meters south. If the gust had not occurred, and still there were no fire in that
hundred-meter northern strip, the Fire would still have occurred—because the portion
below the strip that would still have occurred is a sufficient part of the Fire. So the gust
will not come out a cause of the Fire. This point will apply to temporal as well as spatial
movement, of course. Putting these sorts of very slight movements aside, let us now
consider temporal movements.
Suppose I push the top of the safe as it falls so that it falls faster, and consequently
Squash occurs earlier (in R). It seems that if the push were not to occur, and (still) the
late squash were not to occur, Squash would not occur—in the antecedent situation, the
safe would fall at the original, slow rate. Plausibly, Squash occurring earlier in the
antecedent situation is more far-fetched than its not occurring at all. So the analysis
seems to count hasteners as causes. This result, too, may seem wrong. I am not sure this
is a good causal result, but perhaps it is fine. I sympathize somewhat with those (Section
4.5) who think hastening seems like causing: a hastener induces the event, it brings it on.
In general the situation with respect to delaying is more akin to that of spatial moving
(and my opinion of it is the same): the analysis seems somewhat flexible. Suppose that a
swarm of bees slows a rock’s journey to a bottle just a little. If the swarm hadn’t
occurred and still the early shattering hadn’t occurred, . . . well, one might say that the late
shattering might have occurred instead (the window might have hesitated before
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shattering). If the delay is great, however, it would seem far-fetched that such a late
shattering might occur. Aside from this general similarity with spatial moving, in
delaying there appears to be a special sort of example where the delayer is decidedly
excluded as a cause no matter what the size of the delay. The example comes from Ned
Hall (2000, p. 208): Billy and Suzy are winding up to throw rocks at a bottle, Suzy is the
faster throw, but a sudden cramp in her arm stops her from throwing, Billy continues on,
causing the shattering. The cramp delays the shattering. But on the proposed analysis it
is not a cause, for there is nothing one might hold fixed such that without the cramp the
shattering wouldn’t have occurred. It is definitely false, for example, that if the cramp
hadn’t occurred but still there were no early shattering, the shattering wouldn’t have
occurred. Figure 5.1 diagrams the example.
Figure 5.1
5.4.2 Threat/Savior Cases
Two red lanterns appear on a boat in the harbor, and they are visible from the castle.
The royal cook sees them and thinks they are a signal from his rebel gang that he should
poison the king’s drink now, so he does. The king’s chamber guard also sees the
lanterns, but he thinks they are a signal from fellow guards that someone may be trying to
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poison the king and he should put antidote in any food or drink brought to the chamber,
and so he does. The king drinks, but lives. Is the presence of the lanterns a cause of the
king’s being alive? Do they save him? I prefer to say “Yes.” As with preemptors, the
lanterns both help and hinder. They help in that they cause the guard to add antidote to
the drink, and I think it is fair to say that they help the guard to save the king’s life by
alerting him to the possibility of poison in the drink. Once I see this helpfulness, I prefer
to count the lanterns a cause of the survival.
That sort of example is sometimes put forward as a counterexample to transitive
causal analyses (such as Lewis 1973, Ganeri et al. 1998, Lewis 2000—see Chapter 4):
the lanterns cause the addition of antidote, which in turn causes the king’s live presence,
but the lanterns (it is said) do not cause the king’s live presence. 6 The situational-
dependence analysis also counts the first a cause of the third: if the lanterns hadn’t been
present and yet still there were poison in the drink, then the king would have died. This
particular example is one I devised to try to show that it is fine to count the first a cause
of the third. But other examples perhaps make the causal claim harder to swallow.
Consider the following. The cook decides on his own to poison the king. The guard sees
the cook add poison to the drink, and so he adds antidote. 7 Did the addition of poison
save the king’s life? Was it a cause of his later live presence? The structure is basically
the same here as in the example above. But perhaps it is harder here to answer Yes.
6 Ned Hall (1997, 2000) and Stephen Yablo (2002) present this kind of challenge. (Hartry Field is often
credited with early instances of this sort of example (see Yablo 2002, p. 134).) The examples in Hall 2000
have a special structure in which the final event is clearly not situationallv dependent on the first; this is
made clear by way of Christopher Hitchcock’s discussion (2001, Sections 7-9).
1
This particular example is from Hitchcock (in correspondence).
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I think this may be because, in the second example, the poisoning’s role as threat is
more salient than its role as savior. The reason for this is probably that we do not think of
an act of poisoning as primarily a reflector of light images, but in the story, this is one of
the things it is it sends light into the guard’s eyes, signaling him that there is poison in
the drink. In this way, it saves the king. Focus on the fact that the poisoning event is not
only a poisoner of liquid but a transmitter of a warning message, and the asymmetry
tends to even out.
5.4.3 Switching
Another sort of alleged counterexample to transitivity goes as follows. The train track
splits and the two branches reconverge before the station. A train approaches the fork,
the switch is thrown so that the train travels on track B instead of A, it arrives at the
station just as it would have without the switching. The switching is a cause of the B
journey, and the B journey is a cause of the arrival, but to many it does not seem that the
switching is a cause of the arrival. The situational dependence theory yields that result as
well: if the switching had not occurred and still the A journey had not occurred, then the
arrival would not have occurred. (Perhaps the counterfactuals here are more clearly true
if the branches spread far apart and “A journey” and “B journey” are taken to be
intermediate stages of those journeys, close neither to the point of divergence nor to the
point of convergence. One may add those stipulations.)
I agree that it is a bit of a strain to count the switching a cause of the arrival. But I
think the verdict may be correct. The switching prevents one journey but causes another
that results in the arrival. Like the preemptors we have seen, it helps and hinders, but it
still helps. It is an example in which the lack of outright dependence is especially salient,
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more so than the presence of conditional dependence This would be alleviated some if
we called the switching something else: route positioning, route locating, channel
opening. It opens one channel and closes another It is an opening/closing. Was the
opening/closing a cause of the arrival? Yes and No. Conditionally, but not outright.
Here is a little thought experiment that may make it seem more reasonable to count the
switching a cause. Imagine you know that the train is approaching the fork, that the
switch is set to track A, but that the train does not travel on track A. Then you learn that
the train arrives at the station. How could it? The switching provides an explanation.
5.4.4 Undercounting Challenges Revisited
For “Rumpelstiltskin II” and trumping (Sections 3. 4. 2. 2. 3 and 3 4.2.2.4), we allegedly
had preemption without failure in the backup process, and I claimed that the alleged
preemptor is not really a cause. It would be good to have an explanation as to why we
commit this error in judgement, an explanation consistent with the situational-
dependence analysis of causation. I said (in those earlier sections) that the alleged
preemptor does not clearly look like a cause once we see that its complete circumstances
are already “enough” for the effect. But we should ask, “Why, if causation is what I say
it is, do we prefer to count those cases as preemption when we ignore this fact about the
sufficiency of the circumstances, and why does attending to the fact put a damper on that
preference?”
Here is a theory that seems plausible to me. In the examples at issue, it seems offhand
that the alleged preemptor c’s circumstances fail to imply the effect. As a result, it feels
intuitively that those circumstances must have, or lack, some intrinsic feature in virtue of
which they fail to imply it. Then, it seems that holding fixed this impotent nature, the
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effect would not occur without c (that is, we hold fixed a version of the circumstances
that essentially has this nature). But to the extent we can absorb the fact that the
circumstances do imply the effect, there is no impotence to hold fixed, and no situational
dependence.
For standard non-preemptive overdetermination (Section 3.3
.4), I simply said that
there are intuitions both for and against counting overdeterminers as causes, and that
therefore an analysis could deliver either verdict acceptably. My analysis counts the
overdeterminers non-causes. Now, if causation is situational dependence, and there is no
situational dependence of effect on overdeterminer, then why is there a significant
inclination to count the overdeterminer a cause? I do not know. Until there is an answer,
this stands as something of a failing.
5.5 Christopher Hitchcock’s Analysis
Christopher Hitchcock’s analysis (2001) uses a kind of causal modeling borrowed
from the work on causation of computer scientists Joseph Halpern (2000) and Judea Pearl
(2000). Hitchcock takes a causal model to be a pair of sets Uand E. Uis a set of
variables, each of which corresponds to an event: a variable may be binary, in which
case a value of 1 means that the corresponding event occurs, 0 that it does not; or
a variable may be multivalued, in which case its values are particular (not-too-far-
fetched) alterations of it. The notion of an alteration is taken from Lewis 2000 (Section
8
Pearl (2000) has a counterfactual analysis of particular-event causation that, as Hitchcock notes, is similar
to Hitchcock’s. But it is more complex than Hitchcock’s, and what I have to say about Hitchcock s would,
1 believe, carry over to it anyway, so 1 have not taken it up here.
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4.9, above): an alteration of an event e is either an event with strict occurrence
conditions that is similar to how e actually occurred, or it is the nonoccurrence of e 9
Sis a set of structural equations relating the values of the variables in V. Structural
equations come in two forms. (Variables are represented by italicized capital letters.)
Some take the form X= x—they merely state the actual value of the variable. Others
express the value of a variable as a function of the values of other variables (in V):
Z =fz(X; Y,...,W). Such an equation encodes a set of counterfactuals of the form, “Were
it the case that X = x, Y=y, . . . , W = w, then it would be the case that X y, . . . , w).”
(This is why the equations are “structural”—unlike mathematical equations, they are not
reversible.) Thus the equation reveals how Z’s value would vary given variations in
values of the variables on the right side of the equation. (For this sort of equation, the
variables X,Y,...,W are called parents of Z.) The correct equation of this sort for a
variable Z can be constructed by first expressing the value of Z as a function of all other
variables in Land then deleting those variables whose values make no difference to Z
given every assignment of values to the other variables (p. 281). The equation for Z will
thus tell us precisely which variables Z is counterfactually sensitive to given certain
values of other variables in V. (Every variable in Lis to appear on the left-hand side of
exactly one equation in £.)
As an example, Hitchcock models a preemption story like the one above in which
Lucy refrains from throwing her dart because she sees me throw—without my throw, the
9
Lewis calls them “absences,” not “nonoccurrences.” For Lewis, to say that an absence (alteration) occurs
is just to say that the event does not occur; so an absence, or nonoccurrence, is not itself an event. But
Hitchcock does not comment on what it is (or isn’t).
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balloon-pop would have occurred anyway, by way of Lucy’s throw. Let the variable C
be 0 or 1 according to whether I throw my dart, L is 0 or 1 according to whether Lucy
throws, £ is 0 or 1 according to whether the pop occurs. The set of equations can be this:
C ~ L — 1—C, E — max{L, C} The first says that I throw. The second says that the
value ofL would be 0 if C were 1, but 1 if C were 0—that is, Lucy would throw if I were
not to, but she wouldn’t if I were to. The third equation says that £’ s value would be 1 if
either L s or C s were 1, but 0 ifL s and C s were both 0—that is, the pop would occur if
either Lucy or I were to throw, though not if neither were to.
A route between two variables X and Z is a sequence of variables fromX to Z where
each member of the sequence is a parent of the next. Hitchcock sometimes refers to this
as a “causal route.” A variable is intermediate betweenX and Z iff it is distinct from X
and Z and it belongs to a route betweenX and Z. In the model just described, we can see
two routes from C to E: <C, E> and <C, L, E>. In the second, but not the first, L is
intermediate between C and E.
The notion of an active route is central:
The route <X, Y],..., Yn , Z> is active in the causal model <V, E> iff Z depends
counterfactually uponX within the new system of equations S'constructed from
E as follows: for all Y e V, if Y is intermediate betweenX and Z, but does not
belong to the route <X, Yj,..., Yn , Z>, then replace the equation for Y with a new
equation that sets Y equal to its actual value in E. (If there are no intermediate
variables that do not belong to this route, then £'is just E) (p. 286)
The idea is that a route fromX to Z is active if, perhaps holding fixed certain actual
values of variables along other routes fromX to Z, Z’s value would have differed ifA’s
had. In the model above, we can see that <C, E> is active. Notice that L is intermediate
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between C and E but does not belong to <C, E>. So we replace the equation for L with
= 0 ” S,nce now 1 equal s 0, E equals 0 or 1 according to whether C equals 0 or 1
(because E = max{C, L }) and this is the “counterfactual dependence within the new
system of equations.” One can see that the activity of <C, E> is revealed by this pair of
ordinary-English counterfactuals: If Lucy were not to throw and I were to throw, the
pop would occur”, “If Lucy were not to throw and I were not to throw, the pop would not
occur. These are, of course, just the pair in virtue of which the pop is situationally
dependent on my throw.
Where variables C and E correspond to distinct events c and e,c is a cause of e iff
there is an active causal route from C to E in an appropriate causal model.
Appropriateness has “at least” three components (p. 287): the equations in the model
must entail no false counterfactuals, the dependence relations represented must be
between distinct events (no definition of distinctness is given); and where the variables
are multivalued, their values should not be alterations that we consider far-fetched.
In the multivalued case, it is clear that one of the objections I lodged against Lewis
2000 (Section 4.10) would also apply: the throw of the rock that slips through the hole in
the glass comes out a cause of the shattering, since alterations of it would yield alterations
in the shattering. However, objections that turned on Lewis’s use of an ancestral relation
would not. For instance, on both analyses, putting food-coloring in the poisoned drink
comes out a cause of the drinking of a green poisoned drink (close alterations in the
former yield alterations in the latter), and this drinking in turn comes out a cause of the
death; Lewis’s transitive analysis will therefore count the addition of food-coloring a
cause of the death, but Hitchcock’s will not, since there is nothing F to hold fixed such
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that if close alterations of the coloring occurred but still F held, non-actual alterations of
the death would have occurred
As for the binary case, the analysis cannot clearly handle aftereffect preemption. For
there are cases where there seems to be nothing to hold fixed to gain dependence other
than the nonoccurrence of the late version of the effect, and—as I will explain—
Hitchcock s analysis does not allow this. Let me give a precise illustration of the sort of
case I mean—call it an instance of tight aftereffectpreemption. Suppose time is discrete
Let e be the firing of “neuron” N, an event that could occur at t2 or t3 . Say that, by law,
upon being stimulated neurons fire for one unit of time, whereupon they vanish (at the
next time they do not exist). Imagine that at tu N is directly fired upon (c) by one
(stimulatory) neuron, and N fires (e) in reaction immediately after, at t2 . However, also at
h, yet another neuron fires directly upon N, but N does not fire at t3 , since N is gone then.
So c is a cause of e, but without c, e would have occurred anyway, at t3 . If c had not
occurred and yet N’s firing at t3 had still not occurred, e would not have occurred—by
holding fixed the failure of the backup version of the effect, we get the needed
dependence. The only thing one might call a failure in the backup process preceding (the
backup version of) the effect is the nonoccurrence ofN being present in a resting state at
t2 . But hold fixed this nonoccurrence and it is far from clear you get the needed result:
“If c hadn’t occurred and (still) N’s resting presence at t2 had not occurred, then e
wouldn’t have occurred”—this seems false, because it seems that in the antecedent
situation, N might be firing at t2 . (“Might”? Well, someone may suggest that the
nonoccurrence ofN’s resting presence at t2 might hold in virtue ofN being absent
altogether at t2, in which case e does not occur. I am willing to entertain that this might
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be how that nonoccurrence is realized, but that this is what would happen seems very
artificial.) Now, Hitchcock requires intermediate variables on a route to be “distinct”
from the other variables on that route, by which he means, in the binary case, that the
events corresponding to those variables are essentially distinct. 10 Hence the
nonoccurrence of the late version of the effect could not be held fixed, as it is never
intermediate between cause C and effect E u Perhaps we could alter the definition of
“intermediate” to fix this. 12 But notice that now the intuitive picture is sullied. The
intuitive idea was supposed to be that we gain dependence by holding fixed
(non)occurrences of causal-route intermediates between c and e; but a potential version of
the effect is not naturally taken to be such an intermediate.
There may also be a need to hold fixed the nonoccurrence of a backup cause that is
not an intermediate between cause and effect. There is a worry (e g., Hall 1997) that
sometimes were the cause not to occur, some of the events that might occur in its place
are ones that would be followed by the effect. For example, suppose a lone dart thrower
also had a knife and a crochet needle at hand. It seems reasonable to think, “The dart
flight was a cause of the balloon pop, though if the dart flight hadn’t occurred, a knife
flight might have occurred (causing the pop anyway).” Clearly, if the dart flight hadn’t
occurred, and still the knife and needle flights hadn’t, the pop wouldn’t have—so the
lu
If instead he meant actually distinct, then he would have systemic troubles due to the fact that every
nonoccurrent event is actually distinct from itself (since it does not actually have any parts).
1
1
And clearly it is not something we would intuitively count as an intermediate on a causal route to E.
Hitchcock has confirmed (in correspondence) that he does not intend to allow holding fixed the
nonoccurrence of a version of the effect.
12 We may also need to narrow the interpretation of one of the elements of appropriateness for a model, that
equations represent counterfactual relationships between “distinct” events only. I presume that, like most
writers, by “distinct” he means essentially distinct. But it would need to mean actually. What ripple
effects this blanket liberalization might have on the analysis I am not sure.
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situational-dependence analysis readily yields the correct verdict. On Hitchcock’s
account, the knife and needle flights cannot be held fixed, because they are not
intermediate between cause and effect: intuitively they are not intermediate, but also
formally (the requisite equations are not there, since the equations only encode “would”-
dependence and we only have that the knife (needle) flight might have occurred without
the dart flight). So it seems Hitchcock’s analysis and the intuitive picture it serves may
be too narrow to be adequate.
Here is another illustration of the wider applicability of situational dependence. As
we have seen in earlier chapters, in indeterministic settings sometimes a backup process
just fails on its own, not as a result of the cause (and so there is no preemption). For
example, picture two slightly radioactive samples, A and B, placed before a Geiger
counter; the counter clicks once within the next minute; the placement of A caused the
click, since A emitted a particle; even though we cannot say that the click depended on
A’s placement, we can say that, given the lack of emissions from B, without A’s
placement the click wouldn’t have occurred. Here there are not two routes from A’s
placement to the click, but rather the processes are independent. In these two illustrations
of the larger usefulness of situational dependence, we see we can hold fixed the failures
of other potential processes whether or not those failures are effects of the cause, this, I
think, is what makes it more useful
5.6 Stephen Yablo’s Analysis
Stephen Yablo (2002) proposes to equate event causation with a relation he calls “de
facto dependence.” Let’s begin with a few background definitions. For any fact G, G is
a cause maker iff, for some c and e, had c not occurred but G still held, e would not have
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occurred. “One can see how it would create a presumption in favor of c’s causing e that e
depends on it modulo a factual condition G” (p. 134 ).
From the time of some event c, the way things would have gone had c not occurred is
thefallback scenario, and the way they actually went is the actual scenario.
e s actual needs given G are the events x in the actual scenario such that had x not
occurred but G still held, e would not have occurred. The intuitive idea here is that G is a
circumstance that puts e in need of x.
e^fallback needs with respect to c are the events in the fallback scenario that e would
have (outright) depended on had c not occurred. Fallback needs are not relative to a
cause maker.
From what we have seen in previous Sections, it is clear that threat/savior events and
switches are the final effect’s actual needs for some G. But Yablo does not want to count
threat/savior events as causes, and there are some switches he does not want to count (he
does want to count others, as we will see). These events, he points out, make themselves
needed: the switch prevents one process, which is the only reason it is “needed” (to
deliver the other process), the threat/savior is only needed because of the threat that it
itself produced. The events are responsible for altering the circumstances such that they
become essential, though they would not otherwise be. Thus the “need” for them is
“artificial.” This notion of artificiality gets defined as follows.
Suppose c is an actual need of e (given some G). Fact H makes the need for c
artificial iff e’s fallback needs with respect to c coincide with a c-ffee subset of e’s actual
needs given H. (
H
may be G, but it need not.) The idea is that what e would have needed
without c are all still actually needed—and c itself does not actually meet any of those
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needs (more on ‘meeting needs” later). In the king example, had the addition of poison
(c) not occurred but still there was poison in the drink later (G), the king’s breath (e)
would not have occurred. So c is an actual need of e (given G). Is the need for c
artificial? Had c not occurred, e would have depended on the king’s earlier breaths, on
his earlier meals, on his having defeated foes in battle last month,
.
. .
.
These are the
fallback needs with respect to c. But e still depends on these very events in actuality, so
where H is, say, the fact that 2 = 2, e’s actual needs given H are e’s fallback needs with
respect to c. Thus H makes the need for c artificial (p. 136).
The fallback needs with respect to an event can never contain that event, because by
definition that event does not occur in the fallback scenario, so if e’s fallback needs with
respect to c coincide with a subset of the actual needs given H, don’t they coincide with a
c-free subset? Well, a fallback need might have actual-need c as a “counterpart.”
Yablo explains that subsets “coinciding” can be a matter of their members having
“counterparts” in the other set, rather than identity. Counterparts are events that meet the
same need. They are to be paired off “in ways that preserve salient features of the case:
energy expended, distance traveled, time taken, place in the larger structure of needs” (p.
137). He gives the example of someone who needs to consume H20 and actually gets it
via Italian ice but would (in the fallback scenario) have gotten it via a glass of water
—
these two ingestions may be different events, but they meet the same need (one coincides
with the other). (“Need” is never explicitly defined.)
The strategy now is to count as causes events that meet needs not exposed as artificial
by anyH that satisfies a certain condition. Specifically, if the only Hs that make a need
artificial are facts less “natural” than all the Gs given which c is a need, then c is a cause.
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(The concept of naturalness is left intuitive for the paper. 13 ) One event defacto depends
on another iff it is put in need of the other by a G more natural than any Hs exposing the
need as artificial (p. 138). Causation is de facto dependence between distinct, occurrent
events.
Where is the danger that an H might make the need for a clear cause come out
artificial, but the cause is saved by the fact that the H is relatively unnatural? Yablo does
not suggest an example, and I have not thought of one
Why allow any unnatural-seeming facts? Yablo wants to be able to count non-
preemptive overdeterminers as causes, to count some switchings as causes, to count
trumping events as causes, and to count events with very extrinsic occurrence conditions
as effects (not that he refers to them as having extrinsic occurrence conditions, but they
do, his example (p. 142) is like “Paul’s bullet” (Section 3.4.2.2 2).) For this, he needs
flexibility in what kind of fact G or H can be—as we will see, he relies on facts involving
negative extrinsic properties of events, which seem pretty unnatural. (This is my answer
to the question. I cannot say for sure what Yablo ’s answer would be.)
Yablo applies the theory to preemption using the example of two rock-throwers.
Suzy’s rock breaks the window and Billy’s then sails through the empty frame. If Suzy’s
throw (c) had not occurred and still Billy’s rock did not touch the window (G), then the
shattering (e) would not have occurred. G puts e in need of c. Is the need artificial? Ifc
had not occurred, e would have depended on Billy’s throw, his rock traveling toward the
window, etc. “These [needs] would seem to recur in the actual situation as needs for
Suzy’s throw, her rock’s traveling toward the window, and so on. But then Suzy’s throw
13
Yablo says he is following Lewis in taking naturalness seriously as a metaphysical tool. See Lewis 1983.
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meets the same need as was met in the fallback scenario by Billy’s throw. The need was
thus preexisting; it would still have had to be met even if Suzy had elected not to throw”
(p. 138). I take it that the point here is that the fallback needs do not coincide with a c-
free subset of the actual needs given the above G, since Billy’s throw coincides only with
Suzy s throw. But this is only to ask whether G itself makes the need for c artificial,
Yablo does not explore whether some other circumstance might do so. I do not see any,
probably if one does, it will be trickier, and less natural, than G.
Yablo does not raise the question of whether Billy’s preempted throw will come out a
cause on the analysis. But it appears it will not. Billy’s throw appears to be an actual
need only given a rather unnatural-seeming G: if it (c) hadn’t occurred, and still Suzy’s
throw did not occur unaccompanied (G), the shattering wouldn’t have occurred. Is there
a more or equally natural H that makes the need artificial? The shattering’s fallback
needs with respect to c are Suzy’s throw, the journey of her rock, the earlier presence of
glass, etc. But where H is that Billy’s rock does not touch the window, we saw that the
shattering depends on each of these events given H. So the fallback needs coincide with
a c-ffee subset of the actual needs given H—H makes the need for c artificial. H looks
more natural than G (since G is negative, I would say).
We are supposed to be able to count standard non-preemptive overdeterminers as
causes in the following way. Let the example be one in which both rocks hit the window
at the same time. The shattering depends on Suzy’s throw given the fact Gs that Billy’s
rock does not hit the window unaccompanied, and on Billy’s throw given the fact G# that
Suzy’s rock does not hit unaccompanied (pp. 139-40). Is the need for, say, Billy’s throw
artificial? The fallback needs are Suzy’s throw, the flight of her rock, the earlier presence
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of glass, etc. We can use Gs to make Billy’s throw artificial: given that Billy’s rock does
not hit alone (Gs), the shattering is dependent on each of the fallback needs GB makes
Billy’s throw a need, but Gs makes it artificial. Clearly we have a tie for naturalness.
But then according to the definition of de facto dependence, the shatteringfails to de
facto depend on Billy’s throw. Yablo says that “more natural than” is open to
interpretation: sometimes we may have in mind “strictly more natural,” other times “at
least as natural as” (p. 140). Thus we can count non-preemptive overdeterminers as
causes, though we waver in accordance with our wavering between interpretations (I
will have a comment on this later.)
Again by way of negative extrinsic predicates, Yablo counts trumping events as
causes. We have the example where the prince’s fate corresponds to the content of the
first spell (Schaffer 2000b). Merlin casts a frog spell, then Morgana casts a frog spell.
Holding fixed that no one who is not Merlin casts a first spell, if Merlin’s spell hadn’t
occurred, the prince would not have become a frog. No equally or more natural H
exposing the need as artificial presents itself, says Yablo (though he admits he cannot
rule it out). But what ifH is that Merlin’s spell does not occur unaccompanied? Given
H, the effect depends on Morgana’ s spell and on the earlier presence of the prince, these
are the fallback needs with respect to Merlin’s spell, so H makes the need artificial. I
don’t see that H is less natural than G. If they are equally natural, then according to
Yablo we should waver, as we do for clear cases of non-preemptive overdetermination.
Also, it seems to me that Morgana’s spell is no worse a candidate for cause on this
theory. It is an actual need given H, and I see no more natural fact that makes this need
artificial: the fallback needs are Merlin’s spell and the earlier presence of the prince,
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given that Morgana’ s spell does not occur alone, these are still needed, but this given
does not appear to be relatively natural Rather, it again looks like a tie. (Yablo does not
consider whether his theory will count Morgana’ s spell a cause.)
The analysis is supposed to count switches that make a “big” difference as causes, but
not other switches. The idea is that the train journey along the branch not taken is a
fallback need that is still needed in the actual scenario, because the journey on the actual
branch is a counterpart of it, though if there were a big difference between the two
branches, this counterpart relation would not hold, and the fallback needs would not all
be subsumed by actual ones. Yablo points to Hall’s example of “Billy’s Kiss” (Hall
2000, p. 209): Suzy kisses Billy, so Billy takes the scenic route home instead of doing
his errands, he whistles a happy tune; the whistling would have occurred anyway without
the kiss, because Billy would have heard that tune in the store and it would have stuck in
his head. We want to count the kiss a cause of the whistling. A fallback need is hearing
the tune in the store, this does not occur as an actual need because it does not actually
occur and no counterpart of it occurs either.
This attempt to count only some switchings seems strained, to me. Suppose that
without the kiss, Billy would have thought about his great new job, walked a different
route and then whistled as a result of these happy job-thoughts. It still seems to me that,
since he actually whistled as a result of happy girl-thoughts, the kiss was a cause of his
whistling, but it also seems that the two happy-thought strolls are counterparts, that they
meet the same need. So it seems Yablo has not found the correct dividing line.
As for its causal verdicts, I conclude that the theory is no improvement over others
with respect to trumping and that it does not appear to achieve what it sets out to achieve
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with respect to switching. With respect to threat/savior cases, some will like Yablo’s
results, but I, as I said, prefer to count those cases as causation. The standard non-
preemptive overdetermination result is good.
But I must say I find the motivation for this last result intuitively alien. It seems to me
that the fact that Suzy’s throw does not occur alone is no part ofwhy I think Billy’s throw
is a cause (nor even of why I might be thinking of Billy’s throw as in some sense
“needed”).
More generally, it does not seem that we make comparisons involving negative
extrinsic predicates in judging whether some event was a cause, and for this reason the
theory lacks intuitive support. In judging that Lucy’s (preempted) decision to throw was
not a cause, did you entertain the fact that the only way it is needed is via a rather
unnatural-seeming G (e g., that my throw did not occur unaccompanied)?
The theory gets results in threat/savior cases that some may find attractive. But to me
the theory seems more complex, more subtle (due to “natural”) and less intuitive than the
theory I have proposed.
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CHAPTER 6
TOWARD AN ANALYSIS FOR PURELY INDETERMINISTIC WORLDS
6.1 Introduction
Just as an analysis for deterministic worlds may be helpful in finding an analysis
suitable for all worlds, so, too, may an analysis for purely ///deterministic worlds worlds
where at any given time, any possible future pattern of events has some non-zero chance
In addition to being stepping stones, analyses for these two extremes are of some interest
in themselves: they may analyze species of our causal concept that correspond to ways
we habitually think about the world—sometimes as deterministic, sometimes as purely
indeterministic. Despite the great attention that deterministic analyses have received, an
analysis for purely indeterministic worlds is, I think, in line with the more common way
people naturally think about the world: nothing really has no probability; the freaky and
miraculous are just very improbable. In this chapter, I offer an analysis of causation for
purely indeterministic worlds. In contrast with the deterministic analysis of Chapter 5,
my proposal here is rather inelegant and, as we will see, at points not fully motivated.
Hence the title of this chapter.
6.2 Obstacles to Be Overcome
Very roughly, the idea behind the analysis is that causes are connected to effects by a
chain of (a kind of) direct causation, where “nonoccurrences” may be intermediate links,
this direct causation is primarily a matter of making the direct effect more probable. Let
us first consider the difficulties of this general approach, and get a hint of how they can
be solved. There are six to consider, the first two of which we have already encountered.
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#1) We saw that a preempting cause may make the effect less probable by threatening
to prevent a much more reliable alternate process to the effect. This can happen even in
cases of direct causation: the whole unreliable-but-successful process up to the effect is a
direct cause without which the effect might have been equally or more probable. For
example, in the dart-throw preemption case from previous chapters, if Lucy’s dart is
sharp and mine is dull, the chance of the balloon-pop might have been greater without my
dart flight (at the time at the end ofthe flight), because Lucy’s sharper dart might have
been in play instead of mine.
I have pressed, however, that preemption always involves some failure in the backup
process (here, a missing dart flight). We will see that my analysis will take advantage of
these failures when assessing probabilities. The basic idea will be, given the
incompleteness in the backup process (Lucy’s dart flight), the successful process does
make the effect more probable.
#2) We also saw the problem of failed potential causes. Sometimes a potential causal
process leading to the effect fails to complete, so that it, and its parts, make the effect
more probable but do not cause it. Such a would-be cause can occur simultaneously
with a direct cause, so that there is no hope of locating genuine direct causes just by the
times of their chance-contributions. We saw this in Figure 4. 1 : the non-cause c makes e
more probable, and c occurs simultaneously with b. We saw it also in overlapping
(Section 3 .4 1).
But failed potential causes of an event e are failed in virtue of failing to cause other
things, be it potential causal intermediates—/, in Figure 4 1—or, in the case of
overlapping, other effects besides e—the queen turning into a frog, in the overlapping
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example. Again, we can hold fixed these failures, and the troublesome chance-
contributions go away: given the nonoccurrence of the intermediate (/), c does not
make e more probable, given the nonoccurrence of the queen’s transformation, spell PQ
does not make the prince’s transformation more probable. (We will look at this more
closely later.)
#3) Here is an example we could count as a special kind of overlapping. Suppose that
without spell G or spell H, that the sad prince will become happy, turn green or become a
frog each has an independent chance of .01
. If spell G is cast alone, the chance of the
prince becoming a green frog is
.2, while the chance of him becoming happy is
unchanged; if spell H is cast alone, the chance of the prince becoming a happy frog is .2,
while the chance of him becoming green is unchanged. Neither spell improves the
chance that only one element of its corresponding pair (green/frog, happy/frog) will be
realized—it contributes only to the chance of the pair The occurrence of each pair is, in
any situation, probabilistically independent of the occurrence of the other pair’s elements
and of the occurrence of the other kind of spell—modulo the independent background
chances (for example, with no spells, the chance of a happy frog is .0001; add G, and it
must go up, to (.2 x .01) + (.8 x .0001), or .00208). Hence if both spells are cast, the
chance of the prince becoming a frog (be it green, happy, or both) is .36. Today, both
spells are cast, and the prince becomes a green, but still sad, frog. It seems that, since H
contributes only to the chance of the frog/happy pair (and what it contributes to the other
pair is only a byproduct of contributing to the frog/happy pair), it did not help, or was not
a cause of, the prince becoming a frog, though it made it more probable. (We can view
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this as a kind of condensed overlapping, where the pair of effects associated with each
spell is a pair that essentially occurs in one region.)
Again, this challenge will be met by holding fixed a certain failure: given that
happiness will not occur, H does not make the chance of the prince becoming a frog more
probable.
For the difficulties that follow, picture a simple causal setting, where there are not
competing processes leading to the effect.
#4) Suppose b+c is an event that occurs as long as either b or c occurs, though in fact
both b and c occur. Suppose a is a direct cause of b and makes b more probable, and c is
a direct cause ofd and makes d more probable (also, let a be probabilistically irrelevant
to c, and let b be probabilistically irrelevant to d) Then a will make b+c more probable,
and b+c will make d more probable (because in supposing away b+c, you have to
suppose away c); so a will come out a cause of d, even if it is not.
This problem is solved by requiring that an event contribute to the chance of every
sufficient part of e in order to be a direct cause of e. a does not contribute to the chance
of c, which is a sufficient part of b+c. The analysis I will propose is built upon this
requirement of chance-contribution to every sufficient part.
#5) In a purely chancy world, it seems that, for any event, had it not occurred, a great
variety of other events might have occurred in its place, since they all would have had
some non-zero chance. But then it may be that, without the direct cause d, the direct
effect might have been no less probable, thanks to one of these replacements.
Notice that the event consisting in the union ofd and all such nuisance replacements is
an event such that, without it, the direct effect would have been less probable. So there is
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no replacements problem for this weak direct cause. Since d is a non-proper part (Section
2.4) of this weak cause, we can count </ by allowing that every non-proper pan of a cause
is also a cause. This is how the analysis will deal with this problem
#6) Carl catches the ball that was headed for the window, so the catch is a cause of
the later presence of intact window. I was spraying red paint in the space between the
catch and the window. My spraying made the nonoccurrence of a blue rock-flight there
more probable, and it seems that the nonoccurrence of a blue rock-flight there made the
intact window presence more probable (because had a blue rock-flight occurred there, the
presence would have been very improbable). Yet my spraying was not a cause of the
window presence.
Notice that for the region between the catch and the window-presence there is a
strongest nonoccurrence that makes the window presence more probable, namely the
nonoccurrence of the event consisting in the union of events that would have made it less
probable: if this union had occurred, the chance of the window presence would have
been lower. This union includes projectile flights of various colors. While the spraying
increases the chance of a red flight, it correspondingly decreases the chance of a non-red
flight, and is therefore irrelevant to the chance of the strongest nonoccurrence. Carl’s
catch, though, makes this nonoccurrence more probable Hence we can exclude the
spraying by requiring that causes be connected to effects by chains of probability-raising
that involve strongest nonoccurrences only.
My analysis is based on the intuition that direct causes are “directly” positively
probabilistically relevant under the circumstances. In the next section, I will motivate
and give a definition of this sort of relevance. The first three problems above are solved
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via this special type of relevance. The analysis of causation will be built upon chains of
direct causation in which direct causes are relevant in this way to the chance of every
sufficient part of their direct effects (to handle problem #4) and the nonoccurrence links
are strongest ones only (#6)—unfortunately I have no clear motivation for these two
maneuvers, beyond their effectiveness. They do, however, seem to be ingredients in an
intuitive notion of “primary” responsibility: it is not the absence of a blue rock flight that
is primarily responsible for the window being intact, but rather the absence of anything
that could have broken it, it is not the whole event e that d is primarily responsible for if
there are sufficient parts of e (kind of like little e’s) that escape d s help. Those chains of
direct causation will be called chains of primary responsibility. Problem #5 is solved in
a last move—I just add that non-proper parts of causes are causes, as I trust is intuitive
enough.
6.3 Positive Relevance Under the Circumstances
Let A be a simple event proposition, either 0(a) or ~0(a). Likewise for B, C, D and
E. Where A is true, ifA is 0(a), then A 's region is the region in which a occurs, and ifA
is ~0(a), then ^4’s region is the union of regions in which a could possibly occur.
I want to begin with some intuitive remarks about probabilistic relevance, setting aside
any precise interpretations of the probabilistic expressions I use.
As I said, my analysis is based on the intuition that direct causes are “directly”
positively probabilistically relevant under the circumstances. Sometimes an event is
probabilistically relevant to another in virtue of its relevance to yet other events For
example, the gunshot makes the wound more probable in virtue of the fact that it makes
the flight of a bullet more probable. This is reflected in the fact that the flight makes the
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shot probabilistically irrelevant to the wound, or “screens off’ (Reichenbach) the shot
from the wound: the wound’s probability given the flight and the shot is equal to its
probability given the flight and no shot. We see this not only in indirect causes, but in
indirect effects: the wound makes the shot more probable, though only because it makes
a bullet flight more probable. And in forking effects: the bullet flight makes the sound of
a gunshot more probable, but only because it makes a gunshot more probable. In every
case, the “parasitic” nature of the probabilistic relevance is revealed by the fact that the
relevant event can be screened by some actual (pattern of) events (that excludes the two
events at issue). Perhaps we can define a kind of «o»-parasitic relevance, what we might
call “direct relevance,” in terms of an inability to be screened. Roughly, the idea would
be to say A is directly relevant to B given G (some true background conditions entailing
nothing about the A and B regions) iff (i) Px(B\G8lA) * Pr(£|G&~,4), and (ii) for any
conjunctionF of true event propositions (entailing nothing about the A and B regions),
Pt(B\G&F&A) * Px(B\G&F&~A).
With respect to the intuition of probabilistic relevance under the circumstances, I shall
interpret “the circumstances” very liberally. It will include the entire pattern of events
(past, present and future) outside the (candidate) direct cause and effect. Call this pattern
“0.” Notice that ifA is relevant to B given O, it is directly so: A is not screenable from B
given O, since O already entails every candidate conjunction F of true event propositions.
This relevance all-else-being-equal is a direct relevance. Therefore, once I define
positive relevance under the circumstances, I will have cashed out the intuition I started
with, that direct causes are “directly” positively relevant under the circumstances.
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Chances hold “at a time” in virtue of the (actual) spatiotemporal region that comprises
all of the past up through that time (Section 2.3). Ultimately it is the complete pattern of
events in this region, and the laws, that combine to entail some chance. Presumably other
patterns besides past ones up to a time can, with the laws, entail chances. Say that a
precise pattern of events is a set of true simple event propositions, where each involved
event is spatiotemporally inflexible. In addition to our chance function (Section 2.3) that
takes a world, a time and an event proposition, I presume there is a chance function that
takes a world, a pattern and an event proposition and delivers the correct chance of that
proposition.
I presume that the entire pattern of events outside B ’ s region (with the laws) entails a
chance of B, call this £’ s world-chance (and “6’s world-chance” ifB is 0(b)). Say A
contributes to B’s world-chance iff, were A not the case but everything outsider’s region
were exactly the same, J9’s world-chance would be lower than it actually is.
In addition to including O, the circumstances ofB will also include certain simple
event propositions whose regions are within B" s. Recall from the previous section that a
goal in holding things fixed is to assess probabilities in light of failed potential effects.
As far as I can see, every contributor to an event’s world-chance is a potential cause of it.
In order to get the right results, we will need to hold fixed the failures of potential effects
of a candidate direct cause, A; in holding fixed O, we get most of them, but we may also
need to hold fixed some within B’s region. We can locate these potential effects by
whether A contributes to their world-chances. Suppose A and B are true and distinct. Let
S be the set of all true simple spatiotemporally-inflexible-event propositions that do not
entail B. Construct pattern P as follows First, put in every member ofS whose region is
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outside B s actual region. Then, add any remaining failures of potential effects ofA. add
every remaining member such that A contributes to the world-chance of its negation. I
presume that P (with the laws) will entail a chance ofB—call this 5’s world-chance
modulo A ’sfailures. If there are no failures of potential effects ofA in 5’s region, then
the pattern that determines B' s world-chance modulo ^’s failures is the same pattern that
determines B' s world-chance. 1
Where A and B are true and their regions distinct, A is positively relevant to B under
the circumstances iff, were A not the case but everything outsider’s region were exactly
the same, B s world-chance modulo A s failures would be lower than it actually is For
short: A makes a circumstantial contribution to B Where A is 0(a), or B is 0(b), we can
also substitute the event for the proposition in the appropriate place: a makes a
circumstantial contribution to B, or to b, etc.
6.4 Primary Responsibility and Causation
The backbone of the analysis is a special chain of circumstantial contribution. I will
refer to it as a chain of primary responsibility. By definition, “A is primarily responsible
for B” means that (i) A and B are true, (ii) all ofA’s region is earlier than B’s, 2 and (iii)
the relevant following condition holds:
case 1: A is 0(a), B is 0(b): A makes a circumstantial contribution to every sufficient
part of b
' Thanks are due to Jonathan Schaffer for stimulating some of the refinements here.
2
This temporal move is, 1 confess, pretty ad hoc Assuming there is no such thing as causation at a
distance, it allows the analysis to differentiate direct causes from direct effects and from direct effects of a
common cause; but I am not sure what other motivation it has than that. (1 shall assume there is no such
thing as direct causation at a distance; as I said in Section 4.3, 1 am not confident that such causation is
metaphysically possible.)
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case 2: A is 0(a), B is 0(b). A makes a circumstantial contribution to every sufficient
part of b, this is not true for any strengthening ofA.
case 3: A is O(o), B is -O(b). A makes a circumstantial contribution to B
case 4: A is ~0(a), B is ~0(6): A makes a circumstantial contribution to B, this is not
true for any strengthening ofA
A chain of primary responsibility is a sequence of simple event propositions, each of
which (but the last) is primarily responsible for the next, c is cause of e iff c is a non-
proper part of some event cj such that there is a chain of primary responsibility from c,
to e.
A rock shatters a window. Let c be the release of the rock, let and d2 be the first
and second halves of the rock’s journey, and let e be the shattering, d,’ s world-chance is
high. Let us assume there are no significant failed potential effects ofA in B’s region.
Had c not occurred, but everything outside c’s region had remained unchanged, d?
s
world-chance might, let us say, have been even higher, because a more reliable release
might have occurred in c’s place. Consider the event/which is the union of c and all
such more reliable releases; had/ not occurred, but everything else outside the release’s
actual region had remained the same, then d\ s world-chance would have been lower than
it actually was. And it seems safe to say this about all of di’s sufficient parts. Sof makes
a circumstantial contribution to every sufficient part of dj. Since c is a non-proper part of
/, it comes out a cause of dj. di similarly makes a circumstantial contribution to every
sufficient part ofd2, and d2 to the shattering. Since c is a non-proper part of/, it is a non-
proper part of an event from which there is a chain of primary responsibility to e, hence it
comes out a cause of e.
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Notice that c does not make a circumstantial contribution to (every sufficient part of)
d2 . In supposing away c but leaving du d/s world-chance remains the same—because d,
screens c from d2 . Only direct causes make circumstantial contributions.
In cases of preemption, we have seen that the failed backup process is failed in virtue
of some occurrence or nonoccurrence outside the effect’s region. In assessing world-
chances, this failure will always be held fixed. Given this failure, the direct cause in the
successful process will make the effect more probable. For example, consider the two-
rock case. The circumstances of the shattering include the lack of a late shattering. The
shattering would be less likely in these circumstances if they did not include a last stage
of the first rock throw (or any window-threatening event of which that stage is a non-
proper part). Or consider the dart-throw case. The circumstances of the balloon-pop
include the lack of a second dart. The pop would be less likely in these circumstances if
they lacked the last stage of the first dart throw. The various diagrams of preemption in
previous chapters represent some neurons that fail to fire; it is easy to see that, given
these failures, the direct causes make the effects more probable in the relevant way.
Indirect causes then get counted by way of intermediate ones. (Nonoccurrence links will
fulfill the same function. We will look closely at some chains of that sort below.)
Occurrent preempted potential causes—or backups—will not be counted as causes. In
order for the effect to occur by way of the unsuccessful process, the aforementioned
failures need to occur—and they are either causally intermediate between the backups
and the effect or they are the version of the effect that marks the end of that process (e g.,
the late shattering) In its circumstances, which include the failure(s), the effect is no
more probable with the backup than without. For example, taking into account the lack
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of the late shattering, a late stage of the second rock throw does not make the (flexible)
shattering more probable in its circumstances.
Now consider the problem of failed potential causes. We have the type of case where
a potential indirect cause a makes the effect more probable at a’s time, but a is still not a
cause the presence of a radioactive sample makes the Geiger counter’s “click” more
probable, but the click is caused by a different sample (Section 3.4.1). This problem
evaporates, because the inactive sample is only a potential indirect cause—the click is not
more probable in its circumstances thanks to the samples, because the flight of the
particle from one sample and the lack of such a flight from the other screen the samples
from the click.
Then there is the overlapping type of case. Here is Jonathan Schaffer’s example again
(as adapted for pure indeterminism). One wizard casts spell PK, which is of a type that
generates a .5 chance of the prince and the king becoming frogs, while another casts PQ,
which is of a type that generates a .5 chance of the prince and the queen becoming frogs
(these chances are the chances at the time of spells); the occurrence of each
transformation pair is, in any situation, probabilistically independent of the occurrence of
the other and of the occurrence of the other type of spell, modulo the independent
background chances; and neither spell contributes to the chance that only one of its
potential victims becomes a frog. So the prince’s chance of becoming a frog is .75. As it
turns out, the king and prince, but not the queen, turn into frogs. So it seems PK was a
cause of the prince becoming a frog, even though both spells made it more probable at
the time they were cast
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But PQ does not make a circumstantial contribution to the prince’s transformation.
The world-chance of that transformation is the same with or without PQ, because it holds
fixed that the queen does not turn, given that she does not turn, PQ does not make the
prince’s transformation more probable. (Think of it in terms of evidence. You don’t
know whether the prince turned, and you’re wondering the probability of it. At first you
know only that PK occurred and that the king turned. Then you learn that the queen did
not turn. You now know that even ifPQ occurred, it did not “help” anything, if the
prince turned, it was either independently or thanks to PK; to learn now that PQ occurred
does not increase your confidence in the proposition that the prince turned.)3
Consider now the condensed overlapping case (problem #3), the story of the sad green
frog. Spell H contributes to the world-chance of a happy frog; but the frog was not
happy. Here the pattern that determines the world-chance of the effect modulo H’s
failures includes the nonoccurrence of a happy frog. Given the effect’s surroundings, and
also the lack of a happy frog, the chance of there being a frog is the same with or without
H. The case is analogous to that of the previous paragraph.
The analysis implies that a direct cause makes a circumstantial contribution to every
sufficient part of the effect, that a non-proper part of a cause is also a cause, and that
nonoccurrences involved in chains of primary responsibility are only the strongest
version that will serve. These were what were needed to overcome problems #4-6. Let’s
look closely at #6.
3
Does PK count as a cause? One might think that it does not because given the king’s transformation, the
world-chance of the prince’s is 1 with or without A But we are restricting ourselves to purely
indeterministic worlds, wherein every pattern of events is legal. Thus no world-chance is 1. There is some
chance of the king turning without the prince doing so, whether PK occurs or not, though if PK occurs this
is less likely. PK contributes to the effect’s world-chance: the effect’s circumstances would, if they lacked
PK, make the effect less likely.
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The spraying of red paint apparently raised the chance (at its time) of there being no
blue rock flight up to the window, which nonoccurrence in turn raised the chance of the
(intact) window-presence, though truly the spraying is not a cause of the window-
presence We want the catch that saved the window to come out a cause, but not the
spraying. Consider the surrounding circumstances of the window-presence. If they
included a blue rock flight up to the window, they would make (every sufficient part of)
the window-presence less probable, so the nonoccurrence of such a flight does makes a
circumstantial contribution (the nonoccurrence of a blue rock-flight does not contribute to
the world-chances of any window-region goings on that failed). However, in order for
this nonoccurrence to be primarily responsible for the window-presence, there needs to
be no strengthening of it that makes such a contribution
—
yet one does. For there is a
strongest nonoccurrence—the nonoccurrence of all the events conducive of window-
breaking—such that the window-presence’s chance would be lower without this
nonoccurrence (that is to say, with one of those events). If the spraying is to come out a
cause, it will have to be primarily responsible for this strong nonoccurrence—it will have
to make a circumstantial contribution to it (case 3). It appears not to, however. Here we
have to hold fixed the lack of a red flight, since the spraying contributes to the world-
chance of such a flight. Given the surroundings and the lack of a red flight, the chance of
the strong window-threatening nonoccurrence is no higher with the spraying than
without. The catch, on the other hand, does contribute to the chance of it (here there is no
need to hold fixed things in B's region).
We saw the following challenge to transitivity earlier (Section 4.9): adding green
food-coloring to the poisoned drink caused the drinking of a green, poisoned drink, and
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this drinking in turn caused a death, but the addition of food-coloring was not a cause of
that death. The challenge carries over to the probabilistic approach: on the face of it, the
addition of food-coloring makes that drinking of a green, poisoned drink more probable
(at the time of the addition), and that drinking makes the death more probable. Let’s
make sure my proposal is not vulnerable to this attack.
If the (essentially) green drinking had not occurred, other deadly events might have
occurred in its place, such as yellow drinkings, scalding-hot drinkings,
.... But there is a
weakening of the green drinking that includes such alternates and without which the
world-chance of the death would have been lower (throughout this example, we do not
need to hold fixed anything in 5’s region). Call this event d. It is c/ that makes a
circumstantial contribution, not the green drinking. For the addition of food-coloring to
be a cause, it has to be (a non-proper part of) an event that makes a circumstantial
contribution to every sufficient part ofd But it is not: it does not make one to the
drinking that is only accidentally green.
6.5 Regrets
As I said, in my opinion the analysis is less elegant than we should like, and certain
maneuvers are not adequately motivated. There may be a further shortcoming In
Section 5.4. 1 we saw this example: A safe is falling towards a doughnut on the sidewalk,
I bump the doughnut left a foot, so Squash occurs in region S instead of R. Let R-squash
and S-squash be squashes that essentially occur in R and S, respectively. Squash, the
effect at issue, is more flexible and could occur in either region. If the world is
deterministic, then we might say this: (Q) “If the bump hadn’t occurred but still R-
squash hadn’t occurred. Squash wouldn’t have occurred.” IfQ is true, then the bump is a
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cause of Squash, since it is situationally dependent on it. I pointed out, however, that
there is flexibility in the situational dependence analysis, since we might not want to
accept Q. we might take it that, in the antecedent situation. Squash occurring somewhere
besides R (say, in S) is no more far-fetched than its failing to occur at all. This sort of
flexibility is lacking in the purely indeterministic analysis, because the bump contributes
to the world-chance of Squash (given the lack of R-squash in the circumstances, Squash
is more probable with the bump than without). This lack of flexibility is a result of how
precisely the analysis dictates the nature of its counterfactual comparisons. Perhaps the
analysis is not as flexible as it ought to be.
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